1967

1076

VOL VIII

(1 AUG – 24 AUG)

File No. 1076

~~FO 371/215~~

FO 174/403

Name of File—

INTER. ARAB AFFAIRS

AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

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1076

(1883) D. 156230 177M 10/65 P.I. Gp. 610

1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag: Cy/CAT'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 409 D M

[Date] 2 AUG R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 785 OF 2 AUGUST

R F I AMMAN BEIRUT JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT

TEL AVIV TRIPOLI BENGHAZI TUNIS AND SAVING TO

A.L. Southon 3.VIII

UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW.

ARAB-ISRAEL

H. of C. Jus 3/8
I.O. 2/8
D.A. 3/8 V19
DISTRIBUTION

THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH OF JUL23 AND THE AUSTERITY BUDGET WHICH FOLLOWED FELL RATHER FLAT AND TOMORROWS MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AROUSES SCANT ENTHUSIASM. IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN I HAVE BEEN GETTING A GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT THE EGYPTIANS. WHILE REFUSING THE HUMILIATION OF ANY FORMAL PEACE WITH ISRAEL. WOULD LIKE TO PATCH UP SOME SETTLEMENT AND RETURN TO A MODERATE POSITION BETWEEN THE EASTERN BLOC AND THE USA.

/2. The speech

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

2.THE SPEECH OF THE 23RD AND HEIKALS GLOSS OF THE 28TH.HAVE OF COURSE BEEN COMBED BY MY COLLEAGUES FOR EVIDENCE.AND SOME OF IT IS PRETTY SLIM.FOR EXAMPLE.IT WAS NATURAL THAT NASSER SHOULD AVOID ATTACKS ON THE MODERATE ARABS OR TALK OF SACRIFICES BY THEM:AND REFER TO LONG- TERM STRUGGLE RATHER THAN EARLY WAR AT THIS JUNCTURE.THE PASSAGE ON USA COMPLICITY WAS READ OUT IN A FLAT TONE.BUT LATER PASSAGES.EG ABOUT THE ZIONIST IMPERIALIST MACHINATIONS AGAINST THE REVOLUTION WERE RAPID AND VEHEMENT. HIS REJECTION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY HELP CAN HARDLY TO MY MIND BE READ AS A SLAP AT THE RUSSIANS.IT MAY PERHAPS HAVE BEEN INTENTIONAL THAT WE WERE BARELY MENTIONED(SEE MYTEL 752 NOT RPT NOT TO ALL)AND THE WEST GERMANS NOT RPT NOT AT ALL. I HESITATE TO ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO SUCH POINTS:THERE HAD TO BE A SPEECH ON JUL23 AND THE PRESIDENT HAD LITTLE ROOM TO MANOEUVRE.

an acceptance of the inevitable?

3.IT HAS BEEN NOTED HERE THAT MFA UNDER SECRETARY FEKI.AT AN ADDRESS THE OTHER DAY TO CORRESPONDENTS AND DIPLOMATS INVITED TO SEE AN ATROCITY FILM.SAID THAT THE CANAL COULD BE OPENED WHEN ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN AND THAT THE UAR WERE THEN PREPARED TO

/discuss

DISCUSS ANY PRO- BLEMS.THIS IS PER/HAPS NOT RPT NOT
QUITE THE SAME AS SAYING THE WITH DRAWAL MUST BE
ABSOLUTELY UNCONDITIONAL.BUT THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR
TOLD ME HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE UAR WERE NOW
MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE IN THEIR ATTITUDE.THE TURK
AMBASSADOR HAS AGAIN TOLD ME THE SAME THING AT SOME
LENGTH.BOTH ARE SUSPECT OF SOMB BIAS(THOUGH EQUALLY
BOTH HAVE AN INTEREST IN A SOLUTION).MORE IMPRESSIVELY
THE GOVERNOR OF THE EGYPTIAN CENTRAL BANK HAS
SPOKEN TO ME IN MUCH THE SAME TERMS IN A RATHER
SURREPTITIOUS RENEWAL OF OUR FRIENDSHIP.HE IS A
SENSIBLE BUT SINCERE PATRIOT WITH STRAIGHTFORWARD
MOTIVES.HE REFUSED TO SEE THINGS IN TERMS OF
~~QUOTE~~ "MODERATE" ~~UNQUOTE~~ POLICIES OR CONFLICTING
PARTIES(AND INDEED SPOKE WITH DISCERNIBLE DISDAIN
OF ~~QUOTE~~ "THE SMALL PRO-AMERICAN GROUP" ~~UNQUOTE~~ HERE).
BUT HE SAW THE RENEWAL OF TRADE AND FINANCIAL
CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AS VITAL.AND THOUGHT A
MODUS VIVENDI COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH ISRAEL BUT
NOT RPT NOT IF THE AMERICANS INSISTED ON RUBBING
EGYPTIAN NOSES IN THE MUD.HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS
SHOWED LITTLE IMAGINATION OR FORESIGHT.

14. The feeling

4. THIS FEELING THAT THE AMERICANS CAN NO RPT NO LONGER SEE STRAIGHT ON THE MIDEAST KEEPS CROPPING UP. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT ONE BARRIER TO ANY SORT OF NEGOTIATION WAS THE FEELING HERE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DECIDED THAT THEIR MIDEAST OBJECTIVES WERE NOT RPT NOT COMPATIBLE WITH NASSERS REMAINING IN POWER. TURK AMBASSADOR, HOWEVER, AFTER CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SYRIAN COLLEAGUE, THINKS THAT THE SYRIANS AND ALGERIANS ARE DELIBERATELY FOMENTING THIS ATTITUDE.

5. ON THE INTERNAL FRONT IT SEEMS REASONABLY WELL ATTESTED THAT MOHIEDDIN AND PEOPLE LIKE FAWZI AND KAISSUNI ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE MOMENT. AND THAT ALI SABRI IS AT LEAST BEING KEPT UNDER WRAPS. THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE ABOLITION OF PRIVILEGE (ESPECIALLY ARMY PRIVILEGE) AND (IF HEIKAL IS TO BE TRUSTED) GREATER GUARANTEES OF PERSONAL LIBERTY. THIS MUST BE MAINLY FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION THOUGH IT IS NO RPT NM DOUBT MEANT TO BE READ AND NOTED BY THE WEST TOO AS A SIGN OF GRACE. FOR ALL THIS WE ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT INTELLIGENT EGYPTIANS FEEL THAT POLICY HAS COME TO A DEAD END. SACRIFICES ARE BEING

passed for

ASKED FOR WITHOUT ANY CLEAR PROSPECT OF A RESULT.

THE FEELING TAKES THEM VARIOUS WAYS BUT A GENERAL

IMPRESSION IS THAT THINGS CANNOT RPTNOT GO ON AS

THEY ARE.I DO NOT RPT NOT READ THIS AS MEANING

THAT THEY EXPECT A CHANGE OF REGIME.

6.I AM REPORTING BY BAG ON THE SOURCES FROM WHICH

THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE DRAWN.BUT TAKEN TOGETHER

THEY MAKE A PICTURE OF A COUNTRY WHICH IS DRIFTING,

AND OPEN TO APPROACHES WHICH OFFER ANY HOPE OF A

FACE-SAVING SOLUTION.THE OBVIOUS DANGER IS THAT

IF NO RPT NO SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND PRESSURES MAY

DEVELOP WHICH WILL CHANGE NOT RPT NOT THE REGIME

BUT ITS DIRECTION

F O PASS RABAT 3. SOSFA.

F.O. to Rabat U/N 1076

AR 16.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 432 2 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 15 AUG 1967

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 432 of 2 August
Repeated for information to:-Arab Posts, H.C. Aden, Washington, U.K.Mis New York and U.K.Mission Geneva.

Foreign Ministers Meeting.

The meeting is now getting down to business in closed session and the Algerian Delegates have arrived. No information is available about the proceedings so far, except that Mongi Slim of Tunisia challenged Shukairi's right to participate. There has been no whisper here of the El Ahrani report quoted by the BBC this morning of an agreed settlement of the Yemeni question.

2. Shukairi has submitted a memorandum to the meeting which is a masterpiece of tendentiousness and axe grinding. This defines the extreme position but it is generally thought that a much more moderate line will emerge.

3. Two Somali Ministers, Sayed Yousief Eiman and Sayed Mohd Sheikh, have appeared uninvited and are trying to participate as full members of the meeting. This has caused some embarrassment. They are trying to establish their credentials by issuing statements giving unqualified support to the Arab cause.

4. Asnag has not turned up but is reported to have gone instead to attend a meeting in Taiz.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Arab Posts, H.C. Aden 23, Washington 22, U.K.Mis New York 23 and U.K.Mission Geneva 1.

Mr. Reddaway Sent 1120Z 2 August, 1967
Recd 1300Z 2 August, 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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EJ 1/14

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

JORDAN
3 August, 1967
Section 1

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN JORDAN

Mr. Tripp to Mr. Brown. (*Received 3 August*)

SUMMARY

1. Immediately after the outbreak of war on the 5th of June about 125,000 people fled from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan. This created a refugee problem of appalling size for the Jordan Government which they were at first unable to handle. (Paragraphs 1–5.)

2. By the 20th of July the numbers who had crossed to East Jordan reached 215,000 and strenuous efforts were made by various international and voluntary organisations, notably UNRWA, but also the British Save the Children Fund, to assist the Jordanian Government in the work of looking after the refugees. (Paragraphs 6–12.)

3. Conditions in the camps are now slowly improving but there will be difficulties when winter comes. The majority of refugees would like to go home, but Israeli administrative difficulties look as if they will delay this for some considerable time. (Paragraphs 12–14.)

4. Her Majesty's Government has since the war given considerable help to Jordan for the refugees but if the return to their homes is delayed much longer it may create further economic and political problems for Jordan. The only acceptable solution is to return the refugees to the West Bank as soon as possible. (Paragraphs 15–16.)

(No. 15. Confidential) *Amman, 31 July, 1967.*

Sir,

On the 5th of June when fighting broke out between Israel and the Arabs a host of Palestinian refugees fled from the West Bank to the East Bank of Jordan. In the 10 days to the 15th of June it is estimated that about 125,000 people, mainly from Jerusalem, Ramallah and Jericho, crossed the river. Few of these people were able to take anything with them and the majority were destitute on arrival.

2. By the 7th of June all the bridges over the River Jordan had been destroyed. However, the Allenby and Damia bridges remained passable for people on foot and it was here that most of the refugees came across. The Jordan Government were appalled by the size of the problem confronting them and frequent broadcasts were made telling the Palestinians to stay in their homes or camps and not to cross over to East Jordan. At one stage the Director of Public Security was ordered to stop the crossings, by force if necessary. He replied that this was an impossible order and refused to obey. The flow of people across the bridges continued.

3. Meanwhile, on the East Bank Jordanians searched for news of their families and friends from the West Bank. No normal means of communication with the other side existed and alarming rumours of heavy military and civilian casualties at Jenin, Jerusalem, Jericho and Ramallah increased anxiety and heightened the feeling of tension. Enterprising boys, using fords or swimming the river, carried messages to and from the West Bank for a fee. Foreign Missions with Consulates in

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Jerusalem were inundated with requests for help in tracing West Bank families.

4. Most of the refugees who came across found their way to the Amman/Zerqa area and were temporarily accommodated by the Jordanian authorities in schools and hostels. Others descended like locusts on their relatives and friends. Some 8,000–9,000 unfortunates were put into a transit camp at Wadi Dhuleil on the edge of the Syrian desert: a "camp" which had no tents, no sanitation and an inadequate water supply.

5. Relief supplies were sent to Jordan from many countries, including Britain. Her Majesty's Government's immediate help was of £20,000 worth of blankets and tents which were delivered by air from Cyprus by aircraft provided by the International Red Cross. At the outset of the crisis, in the aftermath of the fighting, the Jordan Government, apparently stunned and disorientated like the people, were incapable of organising the reception and distribution of relief supplies. Two committees were formed and disbanded without achieving anything, before eventually a Ministerial Committee for Refugees was set up, comprising the Ministers of Finance, National Economy, Education, Social Welfare, Health and Reconstruction and Development, the Director of Public Security and the President of the Jordan Red Crescent Society. This committee almost immediately decided to give UNRWA a free hand in setting up new camps each to hold 10,000 people at Suf, South Shuneh, Ghor el Wahadneh, Maadi, Karameh (extension) and Marqa, where the Evangelische Hilfwerke of West Germany announced its intention of opening a camp for 5,000 people. In addition, other camps under Government control were planned for Karak, Tafila, Ma'an and a properly organised transit camp at Wadi Dhuleil.

6. During the first stage, before UNRWA took a hand, non-Government bodies shouldered most of the burden of providing relief. The Jordan Red Crescent Society was quickly swamped with requests for news about relatives on the West Bank and individual requests for assistance and for a time was unable to do anything constructive for refugees. Its Iranian counterpart, The Red Lion and Sun Society, set up a camp for 5,000 people at Jiza, some 20 kilometres south of Amman where it provided tents, sanitation, medical facilities and food stores before allowing any refugees in. This organisation seems to have been particularly efficient in the period of organisational muddle. The British Save the Children Fund teams moved at once to Wadi Dhuleil where they worked unremittingly to alleviate the hardships of over 2,000 children living under appalling conditions. Some local organisations, such as the YWCA, also worked hard to provide hot food and clothing for refugees living in schools in Amman. On the whole, the problem was too much for the Jordanians to tackle effectively on their own with only voluntary helpers.

7. From the 15th to the 20th of June the number of refugees crossing the Jordan fell to a trickle and there were unfounded rumours circulating that many people were going back to the West Bank. Then on the 20th of June a new wave of refugees started to come over from such areas as Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin and Qalkiliya. They were transported with some of their possessions to the Allenby and Damia bridges in Israeli trucks and buses; apparently they were being given every facility to leave the West Bank. They have been given none to return home.

8. It is estimated that in the period from the 5th of June to the 20th of July the number of refugees who crossed to East Jordan was 215,000, of whom about 100,000 were "old" refugees from UNRWA camps on the West Bank. The remainder were "new" refugees, created by the recent fighting. Eye-witnesses report that West Bankers are even now still crossing the Jordan at a rate of over 500 a day, indicating that the final figure of those who have fled from the West Bank may well be in excess of a quarter of a million.

9. For the present, therefore, the Jordanian authorities have to think in terms of up to a quarter of a million refugees, the majority of whom will need some temporary assistance, even though many (perhaps 190,000) will continue to live with friends and relatives rather than in camps.

10. On the 1st of July the Jordan Government started to move the refugees out of schools and hostels in Amman

where they had been temporarily housed and into the new camps listed at Appendix A. These camps have a total population at present of about 60,000, but are planned to accommodate 75,000 or about one-third of the present additional refugees.

11. Life in these camps seems to be slowly improving from the disgraceful conditions of the first few weeks. UNRWA with its wide experience and facilities has shouldered the main burden of work and will continue to do so. A great deal still remains to be done and there is considerable need for additional assistance in the form of supplementary feeding, particularly for children, more tents, family kitchens and, later, schools and recreational facilities.

12. After a recent visit to Suf (one of the better-run UNRWA camps) an eye witness reported as follows: "There are about 12,500 people in this camp, which is grossly overcrowded. At present the food is cooked in Jerash Town (about 5 kilometres away) and brought out to the camp, but it is hoped to switch to dry rations in all the UNRWA camps as soon as possible and people will then prepare their own food. They have already constructed their own bakeries, built mud walls round the tents, and used camel thorn for privacy and shelter. The latrines are totally inadequate for so many people. A complete street of shops has sprung up—tailors, barbers, a shoemaker, general stores, hardware, butcher, &c., run by the refugees themselves and some merchants from Jerash. A regular bus service runs to and from the camp. Goats, sheep and chickens have been brought in and are settling round the tents. A medical centre is run by two doctors and four nurses but they are very overworked, mainly by cases of children suffering from malnutrition. It is hoped to send in a Save the Children Fund team shortly."

13. The majority of refugees would now, it is believed, like to go back "home" to the West Bank, but so far the Israelis have only permitted 50 families to return. Israeli "administrative difficulties" look like delaying the return of any significant number of refugees at least for some considerable time. The International Red Cross has been trying for the last four weeks to find an acceptable formula for the return of refugees to the West Bank and it has been suggested that the Jordanians, by refusing to allow the Red Cross to distribute questionnaire forms are responsible for the postponement of the return of refugees to their homes. But the Jordanian view is that the United Nations recommended the "unconditional return" of West Bankers. They say, with some justice, that the Israelis are laying down conditions in defiance of the United Nations' Resolution and that these are unacceptable.

14. Very little planning has been done to tackle the long-term problems of the refugees, since most Jordanians hope that the West Bank will be returned to Jordan before the winter. If (as now seems possible) most of the new camps have to be kept open when winter comes, because of no significant return of the refugees to the West Bank, much more help will be needed. Some form of heating and drainage will be required in the camps outside the "ghor" and at Jiza new tents will be needed, as those provided by the Iranian Red Lion and Sun Society are not suitable for use in winter.

15. Since the end of the five-day war Her Majesty's Government have given considerable help to Jordan. In addition to their immediate gift of £20,000 worth of supplies and the subsequent grant of £500,000 for relief and rehabilitation works we have restored our cut of $500,000 to UNRWA and collected a considerable sum of money from appeals launched by friends of Jordan in the United Kingdom. The money so raised is being distributed through the British Relief Fund for Jordan which was set up to co-ordinate the distribution of British aid to the maximum advantage.

16. The only acceptable solution of the new refugees problem would be to return as many as possible of those who have come over to the East Bank as a result of the recent fighting to their homes on the West Bank. The Government (and East Jordanians as a whole) are anxious that this should happen for economic and political reasons. The new refugees are, in their opinion, a burden on the economy, potential unemployed trouble-makers and an unacceptable security risk. If the return

of the refugees to their homes is delayed very much longer the strain on the already weakened Jordan economy will intolerably increase as well as the likelihood of political unrest.

17. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to Her Majesty's Representatives at Beirut, Tel Aviv, Washington, Jedda, Bahrain, Kuwait, Tehran, United Kingdom Mission, New York, and United Kingdom Mission, Geneva, and to Her Majesty's Consul-General in Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

J. P. TRIPP.

APPENDIX A

New Refugee Camps, East Jordan

	Location	*Capacity*	*Responsible body*
1.	Wadi Dhuleil	10,000	Jordan Government
2.	Suf ...	10,000	UNRWA
3.	Marqa ...	5,000	Evangelische Hilfswerke and UNRWA
4.	Jiza	5,000	Red Lion and Sun Society
5.	Karak ...	5,000	Jordan Government
6.	Ghor el Wahadneh	10,000	UNRWA
7.	Maadi ...	10,000	UNRWA
8.	Karameh (extension)	10,000	UNRWA
9.	Shuneh (South)	10,000	UNRWA

Other Possible Camps

10.	Tafila ...	?	Jordan Government
11.	Ma'an ...	?	Jordan Government

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PRODROME RABATDF
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

1076

PRODROME RABAT

The B.B.C. is either picking up rumours, or hearing up what few reports are trickling out

FOR 002/03 GROUS 130 0313272

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABT
TELEGRAM NUMBR U/N 3 AUGUST 1967

C.O. 3/8 Stealthy
O.S. AUS 3 VIII
F.O. 4/8

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 437 OF 3 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ARAB POSTS, HC ADEN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS, NEWYORK.
THE CONFERENCE ON 2 AUGUST WAS CONCERNED MAINLY WITH DISCUSSING HOW TO HANDLE THE AGENDA AND WHETHER TO INCLUDE CON ROVERSIAL SUBJECTS.
THE SPOKESMAN, MAHGOUB, WHO IS BEING PRESSED TO HOLD A DAILY PRESS CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO DISPEL A RUMOUR, HAS LIMITED HIMSELF IN PUBLIC TO DENYING (A) THAT TUNISIA HAVE SUBMITTED A REPORT ON THE DANGERS OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND (B) THAT THE SUDAN IS TAKING A LEAD ON SUBMITTING PROPOSALS.
THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT YET GOT DOWN TO DISCUSSING SERIOUSLY LET ALONE DECIDING, THE MAIN ISSUES EG OIL SHIPMENTS, THE HOLDING OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE, THE PLIGHT OF JORDAN , ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND THE USA, RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY AND THE YEMEN.
H
SOSFA SENT AT 1330/03 YCC KK

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON
PRODROME LONDON 0

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

~~Cypher~~ ~~xxxxx~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 346 of 3 August, 1967.

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 346 of 3 August.

ASIDE

Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference

Moroccan Foreign Minister is reported as having said regarding the oil embargo quote -

> Les dommages subis par la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis et l'Occident en général, sont comparables à une égratignure qu'un léger pansement suffira à guérir. Pour le monde arabe, les pertes subies sont tout aussi bien susceptibles d'entrainer un cancer généralisé. Unquote.

HOLLIDAY

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

wlw SAVING TO Rabat 1976

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN
AND CERTAIN MISSIONS

Telno 20 Saving 3 August 1967 (J.I.P:G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 20 Saving of 3 August.
Repeated for information to certain other posts.

Middle East Talking Points - August 3 1967.

"During the war, in England a person got one egg per week, just one egg. We should recall how the English struggled during the Second World War after their defeat at Dunkirk". - President Nasser, July 23.

"About the radio, some people sent letters telling me they were fed up with national songs; the radio was broadcasting them all day ... I told the Information Minister: 'Change the broadcasts'. I said: 'Some countries were at war for five years in the Second World War; did they broadcast national songs for five years?'.... I asked Dr. Qaysuni, who was in London at that time. He told me: 'No, the radio broadcast as usual'". - President Nasser, July 23.

"Looking back now, we can see clearly that the Arab information policy was one of the main elements of the setback. Within our Arab information policy lie the seeds of the danger which has led to our big setback. We lived 20 years enjoying songs about returning to Palestine, as if this would be fulfilled by song and music writers. For 20 years, Arab radio stations were devoted to destroying the psychology of Arab unity. Charges of treason and subservience to imperialism became the salt of radio and Press work in Arab countries. These campaigns of suspicion have borne their fruit: the Arabs reaped the thorns when the hour of war came". - Kuwait's newspaper Al Rai Al Aam, reported in Beirut, July 4.

"Podgorny's personal supervision of the dismissal and trial of no fewer than 1,000 officers of various ranks in the Egyptian Army may be taken to confirm the view that the secret of the setback lies in the fact that so many officers fought under a régime and system which did not inspire their confidence and faith". - Jiddah Radio commentary, July 27.

"Today, after the rôles have been reversed (in Jerusalem), but without any restrictions on the movement of Christians and Moslems to these Holy Places by the Israeli authorities, most States are falling over each other to 'safeguard' the Holy Places. What is even more ironical is that Communist Russia, a self-proclaimed atheistic State - a godless State - should be in the forefront of this agitation". - Ghanaian Daily Graphic, July 15.

A.L. Sowton 10.VIII

C. [illegible]

D.A. [illegible] 10/8

L.O. [illegible]

L.A. [illegible] 11/8

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
8 AUG 1967

"We

"We want to say honestly to our Arab friends that we do not understand and do not share the attitude of those circles which favour the liquidation of the State of Israel. We do not which to give advice to anyone, but the lessons of history show that a people cannot achieve its national and social aspirations by rising against the right of another people to exist". - Ceausescu, speaking in the Rumanian Grand National Assembly, July 24.

The former Venezuelan President, Romulo Betancourt, disclosed in a Caracas television talk on July 6 that in the wake of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Soviet Union had made overtures to sell its petroleum to Britain, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany - none of whom had accepted. Betancourt also said that Venezuela, with its valuable petroleum reserves, was the only country guaranteeing the West a considerable source of petroleum in war as well as in peace.

A number of Lebanese papers appear to be agreed that the Soviet Union was not expected to do much in favour of the Arab cause. Al Amal said on July 21 that it rejected "gold-plated Red chains".

According to Algiers Radio, President Boumedienne received Pavlovskiy, the USSR Deputy Defence Minister, on July 26.

"The signs of suspicious Soviet intervention in the affairs of the Arabs, in their vital causes and even in the choice of Arab leaders, may turn into a light, which will penetrate the present thick clouds, to guide the Arabs towards a road which will prevent the setback from being transformed by the Soviet leaders into a deadly national disaster. The Soviet leaders have gone too far and think they have the right to reclassify Arab leaders".- From the Lebanese paper Al-Hayat, quoted by Jiddah Radio, July 24.

"Whatever the situation, the length of time which President Nasser has estimated it will take to remove the effects of aggression will present the régime with difficulties from which it can escape only by a miracle. This is because the Egyptian people cannot tolerate this situation for long. Furthermore, the Egyptian people will see to it that their taxes are no longer spent on spying, Intelligence and high pay for Army officers". - Jiddah Radio commentary, July 27.

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

PPPPP

1076

BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

CONFIDENTIAL

3 August 1967

... I enclose a copy of the record I have made of my farewell conversation with the Acting Foreign Minister, Ali Benjelloun. I make no apology for its length because this is, I think, the most complete account we have yet had of Moroccan thinking on the Middle East situation. Benjelloun spoke clearly and authoritatively and I think we can rely on the accuracy of his account as fully as if it had come from Laraki. "All this", he said, "is so remote from our own immediate concerns that I can speak to you altogether freely and objectively".

2. What I found most interesting was the view he expressed on Nasser (paragraph 3); on Jordan (paragraph 4), which was clearly a major worry; on the Arab "obsession" with the Israeli occupation (paragraph 8) (on this he spoke with the clinical detachment of a psychiatrist discussing an almost hopeless case!), and on recognition of Israel (paragraph 8).

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Chanceries at Washington, U.K. Mission to the United Nations, New York, Algiers (British Interests Section), Cairo (British Interests Section), Amman, Benghazi, Tripoli and Tel Aviv.

(L.G. Holliday)

D.J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

K qc + wife

CONFIDENTIAL

Record of Conversation

Since it had become probable, owing to the delayed opening of the Khartoum Conference, that the Foreign Minister, M. Laraki, would not be back in time to receive me before my departure on leave, I asked for an audience with M. Ali Benjelloun, the Minister of Justice, (and former Ambassador to Washington), who is acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He received me at 6 p.m. yesterday.

2. I said that I expected to be consulted by my Government on the Moroccan position in regard to the Middle East situation and that I would be grateful if he would enlighten me. Was I, for example, right in thinking that it was a matter of primary concern to the Moroccan Government to avert a renewal of hostilities, since this would jeopardise Moroccan development and create fresh tensions in the country and abroad? In a sense, M. Benjelloun said, I was right. It was a permanent feature of Moroccan policy to place reliance on negotiation rather than on the threat or use of force. Moreover, the countries of the Arab world could not afford to fritter away their resources, needed for development, on military expenditure. The Moroccan Government did not share the point of view of the Syrian and Algerian Governments that though a battle had been lost the war must continue. Nevertheless, the present situation, with Israel in occupation of vast stretches of Arab territory, was one which embodied a permanent danger of renewed hostilities. He would prefer to put things differently. Israel was the creation of the United Nations and it was the responsibility of the United Nations now to find a solution to the problems which the war had left in its train. By the United Nations he specifically meant the Security Council, for there could be no doubt that the Middle East situation constituted a threat to the peace and was therefore within the competence of the Council. I asked him whether his Government would be inclined to support the suggestion made by H.M. Government that a high representative of the United Nations should be posted in the area in a mediatory capacity. I had the impression that the Moroccan Government had not given much thought to this idea, but M. Benjelloun agreed that this might be a useful first step.

/3. I went

3. I went on to ask whether a second essential element in Moroccan policy was to avoid a split in the Arab world. M. Benjelloun confirmed that this was so and said that the principal reason why was the continuing Moroccan fear of Algerian intentions. (By this I understood him to mean that if a split occurred, Algeria would inevitably be in one camp and Morocco in the other.) Boumedienne and Atassi had made themselves into leading exponents of the hard line. Compared with them Nasser was showing considerable moderation. M. Benjelloun had been struck by the echoes in Nasser's latest speech of the speech which King Hassan had made shortly after the termination of hostilities. Perhaps Nasser was still influenceable. He was certainly showing greater realism. But there were other reasons for avoiding a breakdown of Arab unity. Unless the Arabs remained united they could never hope to achieve an honourable settlement with Israel. Moreover, they needed to unite to face in common the problem of their development. It was because they had not worked hard and with determination as the Israelis had done that they had been defeated.

4. I suggested that we might take a look at the various elements in a possible settlement and see how close the British and Moroccan positions were. There was for example the problem of refugees. M. Benjelloun said that this was central to the whole situation. Indeed in a sense it could be said that this war had come about because of failure to solve the problem of the refugees. A particular aspect of this problem was the parlous situation in which Jordan now found itself. We British were old friends of Jordan, were we not? He hoped that we would do all we could to help King Hussein with the frightful refugee problem which now confronted him. I reminded M. Benjelloun in detail of the assistance we had already given to Jordan since the cessation of hostilities.

5. Jerusalem, I continued, constituted a special problem and he was well placed to speak about it since he had been King Hassan's emissary to the Pope, with whom he had discussed it. M. Benjelloun confirmed that this was a very important issue. It was particularly important to Morocco because the Habous owned considerable property in Jerusalem. What he had been instructed to suggest to the Pope was that there should be a return to the status quo, since Islam had won a deserved reputation of assuring free access to the Christian holy places in Jerusalem. The Pope's point of view

/had

had been an interesting one. Clearly he still hankered after internationalisation. His Holiness had indeed explained that the reason why the Vatican had never established diplomatic relations with Israel was because of Israel's failure to apply the Tripartite Declaration of 1948 to Jerusalem. I commented that I had noticed from the communiqué after his visit to the Vatican that it was couched in terms of Christianity and Islam. Did the Moroccan Government regard this as a question interesting these two religions only and not the Hebrew faith? M. Benjelloun shrugged this off by saying that there were no Hebrew shrines involved. I reminded him of the Wailing Wall and he said that no doubt some arrangement could be come to about this. It was clear to me that King Hassan does not favour internationalisation and does favour a return to the status quo under the protection of Jordan.

6. On the control of armaments I struck an immediate spark. This was an issue, the Minister reminded me, on which Morocco had already given a lead, in the suggestions made by King Hassan to U Thant at the time of his United States visit. We could be sure that what Morocco considered good for North Africa she also considered good for the Middle East. On one condition, however. It would not be acceptable that any rationing of arms should be based on the military superiority which Israel had acquired as a result of the recent conflict.

7. Thanking him for this explanation I suggested that we were also faced with a quite different series of issues, which in fact had nothing to do with the Arab/Israeli conflict. A group of Arab countries were taking advantage of the situation to attempt to eliminate British (and American) influence from the entire area. Their attempt to persuade the non-revolutionary Arab countries to break off diplomatic, financial and commercial relations with the United Kingdom showed this. So did the embargo on oil supplies. So did the determination not to reopen the Suez Canal. This policy, I suggested, should be of direct concern to Morocco in the bilateral Anglo-Moroccan context. The United Kingdom had been on the point of emerging from her balance of payments crisis when the war in the Middle East occurred, but the sanctions I had mentioned would inevitably postpone our economic recovery and this in turn would quite certainly make it more difficult for us to extend economic

/development

development assistance to countries such as Morocco which had not received it from us hitherto. M. Benjelloun agreed that these policies were extraneous to the real issue. They were based on the accusation which Morocco had rejected, that Britain and America had given military support to Israel. He then gave me a categorical assurance that Morocco would give such policies no support and would not apply any such measures in her own territory. I asked him whether perhaps the Moroccan Government could go further and use their influence in the Arab world to oppose these measures. M. Benjelloun said that they had already done so, successfully, as regards the proposed breach of relations: this item had been dropped from the Khartoum agenda. As regards oil, he doubted whether the Moroccan bargaining position was strong enough to enable her to take a lead. Should we not rely rather on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya? Libya might be our best bet: the internal situation there was steadily improving and the King was well disposed towards us. He did, however, ask a number of detailed questions as to exactly where our interests lay which suggested that the point had gone home. (In fact, as reported in my Aside telegram No. 346 of 3 August, M. Laraki has strongly criticised the oil embargo at the Khartoum meeting.)

8. It seemed to me, I said, that there were no essential differences between Moroccan and United Kingdom policies and that, within the Arab family, Morocco's friends were our friends. Was there any gesture which the United Kingdom could make which would strengthen the position of Morocco and the other moderate countries in the negotiations which lay ahead? The Minister's answer to this was clear and unequivocal. There was only one gesture which really mattered. The Arab countries were obsessed (obnubilés) by the Israeli occupation of Arab soil. He feared it would not be possible to get them to talk reasonably about the other aspects of the settlement which we had been discussing until an end had been put to the Israeli occupation. If once this issue could be got out of the way, all sorts of other problems, such as the recognition of the State of Israel, could be tackled with good prospects of success. I at once took the Minister up on his example and he confirmed that the Moroccan Government would see no objection to recognition after but not before or as a condition of the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Therefore, the more clearly and the more frequently Her Majesty's Government could make known their opposition to the continued presence of Israeli forces in occupied territory the easier they would make it for their friends

/in the

in the Arab world, such as Morocco, to act in a manner favourable to British interests in the Middle East. I reminded him of the statements already made on behalf of H.M Government in this connection and explained once more the reasons for our votes on the two Resolutions recently submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. M. Benjelloun said this was fine as far as it went but we would have to say the same kind of thing again and again and with unmistakable clarity if we wanted to make any kind of impression on the Arab world. Our role in the Security Council, in particular, would be of the greatest importance, since for well-known reasons the position of the United States Government would probably be unhelpful.

(L.G. Holliday)
3 August 1967

1076

FOREIGN OFFICE/C.O.,

LONDON, S.W.1.

(IR 2/23/1) RESTRICTED 3 August, 1967

Thank you for your letter 32/5/67 of 7 July about "Middle East Talking Points" - you will now have seen that this is coming as a Savingram.

2. I have consulted JIPGD, and I fear that we both feel that there are objections to distributing copies of the telegrams as they are to responsible British subjects. You could perhaps provide your contacts with the essential texts on plain pieces of paper, but if you can manage it, it seems better to brief them verbally.

3. We hope that despite the restrictions you will find the Talking Points of some use.

4. I am copying this letter to the Information Section in Rabat.

(A.C.Elwell)

Patrick Johnston, Esq.,
Consulate-General,
CASABLANCA,
MOROCCO

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 10 AUG 1967

RESTRICTED

Information Section
Rabat

IR 2/23/1

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

3 August, 1967

LONDON, S.W.1.

11/8

QS/Morocco

AZS 11·VIII

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1076

FOR 002/5

051044Z GRS 200

ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 411

O RABAT
4 AUGUST 1967

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO
ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELNO 743 OF 4 AUGUST RFI PRIORITY TO KHARTOUM, ROUTINE TO ALGIERS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDA, KUWAIT, RABAT, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, JIG CYPRUS, LIC ADEN AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON.

ARAB MFA'S CONFERENCE. AHRAM CARRIES IRAQI PLAN AS FOLLOWS:

(A) COMPLETE EMBARGO ON OIL EXPORTS FOR THREE MONTHS, FOLLOWING PARTIAL EMBARGO, WITH CONTROLS ON TOTAL VOLUME, OF PARTICIPANTS ON OR SUPPORTERS OF AGGRESSION.
(B) THREE MONTH CLOSURE OF CANAL AND PIPELINES TO MEDITERRANEAN.
(C) WITHDRAWAL OF ARAB FUNDS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, FROM U.S. AND BRITAIN (AND OTHERS CAN BE ADDED).
(D) COMMERCIAL BOYCOTT.
(E) NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC MONOPOLISTIC INTERESTS, BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, AND OF COMMERCIAL COMPANIES WHO FRUSTRATE BOYCOTT (NATIONALISATION OF OIL INDUSTRY TO BE TIH IN STAGES).
(F) RESTRICTION ON DEALINGS WITH AGGRESSORS IN INVISIBLES.
(G) REVIEW OF OIL CONCESSIONS.
(H) PHASED REDUCTION OF ARAB IMPORTS, ESPECIALLY NON-ESSENTIAL
(I) PAN-ARAB IMPLEMENTATION OF ARAB ECONOMIC UNITY AGREEMENT ON IRAQI-UAR PATTERN.
(J) ARAB PAYMENTS UNION.
(K) UNITED ARAB ORGANISATIONS FOR 'INVISIBLES'.
(L) FUND TO MEET DEFICITS RESULTING FROM OIL AND CANAL CUT -OFF, FINANCED FROM
(A) PROPORTION OF CURRENCY RESERVES OF EACH COUNTRY WITH FOREIGN BANKS.
(B) PROPORTION OF RESIDUAL OIL REVENUES.
(C) SPECIAL TAXES.
(D) LOANS.
(M) ARAB DEVELOPMENT FUND.
F.O. PASS RABAT UNNUMBERED.

SOSFA

SENT 5/1050Z EK

PRODROME RABAT

A.L. Sowton 7.VIII
I.O. 8/8
C. ai

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

C4/Cat A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM Fo TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 412 D M

[Date] 4 AUG 67 R M

Repeated to

There would appear to be the date being floated by the Press. There is still no sign of a Summit Conference.

a.) Sept 11. "Opinion"
b.) Aug 29 "Al Ahram" both top. Khartoum as the venue

A.L. Sowton 7.VIII

L.D. 7/8

C. [illegible]

[Priority]

RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO.

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELNO 737 OF 4 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KHARTOUM ALGIERS AMMAN BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS JIC CYPRUS LIC ADEN AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEWYORK AND WASHINGTON.

PRESS REPORTS ON ARAB MFAS CONFERENCE

DISTRIBUTION

AHRAM: IMPRESSION THATSUMMIT CONFERENCE IS IMMINENT. MOROCCO RAISES ALGERIAN BORDER QUESTION. SUDAN PROPOSES APPLICATION OF NON-INTER- VENTION PROVISIONS OF ARAB SOLIDARITY CHARTER. COMMITTEE OF THREE CONSIDER UAR PROPOSAL FOR YEMEN SETTLEMENT. PROPOSALS MADE FOR UR- GENT MEETING OF EXPERTS TO CONSIDER IRAQI BOYCOTT PROPOSALS.

2. GOUMHOURIYA: LEBANESE. KUWAITI. IRAQI. JORDANIAN. SAUDI ARABIAN. SUDANESE AND TUNISIAN DELEGATIONS

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.We.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

SAY PROSPECTS OF SUMMIT ARE IMPROVING. MEETING

STUDIES PLAN FOR MASSIVE DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA

CAMPAIGN AND SAUDI DELEGATION PROPOSES SPECIAL

COMMITTEE.

3. AKHBAR: AGREEMENT TO CEASE PRESS AND RADIO CAMPAIGNS.

F. O. PASS U/N TO ALL.

SOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy/CAT 'A'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 413 D M

[Date] 5 AUG. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] ROUTINE.

Contains little new: Morocco continues to stall.
A.L. Sowton 7.VIII
C. & A. Nothing further Khartoum yet. Ans 7/8
I.O. 8/8

RESTRICTED.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CAIRO.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 801
OF 5 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KHARTOUM
ALGIERS AMMAN BEIRUT JADDA KUWAIT RABAT
TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIE JIG CYPRUS LIC ADEN
AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON.

DISTRIBUTION

ARAB MFA'S MEETING

AHRAM GIVES ~~ZSOU WBIPCUVES~~ WHAT LOOKS LIKE A FULL ACCOUNT OF MOST OF YESTERDAYS DEBATE:EXAMINATION OF IRAQI PLAN(WITH SOME HEATED EXCHANGES):PRO- POSALS IN THE SAME SENSE ~~BY D" ·580E~~ BY SYRIA AND KUWAIT: EVIDENCE OF STRONG EXTERNAL PRESSURE TO PREVENT STOPPAGE OF OIL.AFTER MEETING HAD ORI- GINALLY WELCOMED THE PLAN IN GENERAL.SOME MINISTERS HAVING RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS.REOPENED DISCUSSION ON THE effectiveness

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE.TUNISIA

QUERIED ITS VALUE AND THAT OF BREAKING OF

DIPLOMA- TIC RELATIONS AND ASKED THAT OTHER

COUNTRIES VIEWS BE TAKEN.PARTICU- LARLY THAT OF

EGYPT.BOTH EGYPT AND ALGERIA REPLIED INDIGNANTLY

AND BOUTEFLIKA ADDED THAT DECISION MUST BE TAKEN

ON THE PROJECT BEFORE DECIDING ON DATE FOR SUMMIT.

.SAUDI ARABIA EXPRESSED NO RPT NO VIEW BUT DID NOT

RPT NOT OBJECT TO A MEETING OF EXPERTS TO STUDY

IT. SYRIA PROPOSED AN ALTERNATIVE BUT SIMILAR

PLAN FOR STOPPING OF OIL. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

BOYCOTT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FUNDS.KUWAIT PROPOS- ED

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE FOR A WAR FUND.BUT SUPPORTED

IRAQI PROJECT AND FAVOURED STUDY BY EXPERTS.

YEMEN SUPPORTED.MOROCCO PLEADED IGNORANCE AND

FAVOURED REFERENCE TO EXPERTS.SHUKAIRY ALSO

SUPPORTED(AND SEEMS TO HAVE SURVIVED HIS REPORTED

ROW WITH MONGI SLIM).APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE

WAS DECIDED ON.AT ONE POINT WHEN THE CONFERENCE

APPEA- RES TO BE FLOUNDERING EGYPT.IRAQ AND

ALGERIA CHALLENGED THE REST TO PRODUCE AN

ALTERNATIVE PLAN.MAHGOUB. THOUGH THE MEETING WOULD

FINISH TODAY OR TOMORROW.

2.AHRAM AND GOMHOURIA:BEFORE ITEM ON THE IRAQI

project/

PROJECT.THERE WAS A DISCUSSION ON THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL ON YEMEN.FEISAL HAD ACCEPTED IT ACCORDING TO MAHGOUB)BUT ASKED FOR SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILS ON THE ROLE OF THE TRIPARTITE COMMISSION.THESE HAD BEEN SENT THROUGH MAH- GOUB AND FURTHER REPLY WAS EXPECTED TODAY.SUGGESTIONS SO FAR FOR MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSION:ALGERIA(FOR UAR). TUNISIA OR KUWAIT(FOR SAU- DI ARABIA).AND THE SUDAN.

3.GOMHOURIA:ON FINAL ITEM:LIBYAN AND ALGERIAN GOVERNMENTS REPORTED ON LIQUIDATION OF BASES.SAUDI ARABIAN POSITION NOT RPT NOT YET RE- VEALED.IT IS EXPECTED THAT THERE WILL BE ANOTHER.TWO DAY.CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS BEFORE THE SUMMIT FOR FINAL EXAMINATION OF AGENDA.AHBAR:YEMEN INSISTS ON TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA TO PREVENT SAUDI INFLITRATION.// FOREIGN OFFICE PASS ALGIERS AMMAN BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS JIG CYPRUS LIC ADEN ALL UNNUMBERED. SOSFA

F.O. to Rabat U/N
1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 441 5 August 1967

AZS 16.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 441 of 5 August.
Repeated to all Arab Posts, H.C. Aden, Washington and UKMIS New York.

Foreign Ministers Meeting.

The conference is due to end later today or tomorrow (6 August) and a communique is promised after then. There has been no official announcement of the decision to go ahead with a Summit Conference but President Azhari said in a speech yesterday that this would take place in the near future and it is generally assumed that there will be at least a firm recommendation to this effect in the final communiqué. The probable place is Khartoum and possible date about 25 August.

2. So far as we can tell the Yemen has been the main subject of discussion; Sallal is reported to have welcomed the U.A.R. initiative but the Saudi reaction is still awaited. Among other subjects discussed was the improvement of the Arab image with Mongi Slim advocating a more moderate line and a more moderate presentation of it and coming up against Shukairi in the process. Further action on the economic boycott of the "States which helped Israel" will probably be referred to a separate conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economics and Oil charged with making recommendations to the Summit Meeting.

Foreign Office please pass to Arab Posts U/N, H.C. Aden 26, Washington 25 and UKMIS New York 26.

Mr: Reddaway

Sent 1130Z/5 August
Recd 1233Z/5 August

[Repetition to Arab Posts, referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts.]

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 15 AUG 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

(10712/67)

CANADIAN EMBASSY,
(British Interests Section)
CAIRO.

7 August, 1967.

AJS 16.VIII

I have over the last two or three weeks been reporting such signs as I saw that the Egyptians, finding little joy in other directions, might be ready to talk discreetly with the "Imperialists" about some sort of settlement with Israel.

2. Heikal's latest article, of 4 August, seemed almost designed to kill any hopes of rapprochement with the Americans, though apart from that people are simply wondering what on earth it meant in practical terms. But today Ibrahim Ezzat, the well-known journalist who writes for Rose al Yusuf when he isn't reporting to the Intelligence, has produced an article in which he denies the rumours that secret contacts are going on between Cairo and Washington. The truth is, he says, that though Fawzi did see Dean Rusk in New York, it was at the latter's request (and that similarly Lord Caradon had sought contacts)and that Fawzi's reply to both had been that Cairo could accept no discussion as long as a single Israel soldier remained on Arab soil . He had more than once refused to see Goldberg. Another rumour, that there had been secret talks between the U.S. and Britain on the one hand and Turkey on the other with a view to a meeting with the Egyptians in Ankara to discuss a "practical solution" was equally false. The truth was that ever since the "aggression" Britain and America had constantly tried to get the Canal reopened but that Egypt's attitude was, again, quite flatly "no opening as long as a single Israel soldier remains on Arab soil and no utilisation of the Canal by the aggressor states as long as the military or political aggression continues". Britain and America had tried to use close friends of the Egyptians as intermediaries for this purpose but this had failed too. Egypt had declared itself perfectly ready to transport the goods of such states overland.

/The name

D. J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East Africa Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
15 AUG 1967

The name of the Indian Foreign Minister, Chagla, had frequently been mentioned in this context.

3. I cannot think that this article was not inspired, though one can only guess by whom. It may be, of course, that someone is simply taking care not to blurr the public impression of U.A.R. policy.

I am copying this letter to Chanceries at Washington, Khartoum, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis and to UKMIS, New York, L.I.C. Aden and J.I.C. Cyprus, also to Ankara and New Delhi.

(R. M. Tesh)

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

CY CAI A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 415 D M

[Date] 7 Aug R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

A.L. Scratton 8.VIII

Ch. of Staff 8/8. D.O. 8/8. F.S.(E) 9/8.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM JEDDA.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 529 OF 7 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO KHARTOUM KUWAIT

BEIRUT AMMAN TRIPOLI BENGHAZI ALGIERS RABAT

TUNIS AND ~~WASHINGTON~~ WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING:

OIL EMBARGO AND ECONOMIC BOYCOTT

DR RASHAD PHARAON (KING FAISAL~S PRINCIPAL ADVISER) AND MUHAMMAD MASUD (ACTING HEAD OF THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY) HAVE GIVEN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT WENT ON IN KHARTOUM.

MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL) DEALS WITH THE YEMEN SIDE OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

2. THE SAUDI, LIBYIAN AND KUWAIT REPRESENTATIVES WERE SUCC- ESSFUL IN PERSUADING THE MEETING TO adopt a .

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ADOPT A RECOMMENDATION THAT QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OIL EMBARGO AND ECONOMIC BOYCOTT MEASURES SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE FINANCE AND OIL MINISTERS, WHO WILL MEET IN BAGHDAD ON 15 AUGUST TO DISCUSS THEM AND REPORT BACK TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN KHARTOUM ON 26 AUG.

3. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SYRIANS, THE OTHER ARAB REP- RESENTATIVES AT KHARTOUM WERE ALL FAIRLY MODERATE. EVEN THE ALGERIANS DID MORE LISTENING THAN TALKING AND WERE GENERALLY REASONABLE. THE U A R REPRESENTATIVE ALSO SHOWED RESTRAINT. ONLY THE SYRIANS SPOKE WILDLY ABOUT TAKING UP ARMS AGAIN AGAINST ISRAEL. THE JORDANIAN WAS QUIET AND SORROWFUL.

FO PASS KHARTOUM 14 BEIRUT 140 AMMAN 58 TRIPOLI 20 ALGIERS 7 RABAT 9 AND TUNIS 7.

SOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CWE A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 7.0 TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 417 D M

[Date] 7 AUGUST. R M

Repeated to

A.L. Souther 9.VIII

C. d'A. 9/8

L.o. 9/8

[Priority] PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 445 OF 7th AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ARAB POSTS HICOM ADEN TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

. FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE DISPERSED. THEY ARE DUE TO MEET AGAIN IN KHARTOUM ON 26 AUGUST TO MAKE FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING AFTER RECEIVING THE REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND OIL MINISTERS WHO WILL MEET IN BAGHDAD ON 15 AUGUST. THE SUDANESE FORECAST A SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM ON 29 AUGUST BUT IT IS REPORTED THAT THERE IS A LEBANESE COUNTER PROPOSAL THAT IT SHOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER (ALSO PRESUMABLY IN KHARTOUM) SO THAT IT CAN CONSIDER THE LINE TO BE TAKEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS

2. ALL BUSINESS WAS TRANSACTED IN CLOSED SESSION

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and The

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

AND THE PRESS COMMUNIQUE (KHARTOUM TELEGRAM 444) WAS NO DOUBT DELIBERATELY UNINFORMATIVE. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN DIFFICULT TO FORM A CLEAR IDEA OF ALL THAT WENT ON OR TO ASSESS THE OUTCOME. IN KHARTOUM THE WHOLE AFFAIR HAS BEEN RATHER BLURRED BY THE DELIGHT OF THE SUDANESE AT THEIR SUCCESS IN GETTING TOGETHER A FULL TALLY OF ARAB MINISTERS AND IN DECIDING TO RECOMMEND A SUMMIT.

3. AS I SEE IT THE CONFERENCE WAS OF VALUE TO THE ARABS AS A DEBATING FORUM AT WHICH ALL COULD CALCULATE HOW FAR THEY COULD PERSUE THEIR SEPARATE POLICIES AND INTERESTS WITHOUT SPLITTING THE ARAB WORLD. IT WILL NOW BE UP TO THE HEADS OF STATE TO DECIDE HOW SAFELY THEY CAN EMBARK ON A SUMMIT WITHOUT SELLING INDIVIDUAL PASSES. THERE WERE CLEARLY ENORMOUS EFFORTS TO AVOID OPEN QUARRELS AND THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE YEMENI QUESTION (KHARTOUM TEL 446) REFLECTS THE UAR'S WISH AND THE GENERAL CONCERN TO HEAL THE WORST WOUND. I HAZARD A GUESS THAT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME WILL BE THAT ALL THE COUNTRIES WHILE STRIVING FOR A SEMBLANCE OF UNITY WILL GO THEIR OWN WAY IN THEIR RELATION WITH

THE WEST AND THAT THIS IS THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR UNTIL THE ECONOMIC SHOE BEGINS TO PINCH EGYPT REALLY HARD.

4. ALL DELEGATES WERE SOLID IN THEIR EXPRESSIONS OF HOSTILITY TO ISRAEL BUT NO PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS WERE MADE ABOUT GETTINC RID OF THE ISRAELIS FROM ARAB TERRITORY. WHATEVER PROPOSALS THE JORDANIANS MADE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL AND THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE AGREED NOT TO ACT UNILATERALLY ON SEEKING AN UNDER STANDING WITH ISRAEL.

5. THE DELEGATES REPRESENTING THE ~~QUOTE~~ "REVOLUTIONARY STATES" ~~UNQUOTE~~ BY NO MEANS HAD IT ALL THEIR OWN WAY. IF THE CONFERENCE HAD STARS THEY WERE MAHGOUB FOR HIS ORATORY AND CHAIRMANSHIP AND MONGI SLSM (SIC) FOR HINTING THAT ARAB TACTICS TOWARDS ISRAEL WOULD NEED TO BE RECONSIDERED. THE ALGERIANS ARRIVED LATE AND WERE NOT PROMINENT: THE EGYPTIANS GOT THE HEADLINES ONLY WITH THEIR YEMENI INITIATIVE: THE IRAQIS MADE THE RUNNING ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE SAUDIS WERE INSCRUTABLE: THE KUWAITIS AND THE SUDANESE TRIED TO BE ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN.

[redacted]

6. There

6. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT RELATIONS WITH EAST GERMANY OR SOUTH ARABIA WERE DISCUSSED. THE FLOSY DELEGATION DID NOT TURN UP.

7. KHARTOUM WAS COMPLETELY CALM THROUGHOUT AND REFLECTED THE GENERALLY LOW KEY OF THE CONFERENCE. THE EGYPTIAN LINE WAS CLEARLY TO AVOID FIREWORKS AND TO KEEP SOME OPTIONS OPEN.

F O PASS RABAT U/N.

SOSFA

Presse arabe

AS 10.VIII

"Al-Alam" (Istiqlal) -- 7 août 1967

(Editorial)

Une aide que le peuple marocain est en droit de réclamer à ses frères arabes

De Khartoum on apprend que des solutions constructives ont été adoptées en vue de mettre un terme au différend qui oppose l'Arabie séoudite à l'Egypte, et que des contacts ont commencé à se nouer entre les représentants de ces deux pays frères, dans la capitale soudanaise, pour réactiver les accords de Djeddah et baisser enfin le rideau sur le problème du Yémen.

Dans le cadre de la liquidation des litiges entre Arabes on rapporte d'autre part que la délégation marocaine a soulevé la question du différend frontalier qui existe entre nos frères algériens et nous-mêmes, et demandé que les pays arabes recherchent une solution à ce différend. Nous n'avons pas pour l'instant d'indications concernant la manière selon laquelle cette question a été posée. Nous ne savons pas non plus si les dirigeants ont décidé de dessaisir de cette affaire l'instance africaine, où pourtant les contacts se poursuivent et où l'on s'attend que la commission des sept annonce la date de sa prochaine session, et de la porter devant l'instance arabe où l'on s'occupe sérieusement maintenant de faire face aux conséquences de l'agression impérialo-sioniste et de liquider les divergences interarabes.

Quoi qu'il en soit le communiqué final de la conférence de Khartoum ne fait aucune allusion à l'affaire et nous ne savons rien, par conséquent, sur ce qui a été décidé à ce sujet. Cependant nous apprécions cette initiative à sa juste valeur et nous souhaitons qu'elle nous rapproche du règlement d'un problème frontalier que, comme nous l'avons toujours dit, le temps ne peut qu'aggraver. En négligeant de résoudre un tel problème on ne fait qu'entretenir une situation précaire qui ne saurait servir ni l'intérêt du Maroc ni celui de l'Algérie ni celui de l'unité arabe tant souhaitée.

Il est donc tout naturel que nous aspirions à une solution juste et honorable du problème des frontières. En conséquence, nous demandons instamment à nos frères arabes de faire preuve de compréhension à l'égard de la position équitable du Maroc et d'intervenir avec bienveillance afin d' extirper une fois pour toutes les racines du différend maroco-algérien. Délivrés de toute réserve et des autres facteurs négatifs résultant du différend frontalier, le Maroc et l'Algérie pourront ainsi participer efficacement à l'action arabe commune en faveur de la Palestine et des autres causes arabes.

.../

La liquidation du contentieux frontalier entre nos frères algériens et nous-mêmes serait une précieuse contribution à l'unification des efforts des peuples algérien et marocain et un facteur important pour les engager dans la voie d'une action constructive.

Elle mettrait fin à tout ce qui est de nature à favoriser les intrigues, les mauvaises tentations et les querelles entre les deux pays frères. Aussi le peuple marocain souhaite-t-il voir dans un proche avenir se dénouer d'une manière heureuse ce problème des frontières et voir se manifester, tout comme maintenant à propos du Yémen, l'intention de baisser le rideau sur le dernier acte de ce drame.

Les éléments encourageants nous permettant d'espérer pour bientôt une solution nous faisant encore défaut, nous estimons devoir rappeler à nos frères arabes qu'ils ont le devoir d'aider le peuple marocain dans la bataille qu'il mène pour récupérer ses territoires usurpés par l'Espagne.

Nous leur demandons de prêter attention aux actes auxquels se livre le colonialisme espagnol dans certaines parties de notre territoire dans le dessein de fomenter d'odieux complots contre le caractère arabe et islamique de ces régions.

C'est là une aide que le peuple marocain est en droit de réclamer à tous ses frères arabes, un droit auquel il ne renoncera pas.

1076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

C4/Cat A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM

TO

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 416 D M

[Date] 7 Aug 67 R M

Repeated to

A.L. Southorn 9.VIII
C. of A. Fam. 6/8
L.O. 10/8

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLG RECD FROM JEDDA. ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 530 OF 7 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO H C ADEN KUWAIT KHARTOUM BEIRUT ALGIERS RABAT AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK

1076

M I P T (NOT TO ADEN)

PARAGRAPH 1: YEMEN ON 3 AUGUST THE U A R FOGREIGN MINISTER MADE A FORMAL PROPOSAL AT KHARTOM ON THAT THE U A R AND SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD RETURN TO THE 1965 JEDDA AGREEMENT AND ENDEAVOUR TO SOLVE THE YEMEN PROBLEM ON THAT BASIS. A THREE-MAN COMM- ISSION SHOULD BE SET UP TO SUPERVISE THE CARRYING OUT OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. SAQQAF. THE SAUDI REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT HE COULD MAKE NO COMMENT ON THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE YEMEN WAS NOW ON THE AGENDA AND IN ANY CASE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS. HE DID POINT OUT

not ?

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

Hoseason

389.We.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

HOWEVER SPEAKING PERSONALLY. THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED SINCE THE JEDDA AGREEMENT AND THAT THE LATTER MIGHT NO LONGER PROVIDE A PRACTICAL BASIS FOR SOLVING THE YEMEN PROBLEM. SAQQAF SAID THAT HE WOULD REFER THE MATTER TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

2. ON KING FAISAL~S INSTRUCTIONS SAQQAF SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THE MEETING THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD SAID. THE SAUDIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REVIVING THE JEDDA AGREEMENT. BUT THE FIRST OBJECTIVE OF THE THREE MAN COMMISISION SHOULD BE TO CONSIDER AND DECIDE THE QUESTION OF

(A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF U A R FORCES AND

(B) THE CESSATION OF SAUDI AID TO THE ROYALISTS.

ONLY AFTER THESE HAD BEEN SETTLED WOULD IT BE PRACTICABLE TO TURN TO DOMESTIC YEMENI PROBLEMS LIKE THE FUTURE FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND THE RIGHT OF THE YEMENIS TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY.

3. THE ONLY PROGRESS MADE SO FAR WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE THREE- MAN SPECIAL COMMISSION SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF A MOROCCAN. AN ALGERIAN AND A SUDANESE. THE SAUDIS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ALGERIAN OR SYRIAN TROOPS AS PART OF ANY ARAB SUPERVISORY FORCE IN THE YEMEN.

4. RASHAD PHARAON THINKS THAT THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL IS A DEVICE TO PROLONG THE PRESENCE OF U A R FORCES

D Yemen

IN YEMEN UNTIL WE LEAVE ADEN. AND THE SAUDIS ARE MORE THAN EVER SUSPICIOUS OF NASSER~S MOTIVES IN YEMEN. THEY CONSIDER THAT EGYPTIAN TROOPS MJST BE OUT OF YEMEN AT LEAST TWO MONTHS BEFORE SOUTH ARABIA BECOMES INDEPENDENT. OTHERWISE THE THREAT TO SOUTH ARABIA WOULD BE VERY REAL.

FO PASS RABAT 10.

SOSFA

(1076/67)

TELEGRAM

~~Cypher~~ ~~code~~ en clair

From:— RABAT *To*:— FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched Received

No. 350 of 8 August, 1967.

ROUTINE
UNCLASSIFIED

ASIDE. Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 350 of 7 August.

Following MAP report on part played by Moroccan delegation at Khartoum Conference is carried this morning by Le Petit Marocain Begins:-

Le Maroc, au cours de la Conference des Ministres Arabes des Affaires Etrangères qui vient de prendre fin, a Khartoum, sous la direction eclairee de S.M. Le Roi, a fait montre d'un esprit de perspicacite profonde, comme il lá d'ailleurs prouve tous les echelons que ce soit sur le plan interne ou externe. La question de l'embargo sur les exportations du petrole arabe etait parmi les points importants que la Conference. Du fait que le petrole constitue un facteur primordial a etudiee, dans l'economie des pays arabes. Ce propos, les milieux proches de la delegation Marocaine indiquent que le representant du Maroc, au cours de ses interventions, essaye de donner au projet sur l'embargo un caractere de sincerite et d'objectivite. C'est ainsi que la delegation Marocaine a preconise de ne prendre aucune decision jusqu'a que toutes les conjonctures, les circonstances et les resultats attendus quant a cet embargo, soient etudies.

En fait, les questions arabes importantes et a l'echelon general, ne peuvent etre reglees, tant qu'un probleme aussi grave, qu'est celui du differend frontalier Algero-Marocain, n'a pas trouve de solution dans le cadre du monde arabe. Il convient de constater que les Ministres Arabes des Affaires Etrangeres ont convenu pour que toutes les campagnes de presse et de radio soient arretees entre les pays arabes et d'appliquer

(4006) Wt.32978/D126 50m 9/63 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

/toutes.....

toutes les dispositions du pacte de solidarite arabe signe lors de la Conference au "Sommet" arabe de Casablanca en Septembre, 1965.

Il fait aussi signaler que la delegation de la Republique Arabe Unie a suggere un projet sur le reglement de l'affaire du Yemen et ce, en mettant en valeur l'accord de Djeddah de 1965, lorsqu' on sait que cette affaire constitue le premier obstacle dans les relations entre le rau et l'arabie seoudite.

Si cette affaire a retenu enormement l'attention des Ministres arabes des Affaires Étrangères par rapport a la clarification de l'atmosphere arabe, il n'en demeure pas moins que le differend frontalier Algero-Marocain occupe egalement une importance capitale quant a la purification de cette atmosphere.

Selon des sources proches de la Conference, la delegation Marocaine a saisi cette occasion pour souligner que l'assainissement de l'atmosphere arabe ne peut etre complet qu'avec la reglement de l'affaire du Yemen, mais bien avec la solution de tous les problemes qui electrisent cette ambiance, et a leur tete le contentieux frontalier Algero-Marocain. Ends.

WALKER

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

(10712/67)

CANADIAN EMBASSY,
British Interests Section,
CAIRO.

8 August, 1967.

Still no sign of any Moroccan activity! ALS 16.VIII

Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Khartoum

This is a brief summary of the course of local reactions.

2. You will recall that in two articles before 23 July Heikal prepared the ground rather tentatively for an Arab Summit. In his 23 July speech, the President himself came down in favour of a summit, saying "we are not against any Arab country. We do not change the social system in any Arab country. We are not against the influence of any Arab country. We are only against Imperialism...." The general view here was that the Algerians and Syrians at least would go very reluctantly. Essentially, however, everything depended on King Feisal.

3. The Egyptians did their best to take the wind out of Feisal's sails by their offer to go back to the 1965 Agreement with Feisal over Yemen. When the Foreign Ministers did meet their discussions were very fully reported here, with every conviction that this gesture was going to make the meeting a success. The emphasis was not however on the abandonment of ideological differences, but on unity in the face of the enemy. After a day or two it began to be plain that there were nevertheless differences between the Arabs, no matter what formal unanimity there was on "giving priority to the removal of the traces of aggression". By the 5th Ahram's editorial was talking about "perceptible progress" towards agreement on "certain problems" concerning Arab solidarity, and Akhbar was saying that the most important thing was not a complete agreement by the Ministers but that the Arabs emerged from the conference more united than they had been before. On the 6th only Massaa dealt with the meeting in its editorial and on the 7th Ahram was saying it was difficult to define the results, since the true success of the meetings would only be known in the next meeting in Khartoum on 26 August.

/4..

D. J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East Africa Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 15 AUG 1967

4. I hope I have not wasted telegraphic space in sending you press reports from here on the course of the meeting. The press of 6 and 7 August complained that some Ministers had changed their earlier view points (in particular Mongi Slim had had a violent row with the Iraqi Minister and other "difficulties" had arisen on the 5th). Even after the closure of the conference discussions had gone on between various delegations into the small hours and up to the last moment. The delegations of Kuwait, Syria and Yemen had come back to Cairo for further talks. Mahgoub had had contacts with the Syrians and Algerians, who accepted a summit but thought it necessary to "eliminate the influences of foreign pressures on certain participating states, particularly over the stopping of oil". He had also had further talks with the Saudi Foreign Minister on the method of implementation of the Sudanese proposal to form a tripartite committee to discuss the carrying out of the Jeddah agreement and the differences which had arisen over this. (Riad was quoted on 6 August as having said he had no objection to the tripartite committee studying the question of Yemen as a committee, as well as exercising its function of control of the agreement, and that the U.A.R. were setting no time limits on its execution, which could be immediate or could follow the Summit meeting). Akhbar said that Ministers waited until the end of the meeting for a reply from King Feisal and that when it came it was only a request for clarifications.

5. Today's editorials are cautious but hopeful: this is a test of Arab unity but "we do not deny some of the differences between the Arab countries are considerable" (Akhbar). A long article in Ahram asks what would be the point of talking about the attitudes of certain states when hope had not been lost that the future would reveal more strength than appeared at present. Some states had favoured agreement on a summit meeting without fixing a date; others, of leaving the date to be fixed by the Sudan after consultations; a third, of agreeing on a firm date now. Algeria, supported by Syria and Yemen, had agreed to the last but only on condition that there would then be a practical programme to which the Arab leaders would be committed. It was finally decided that the date of 29 August should be agreed on but not announced until the Sudanese had confirmed it through their bilateral contacts. But it had become known to the press agencies very quickly. The article concluded that in the light of what had happened in Khartoum, whether one liked it or not there would have to be a revised evaluation of the whole political situation, including the situation vis-à-vis the African and Asian states. The results of the economic meeting in Baghdad would affect the course of events.

6. All this has naturally added up here to an impression that things did not go very smoothly and even that a Summit is still in doubt (though it would be a sad blow to the pretentions of Arab unity if after all this it did not take place).

I am copying this letter to Chanceries at Washington, Khartoum, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, Ankara and New Delhi and to UKMIS New York, L.I.C. Aden and J.I.C. Cyprus.

(R. M. Tesh)

1076

Tel. No. 84 Retel

AJS 16.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 15 AUG 1967

Cypher/Cat. A

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 446 8 August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 446 of 8 August
Repeated for information to Cairo, Washington, Jedda, UKMission Geneva, UKMission New York, HICOMA Aden (Personal) and Saving to other Middle East Posts.

The Yemen.

The U.A.R. initiative for the ratification of the Jedda Agreement has run into difficulties here.

2. Sallals representative at the Foreign Ministers Conference Mohd Abdellaziz Salam announced on 6 August that the Republicans have reservations about the Egyptian proposals; they would not compromise over anything affecting the sovereignty of the Yemen. He said that his country would not accept a plebiscite (provided for in the Jedda Agreement) since the Yemeni people have already decided their own future (on 26 September 1962) when the Republican system was declared in the Yemen.) He added that to impose a plebiscite on the Yemen at the instigation of another country was an interference in the Yemens domestic affairs.

3. We understand from journalists covering the Conference that the initial reply from Jedda to the Egyptian proposals was cool; the Saudis were not anxious to deal with the problem in a multilateral way through the Conference. As Chairman of the Conference Mahgoub telegraphed King Feisal for further clarification. When this arrived it was still equivocal and questioned the U.A.R's motives in dredging up the Jedda Agreement at such a time and in such a manner. The Conference appears to have agreed however on the formation of a Three Nation Committee, U.A.R., Saudi Arabia and the Sudan to tackle the problem and to try to get negotiations going.

F.O. pass Priority Cairo 28, Washington 27, Jedda 7, UKMission Geneva 1, UKMission New York 28, HICOMA Aden (Personal) 4 and Saving to other Arab posts unnumbered.

Mr. Reddaway

Sent 0615Z/8 August 1967
Recd 0946Z/8 August 1967

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

[No action taken re Saving other Arab posts by Room 8].

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Arabian Dept. CONFIDENTIAL

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Publication prochaine d'un Livre blanc sur l'agression

Voici le texte intégral d'une résolution adoptée par le colloque des juristes arabes.

1) Le peuple arabe palestinien est le peuple détenteur de la souveraineté sur la Palestine. Il y a vécu sans discontinuité ni contestation ;

2) Après la première guerre mondiale, la Palestine fut placée sous mandat de la Société des Nations afin de la préparer à accéder à l'indépendance sous la direction d'un gouvernement national ;

3) La création d'Israël en 1948 est un phénomène colonial d'agression, résultante de la collusion du mouvement sioniste mondial avec les forces impérialistes. Ceci entraina l'expulsion de la majorité du peuple arabe de sa patrie et l'implantation d'éléments immigrants étrangers, sans aucun lien historique, politique et culturel avec la région. Le but de tout cela était d'imposer la domination et l'influence dans le cadre des actions de dépossession des peuples arabes et de la perpétuation de la domination sur l'Asie et l'Afrique ;

4) La création d'Israël est un phénomène raciste puisque Israël s'est constitué sur une base ethnique en vertu de laquelle il est l'Etat des juifs. Les législations israéliennes successives dans les domaines soit de la nationalité, soit de la propriété agraire, soit de l'enseignement, soit du travail, démontrent la politique de persécution raciale qu'Israël pratique à l'encontre des habitants autochtones arabes qui furent réduits à une minorité persécutée ;

5) Le principe de l'autodétermination, confirmé par la charte des Nations unies de même que par les résolutions successives de l'Assemblée générale, est un principe fondamental qui doit s'exercer à l'égard du peuple palestinien, lequel revendique son droit à la liberté et à l'indépendance ;

6) La résolution des Nations unies portant partage de la Palestine est fondamentalement nulle, car l'Assemblée générale n'est pas compétente pour créer des Etats et mettre fin à leur existence. Il ne lui appartient pas en particulier de porter atteinte, dans ses résolutions, au droit des peuples à l'autodétermination ;

7) La constitution d'Israël sur une base que ne reconnait pas le droit international n'est pas de nature à créer une situation légale à laquelle serait assurée la protection que le droit international reconnait aux situations légales. L'écoulement du temps ne saurait conférer à une telle situation une qualité légale. Les règles de la prescription ne s'y appliquent pas.

De fait, les Palestiniens n'ont pas renoncé à revendiquer leur patrie et les Arabes n'ont pas cessé de déployer leurs efforts pour rétablir leurs droits légitimes en Palestine ;

8) La liberté de passage dans le canal de Suez ne contrevient pas aux mesures, prises par la République arabe unie, interdisant le passage aux navires et aux marchandises israéliens dans le canal. En effet, la convention de Constantinople et la déclaration du gouvernement égyptien de 1957 ne confèrent à Israël aucun droit d'autant que cette convention accorde à l'Egypte le droit de prendre des mesures d'autodéfense dans le canal de Suez ;

9) Le golfe d'Akaba est historiquement un golfe arabe sur lequel les Etats arabes ont exercé sans discontinuité leur souveraineté du fait qu'il fait partie de leur territoire. De plus, son ouverture navigable le reliant à la mer Rouge, ainsi que la totalité des eaux du golfe font partie, conformément aux règles du Droit de la Mer, des eaux territoriales des Etats arabes. La présence illégitime d'Israël sur le golfe d'Akaba a commencé en 1949, par suite de l'usurpation par Israël — postérieurement à l'accord d'armistice avec l'Egypte — du village arabe d'Om Rechrache et sa transformation en un port, celui d'Eilath. Israël n'a utilisé le golfe et le détroit de Tiran qu'en conséquence de son agression contre l'Egypte en 1956 ;

10) Jérusalem est une ville arabe faisant partie des territoires sur lesquels les Etats arabes successifs ont exercé leur souveraineté dans des conditions garantissant la sauvegarde et la liberté d'accès aux Lieux saints. L'usurpation par Israël de la ville arabe de Jérusalem, après l'agression de 1967, est un fait illégal condamné par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU dans deux résolutions adoptées au cours de la session extraordinaire de juin 1967. Réclamer l'internationalisation de Jérusalem constitue une atteinte à la souveraineté arabe et une violation du droit des peuples à l'autodétermination. Au surplus, l'internationalisation ne saurait être considérée comme le régime idéal pour la sauvegarde des Lieux saints ;

11) Le détournement des eaux du Jourdain par Israël est un acte illicite, incompatible avec les règles internationales établies en matière d'usage des eaux des fleuves internationaux et implique une violation des droits de la Syrie, du Liban et de la Jordanie ;

12) Les réfugiés arabes ont le droit de réintégrer leur patrie. C'est un droit fondamental que sanctionne le droit des peuples à l'autodétermination et que confirment les résolutions successives de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Il n'est pas admissible que les habitants arabes de la Palestine soient chassés de leur patrie et transformés en réfugiés pour laisser la place à l'implantation d'immigrants étrangers ;

13) Le Colloque condamne la dernière agression contre les pays arabes et déplore la carence des organes des Nations unies à mettre en œuvre les principes de la Charte en faveur du rétablissement du Droit ;

14) Le Colloque développera les conclusions de ses travaux dans un livre qui sera publié en plusieurs langues à l'adresse de l'opinion publique internationale.

15) Un Colloque juridique élargi, comprenant, outre les juristes arabes, des juristes des diverses parties du monde, se tiendra en un lieu et à une date qui seront fixés ultérieurement.

1076

British Interests
Section,
Swiss Embassy,
ALGIERS.

UNCLASSIFIED

8 August, 1967.

Please refer to my letter of 7 August (not copied).

2. I enclose a copy of the final resolution of the Colloquium of Arab Lawyers published in El Moudjahid of 8 August.

(J.C. Kay)

R.H. Baker Esq.,
North and East Africa Department.

AS 18.Vm

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
17 AUG 1967

No. 1072/2035/67
1072/2036/67

1076

THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AT NEW YORK

[redacted]nts its compliments to H.M. Representative, Rabat and has the honour to transmit the under-mentioned documents.

United Kingdom Mission
To The United Nations .....
New York,

9 August, 1967.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure

Name and Date	Subject
Despatch Nos. 21 and 22 of 9 August, 1967.	The United Nations and the Arab/Israel crisis: The Security Council The Emergency Session of the General Assembly

A.L. Southern 13.XI
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Fm S/S
I.D.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
22 AUG 1967

The United Nations and the Arab/Israel crisis:

The Security Council

Summary

1. Complaints circulated to the Security Council of frontier violations on the Israel/Syria border increased noticeably in April and May. The Syrians seem to have persuaded the Egyptians that an Israeli attack on South West Syria was imminent, and the Russians did nothing to dispel their fears. (Paragraph 2.)

2. U Thant's handling of first unofficial, and then official, Egyptian requests for UNEF's withdrawal. Some troop contributors were against withdrawal, but their position was weakened by India and Yugoslavia. Argument on the rights and wrongs of U Thant's decision will continue, but he took full responsibility for it. (Paragraphs 3-5.)

3. Within days, the Egyptians announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Our efforts to get the Security Council to meet and consider the dangerous situation failed. Its implications began to sink hometo the Latins and some Afro-Asians, and the Council finally met to consider U Thant's report on UNEF and his appeal for restraint by all. But there was still no general determination to deal with the threat to peace. (Paragraphs 6-7.)

4. The outbreak of war shocked the Council into action, but its first call for an immediate cease-fire was delayed for 36 hours while the Arabs argued about conditions for Israeli withdrawal. The Russians withdrew their support on this when the extent of Arab defeat was clearer. The Israelis, Jordanians and Egyptians then accepted the cease-fire. (Paragraphs 8-9.)

5. The Syrians followed suit shortly afterwards, but the Israelis fought on until they had captured the heights overlooking the northern demilitarised zone. Feeling in the Council began to grow against them. We and the Americans were challenged to declare our position on immediate withdrawal. But it was clear even then that a majority in the Council would not support a resolution unduly weighted against Israel. (Paragraph 10.)

6. Conclusions. A precarious cease-fire was achieved but the Council's debates were exceedingly bitter and unconstructive. The Arabs, chagrined beyond all bounds, were given stiff doses of public support by the Indians and by the Russians - except on the "Big Lie". (Paragraphs 11-12.)

7. The Council can only act when broad agreement on the next step exists between the great powers and between the parties to a dispute. We should not expect more, while remembering that only the U.N. can provide the services it does to the international community. The despatch of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the area, as proposed by H.M.G., could be the next constructive step. (Paragraphs 13-14.)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 21
(1072/2035/67) 9 August, 1967.

Sir,

I have the honour to report upon the United Nations' handling of the Arab-Israel crisis from the events leading up to the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the 18th of May to the beginning of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on the 17th of June.

2. Throughout the spring the provocations and ripostes along the Syrian-Israeli border, culminating in the destruction of six Syrian MIG aircraft on the 7th of April, increased in seriousness and frequency and were duly reported to the Security Council. The Israelis had by now given up hope that in the face of the Soviet veto the Security Council would pay serious heed to complaints from their side. Mr. Eshkol's statement of the 13th of May threatened fierce retaliation if border raids continued. Very soon afterwards the Syrian-UAR Mutual Defence Agreement was activated. It seems that by about the beginning of May the Syrians had convinced themselves and the UAR that the Israelis were preparing for a major air and land attack on South West Syria (though this did not accord with UNTSO's assessments). Egyptian suspicions were confirmed when the Russians told a UAR parliamentary delegation on or about the 14th of May that there was a premeditated Israeli plan to invade Syria; the Russians have never publicly denied Nasser's statement on this point. What the Russians may have done privately

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George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

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privately to correct the Syrian assessment, and its repercussions in the UAR, we do not know. Their efforts to lessen the harm done were certainly not effective and they must take a large share of responsibility for what followed.

The withdrawal of UNEF

3. The UAR build-up in Sinai started about the 15th of May. This became known in New York the next day when the UAR Chief of Staff asked General Rikhye, the Commander of UNEF, to withdraw immediately all his troops from the territory of the UAR into the Gaza Strip "for their own safety". The Secretary-General reacted at once in an Aide-memoire to the UAR Permanent Representative in which he deplored the manner in which the UAR request had been communicated, and insisted that he be formally consulted. At the same time he ordered General Rikhye to maintain his positions. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 17th of May, U Thant consulted representatives of the troop contributors to UNEF. At this meeting Canada, supported by Denmark and Brazil, held out for resisting UAR pressure for the precipitate removal of UNEF, but other contributors gave little support and India and Yugoslavia were apparently in favour of acceding to the UAR request. At this point the Secretary-General was undecided how he should act. He gave Lord Caradon to believe that he thought a personal appeal to Nasser might calm the situation. But even at this stage he was of the opinion that any attempt by Nasser to dictate the deployment of UNEF could not be accepted, and must result in the evacuation of the complete force. The Minister of State spoke in the strongest terms to U Thant urging him to consider very carefully this crucial problem, since on his decision could depend peace in the Middle East as well as the whole future of United Nations peacekeeping.

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4. At noon on the 18th of May U Thant received a formal communication from the Egyptian Foreign Minister requesting him to take the necessary steps for the Force's withdrawal "as soon as possible". Four hours later, the Secretary-General informed the UAR of his intention to comply with their request. Having done so, he called a meeting of the UNEF Advisory Group, together with the troop contributors who were not members of the group, and informed them of his decision.

5. This momentous step has been much criticised. U Thant himself has justified it repeatedly and at length. There were strong legal and constitutional arguments for what he did. Moreover, there were the practical facts that the Indian and Yugoslav elements were likely to be pulled out by their Governments at any moment and the whole force was, in the Secretary-General's view, in considerable danger. Previous experience of attacks on United Nations contingents in the Congo were much in the minds of his advisers, Bunche and Urquhart. On the other hand, the grave dangers arising from his decision were so obvious that they might have argued at least for his playing for time. No doubt debate on the rights and wrongs of this decision will go on for a long time. But what cannot be questioned is the courage of the Secretary-General in taking upon himself full responsibility for this decision, which he believed to be the right one and which he believed it to be his duty to take.

The Security Council

6. After his decision, the Secretary-General flew to Cairo to meet Nasser. But even while he was in the air, the situation dramatically worsened. On the 23rd of May Nasser announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli vessels and to any vessels carrying strategic cargoes to Elath.

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Immediately we and others pressed for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. But, at that time, the Arabs believed that they had got away with a substantial and bloodless victory and their friends opposed a meeting. As a result, a whole day was lost in fruitless negotiation and finally the Council only met on the morning of the 24th of May. Even then all attempts to pass an uncontroversial resolution supporting the Secretary-General's efforts in Cairo were blocked. We were even accused of seeking to "over-dramatise" the situation; an accusation which subsequent events were rapidly to disprove.

7. The Secretary-General returned to New York on the 25th of May. After his report to the Council on the 26th of May, the dangers of the situation, particularly at the flashpoint of Aqaba, began to sink home to the Latins and some of the Afro-Asians, if not to the Arabs. In a further series of daily meetings of the Council beginning on the 29th of May, we strove for an endorsement of the appeal in U Thant's report for the foregoing of belligerence, restraint and lowering of tensions, but still without success. On the 3rd of June the Prime Minister himself impressed upon U Thant and the President of the Security Council the seriousness with which Her Majesty's Government viewed the situation and the urgent need for concerted United Nations action. It was clear, however, when the Council adjourned on the 3rd of June without result, that there was still no general determination to get to grips with the threat to peace in the Middle East. Meanwhile rumours of the formation of a naval force by maritime powers to open the Straits of Tiran raised Arab hackles against the West.

Outbreak of war

8. War broke out on the 5th of June. Only this finally shocked the Council into action. We at once urged upon the

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Council the need for an immediate cease-fire resolution. But while the issue of the fighting was in doubt, the Arabs - as ill-informed as ever on what was happening on the ground - would not have such a resolution unless coupled with a simultaneous call for withdrawal of Israeli forces. In this they were backed by the Russians and the Indians. We and the Americans strove to bridge these differences, but the negotiations stuck on definition of the conditions of withdrawal. AmbassadorsGoldberg (United States) and Fedorenko (USSR) had three long meetings on the 5th and 6th, but no agreement could be reached.

9. As the 6th of June wore on, it became clear that the Israeli pre-emptive air strikes had been successful, and there was little doubt left on the outcome of the war. We saw then a dramatic reversal of the Soviet position in the Security Council. At 7.15 p.m. a resolution calling for a simple case-fire was passed unanimously. The Russians may have informed the Egyptians of their change of line some hours before the vote; but there seems to have been no consultation. The next day, the 7th of June, a resolution setting a firm time for implementation of the cease-fire was passed. Israel accepted this and the Jordanians were the first Arabs to do the same. On the 8th of June the Egyptians accepted the cease-fire. Also on that day the Russians put forward a tough draft resolution condemning Israeli aggression and demanding that she should withdraw her troops behind the armistice lines of 1949. This remained their position for the rest of the debate until their draft was voted upon and failed on the 14th of June.

10. After the Egyptians had accepted the cease-fire, the Syrians became perilously exposed. Though they also accepted

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the cease-fire late on the 8th of June, hostilities continued until Quneitra, the garrison town in South West Syria, from which the troublesome Syrian emplacements overlooking the northern demilitarised zone were garrisoned and supplied, fell to the Israelis on the 10th of June. Feeling in the Council began to shift strongly against the Israelis when it appeared that they were intent on making further territorial gains, in open breach of the cease-fire resolutions. We and the Americans were increasingly challenged to declare ourselves on withdrawal, and it rapidly became clear that readiness to support a call for immediate and unconditional withdrawal was to be the touchstone by which the Arabs would distinguish friend from foe. As the failure of the Soviet motion on the 14th of June showed, it was also clear that a majority in the Security Council did not think that a call for condemnation of and withdrawal by the Israelis, without some balancing call on the Arabs to abandon the state of war, would help the situation.

Conclusion

11. Though they achieved a precarious cease-fire, this series of tense, vituperative and largely nocturnal Security Council meetings ended in deadlock on the more difficult issue of a settlement. The passion and violence of the Arab speeches against Israel suggested that the will to settle on the Arab side did not begin to exist. Shaken by the swift and devastating military defeat of their clients, the first reaction of the Soviet Union was to give them unstinting public support. Only on the subject of the "Big Lie", which the Minister of State nailed by repeated and categoric denials, did Mr. Fedorenko fail to support the Arabs. The Bulgarian representative revelled in the atmosphere of intemperate and tendentious

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speech. Even amongst the many unedifying moments of the debate one picture stands out - the stricken face of Mr. Goldberg, profoundly vulnerable in this dispute, when taunted by the Syrian delegate as being the representative of Israel rather than of the United States. India, for a mixture of motives, abandoned all pretence of objectivity and emerged as the Voice of the UAR. Mali, as a radical African country, took up sides automatically against the "American imperialists". So the Council was riven by a deep division.

12. As the world's top body for ensuring international peace and security, the Council was not impressive. Its recent enlargement to fifteen members rendered it less and not more efficient. But such success as the Council achieved was due in no small measure to the considered and constructive interventions by the Minister of State.

13. The Middle East crisis has once again shown clearly that the Security Council is, in general, only able to act when there is broad agreement between the great powers and between the parties to a dispute on what is to be done. The United Nations Organisation nevertheless provides to the international community a service which, in the absence of anything better, is of great value. When the parties realised that they had all had enough of fighting, only the Security Council was there to provide a quick and effective means of bringing the war to an end. It is also United Nations machinery, fragile and over-extended though it may be, which maintains the Council's cease-fire, on the whole effectively. One must hope that when all the parties have concluded that they must make some concession in order to break the deadlock which still persists on the broader question of settlement, the Security Council will again

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be able to provide the necessary machinery, the necessary catalyst, to enable such concessions to be successfully negotiated. Indeed it is with such an end in view that you, Sir, have decided to back the idea of a United Nations Special Representative for the area.

14. The Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which, by an unexpected and untypical Soviet manoeuvre, formed the sequel to this series of Security Council meetings is the subject of an accompanying despatch.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Geneva (U.K. Delegation to the U.N.), Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington; to POMEC (Aden), and to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Group, Nicosia.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(L. C. Glass)

The United Nations and the Arab/Israel crisis:

The Emergency Session of the General Assembly

Summary

1. With the Security Council deadlocked, the Russians unexpectedly (and probably unconstitutionally) asked for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Session's high point was the Glassboro Summit, which gave members the hope that business might at least be going on between the two super-powers. Your speech on 21 June was warmly welcomed, not least by the Arabs. (Paragraphs 2-4.)

2. Behind the scenes the search for an acceptable form of words went on. Yugoslavia and other "non-aligned" states tabled a draft calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal, but no condemnation. The Latins produced a better draft linking withdrawal with an end to the state of belligerency. But it omitted to make mention of a special representative of the Secretary-General, for which we were pressing. (Paragraphs 5-7.)

3. France decided at an early stage to vote for the "non-aligned" draft. Thereafter our concern was to keep the Latins solid and to prevent the rival draft coming within striking distance of the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. Eventually both drafts failed, but the Latin did relatively better than its rival. (Paragraphs 8-10.)

4. Resolutions on humanitarian assistance to the refugees, and on the status of Jerusalem, were also passed, both unanimously. (Paragraph 11.)

5. The Session was thereafter kept alive by its pro-Arab President Pazhwak, and by the Russians, who were desperately keen to take home some sort of resolution. The Dobrynin/Goldberg contacts began. The Latins continued the search for a compromise resolution, and a second resolution on Jerusalem was adopted. (Paragraphs 12-13.)

6. On 19 July Dobrynin and Goldberg agreed on revised versions of the Latin draft, but the Algerian Foreign Minister rejected this firmly when Gromyko put it to him. The Russians then tried to wind up the Session with all speed, but had to vote against the Arabs to achieve this. (Paragraph 14.)

7. Conclusions. Increased Latin American cohesion has made them a political force to be reckoned with at the U.N. The Pakistanis did far better than the Indians in Arab eyes. The French did poorly in spite of pressure on OCAM states. The Israeli case was brilliantly handled by Mr. Eban, against whom the Arabs could field no equal. (Paragraph 15.)

8. Soviet tactics and motives were inexplicable, except in terms of policy changes at the highest level in Moscow. Russian efforts to agree with the Americans on a substantive resolution were probably genuine, and may augur well for the longer term. As to the Arabs, their confusion at the way the Russians handled them ended in an obdurate but predictable refusal to accept Soviet advice. The continuing deadlock at the United Nations reflected growing international realisation that there are two valid sides to the Arab/Israel question. (Paragraphs 16-18.)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 22
(1072/2036/67)

9 August, 1967.

Sir,

I have the honour to report on the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, and the lessons to be drawn therefrom.

2. When it became clear in the Security Council about the 12th of June that both the Soviet and the American draft resolutions (the former calling for condemnation of Israel and immediate withdrawal of her forces from Arab soil) would fail, and that no compromise or consensus was likely to be forthcoming, the Russians made a totally unexpected move. While the Council was still considering the resolutions on the table, Mr. Gromyko wrote to U Thant on the 13th of June requesting the immediate convening of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Many members were dubious about the usefulness and constitutionality of such a meeting but nobody was prepared, given the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East, to stand out against the proposal except the United States and Israel, joined somewhat incongruously by Botswana. The constitutional significance of the Soviet request, and its possible implications for United Nations peacekeeping, are the subject of another despatch. It is indeed a sign of changing times that it should be the Russians and not the Americans who appealed to the Assembly from the Security Council.

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George Brown, M.P.,
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3. The high point of the Emergency Special Session took place outside the United Nations. This was the Glassboro Summit between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. I have read with great interest Sir Patrick Dean's despatch from Washington (No. 87 of the 29th of June) on that meeting, and can add nothing to it from the United Nations viewpoint.

4. During the Special Session's first week, all the major powers spoke, as well as the main combatants in the war. Your own statement of the 21st of June (particularly the passage on the status of Jerusalem) received much praise as the most constructive single contribution, and did much to dispel the feeling that Her Majesty's Government would inevitably follow an American pro-Israel policy. More important, it did much to restore Arab confidence in British neutrality, which had been much sapped by their uncritical acceptance of the "Big Lie".

5. While the main statements were being made, intensive informal consultations went on. You had important and constructive bilateral talks with many of the visiting Ministers. Within the Assembly there was from the beginning no enthusiasm for the crude Soviet draft resolution calling for condemnation of Israel and immediate unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory. There was an equal lack of enthusiasm for the American draft, which critics saw as making withdrawal contingent on negotiations between the combatants on matters of principle. It also became clearer as the week wore on that the Soviet attempt to make the Emergency Special Session an occasion for putting Israel and her American friend publicly in the dock had misfired, though many statements of great bitterness were made. An exception was King Hussein's dignified and realistic statement of the 26th of June.

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6. Lobbying for something more acceptable to the bulk of the membership than the Soviet draft led on the 28th of June to the tabling by Yugoslavia and thirteen other "non-aligned" nations, prominently India, of a draft which, while still calling for immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal, did not call upon the Assembly to condemn Israel. The resolution's last operative paragraph seemed however to be open to the interpretation that it barred the Security Council from taking any further action on the Middle East - of which subject the Council remained formally seized - until the Israeli withdrawal had been completed. It was this provision in particular which we and others found one-sided and unacceptable. Moreover, we saw no prospect of a resolution in these terms effectively achieving the object of a withdrawal of Israel's forces. These objections remained in spite of later revisions which did a good deal to offset the resolution's one-sidedness.

7. The Latin Americans meanwhile had been in almost permanent conclave with each other, as well as taking part in meetings organised by the Danes, the Americans and ourselves to work out a more balanced draft. This sought to link withdrawal with an end to the state of belligerency and other signs of recognition by both sides that the threat or use of force would have to be abjured in future. Throughout these consultations we pressed strongly for a provision calling for the appointment of a personal representative of the Secretary-General to be in contact with the parties in the area. It was not however possible to obtain broad agreement to this throughout the group and it was omitted from the text finally tabled by Dr. Solomon of Trinidad, as Chairman of the Latin American group, on the 30th of June.

8. It was clear from the start that the Communists and Arabs, with a minimum of African support, could block the Latin .

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American resolution. It was also clear fairly early on that 30 to 35 votes could be counted on against the "non-aligned" draft. Could the "non-aligned" hope for a two-thirds majority in such circumstances? France's decision to vote for the "non-aligned" draft, which was made known between the 1st and 2nd of July, was crucial since if the great majority of OCAM's fourteen members followed her lead, the "non-aligned" would have been within striking distance of their goal.

9. Our own lobbying efforts were devoted to maintaining support for the Latin American draft and dissuading those who, while opposed to the "non-aligned" draft resolution, were tempted, for reasons of political expediency, to abstain rather than to vote against it. With this last point in view, and also since it was of great importance to us that there should be an alternative resolution for which we could cast a positive vote, thus making clear our support for the principle of withdrawal providing it was in a proper context, we strongly urged the Latin Americans to put their resolution to a vote even if the "non-aligned" draft had already been adopted. In the event, however, this situation did not arise.

10. The result of the voting on the 4th of July has already been reported but is perhaps worth recapitulating. The "non-aligned" draft attracted less affirmative votes than we had estimated (53 for; 46 against; 20 abstentions). The bulk came from the Latin Americans and Western Europeans (except Sweden and Finland, who abstained); they were joined by one Asian and seven African states. The votes in favour were almost entirely Arab, extreme Moslem or Communist, plus four OCAM countries. The Latin American draft did rather better than expected (57 for; 43 against; 20 abstentions). The Latin Americans voted for it as a bloc, as did the overwhelming

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majority of the Western Europeans. In addition, seven OCAM and six English-speaking African states voted in favour. Japan voted in favour of both draft resolutions.

11. A resolution on humanitarian assistance to refugees and other victims of war, tabled by Sweden, was passed with only two abstentions; and a Pakistan resolution calling on Israel not to alter the status of Jerusalem, and to rescind all measures already taken, was also passed with a vote of ninety-nine in favour, including our own.

12. At this point the Americans and Israelis and many others would happily have wound up the Session. But Mr. Pazhwak, the Afghan President of the Assembly, by somewhat devious use of "consultations", kept the Session in being from the 4th of July to the 21st of July to provide an opportunity for a compromise substantive resolution to be concocted.

13. The period was marked by growing Arab intransigence, orchestrated by the diminutive but pugnacious Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika; and increasingly desperate attempts by the Soviet Delegation, under Gromyko, to patch up some sort of resolution - at worst procedural if a compromise on substance could not be obtained - before returning home. Ambassador Dobrynin from Washington approached Goldberg on the 9th of July with a watered-down version of the "non-aligned" draft; not unexpectedly this was turned down. The Latins continued actively to search for a compromise, and came under pressure from the Russians to accept ingenious but inadequate variations of their original text. The Russians also exerted pressure in Arab capitals in the hope of getting agreement to a compromise draft. These efforts did not appear to have much effect in New York, where on the 14th of July unanimous adoption of a second resolution on Jerusalem did something to raise Arab

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morale, thereby making them more intransigent on substance than ever.

14. On the 18th of July Presidents Boumedienne and Arif arrived in Moscow to communicate to the Soviet leaders the line adopted at the Cairo meeting of the Presidents of the UAR, Syria, Algeria and Iraq, and the Prime Minister of the Sudan. On the same day Dr. Solomon, on behalf of the Latin drafting group, finally bowed out of the negotiations with a letter to the President of the Assembly, which said that the results of the group's efforts to arrive at a compromise were "mainly negative". On the 19th and 20th of July Gromyko and Dobrynin were again in touch with the latter offering further concessions; this time two alternative versions were floated of the Latin American draft, both of them rather better (from our point of view) than the version we had voted for on the 4th of July. Many Western delegations had grave doubts whether the Arabs could accept the proposed Soviet wording even tacitly, but the Russians appeared sanguine enough, though they suggested an extension of the Session for yet another four or five days during which the Arabs could be worked on. The crucial stage in their negotiations was reached on the evening of the 20th of July, when Gromyko and Bouteflika met to discuss texts. Without even consulting his government, Bouteflika rejected both proposed drafts out of hand. Furthermore he let it be known that he would personally denounce any Arab delegation who abstained on the vote. The next morning, all the other Arabs, including the jaded UAR who had put it about earlier that they would abstain, had swung firmly against the Soviet proposal. Thereafter the Russians had no alternative but to try and get the Session wound up with all speed. Even this proved difficult as the Arabs, influenced this time by Pachachi

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of Iraq, let it be known that they did not want any adjournment of the Session. They accordingly voted against a modest procedural resolution, concocted, though not sponsored, by the Indians, inviting the President to adjourn the Session "temporarily". This was supported by the West, the Soviet Union, the East Europeans, most Latin Americans and some moderate Africans and Asians. This odd voting pattern showed all the great powers (with the usual exception of France, who abstained) lined up at the finish against the "victims of aggression". The latter had only themselves to thank.

Conclusion

15. It remains to ask what lessons and morals can be drawn from this extraordinary dénouement. Perhaps the most obvious gainers in stature were the Latin Americans, whose cohesion seemed to improve under intense pressures from the Communists and the more extreme Afro-Asians. Dr. Solomon of Trinidad gave a particularly clear-headed and courageous performance, and the Latins are conscious that they have flexed their muscles for all to see; at some temporary cost of popularity among the wilder Afro-Asians no doubt, but to their own considerable advantage as a group within the United Nations. The Pakistanis increased their credit with the Arabs as the leading sponsors of the two Status of Jerusalem resolutions and in doing so turned the tables on the Indians, whose Kashmir-based solicitude for Arab causes was scurvily rewarded. Indeed, at the end of the Assembly the Indians' irritation and disillusionment with Arab behaviour was second only to that of the Soviet Union. The West as a whole did well, perhaps at the cost of not separating its vital interests and concern for the area clearly enough from the Israeli presentation of their case. As in the Security Council, the Israeli presentation, if at times a little smug, was bravely and brilliantly handled

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by a team led by Mr. Eban, which had to deal with not one but nine Arab speeches at a time. The bitterness of the Arabs was enhanced by the applause given to the Israelis by the daily gallery of New York Jews. The French were unable to prevent seven OCAM states from voting for the Latin American draft on the 4th of July, in spite of strong pressure exerted in OCAM capitals. The Israelis were delighted and point to this as a notable dividend for their policy of limited but imaginative technical assistance to selected African states.

16. Soviet actions and the motives behind them during the Special Session were the greatest puzzle of all, to their allies as much as to the rest of us. They seemed to make every possible mistake, and ended not only with a rejection of their proposals by the Assembly, but with bitterness against them amongst the Arabs themselves. Their decision to call for an Emergency Special Session in the first place suggested that they would give the "victims of aggression" maximum propaganda support to make up for the fact that they had not stood by them militarily during the war. Such a policy, as was evident even at the time, involved serious risks because (a) it tied the Russians in advance to the defeated Arabs' chariot wheels; and (b) it had to be justified by outstanding success if it was to be acceptable domestically. By the 4th of July, when voting took place on the main resolutions before the Assembly, it was plain that the Soviet strategy had failed, in that a large segment of Afro-Asian opinion, and all the Latins, remained unconvinced of the justness of the Arab cause. Furthermore, the Arabs were increasingly dissatisfied at Soviet failure to deliver the goods, and suspicious of a sell-out at Glassboro.

17. The Russians then took frantic stock, sending Podgorny to,

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Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, keeping Gromyko on at the United Nations, and finally sending Malik to sit in Cairo and keep in constant touch with the highest policy-makers (whoever they might be) in Egypt. At the UN they worked relentlessly to arrive at a substantive resolution; when negotiations with the Latins failed finally on the 18th of July, the attempts to deal directly with the Americans on the basis of the despised Latin text began, and it became clearer than ever that the Russians were very much in earnest. It is noteworthy that Boumedienne's tough talking with Soviet leaders in Moscow after the Cairo meeting of the five "progressive" Arab Presidents took place on the same day as Dobrynin from Washington (not Fedorenko) began dropping in on Goldberg. One can only conclude that, after their failure on the 4th of July (perhaps when Podgorny returned and reported to Moscow), the Russians decided at the highest level that re-arming the "progressive" Arabs on the scale necessary to enable them to win the "fourth round" was likely to be too dangerous, in spite of all the tempting political arguments in favour. So they decided to try for Israeli withdrawal at all costs, thinking that if they could obtain that for their protégés, Arab delight at this restoration of their territorial losses would in the end outweigh their fierce criticisms of Soviet "flexibility" at the UN. In the event Arab objections to the revised Latin draft, as marshalled by Bouteflika, were stronger than the Russians expected. They were left with no choice but to press for the earliest possible adjournment of the Special Session. They may now continue their dialogue on withdrawal privately with the Americans, leaving the Arabs to stew in their own juice while the economic and military facts of post-war life sink in, slowly but bitterly. We can expect little change in.

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the/public Soviet line in the forthcoming debates in the Security Council, but we should I suggest be thankful for the last-minute realism which, if this analysis is correct, prevented them from doubling their military stake in an attempt to retrieve the Arab defeat. They perhaps calculate that if they can avoid further hostilities and too great an economic and financial drain on them by their clients, they have already gained handsome advantages in damage to Western influence and interests throughout the Arab world, and in the strengthening of their own influence.

18. The United Nations as such came in for more criticism. After all the talk, the General Assembly could not agree on the simplest form of substantive resolution covering the main problem. But in fact the deadlock reflected a valuable acceptance by the nations of the world that there really were two sides to this question. Acceptance of this is basic to future United Nations efforts to reach a settlement.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Geneva (U.K. Delegation to the U.N.), Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington; to POMEC (Aden), and to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Group, Nicosia.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(L. C. Glass)

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MAP-37

AL ANBAA: LA POLITIQUE ETRNGERE DU MAROC EST BASEE SUR LA SAGESSE, LA SAGACITE, LA CONSIDERATION A LONG TERME ET PROFONDE DES EVENEMENTS.

QS/AFS 18.VIII

RABAT, 10 AOUT.-(MAP)- DANS ON EDITORIAL LE JOURNAL ''AL-ANBAA'' DEFINIT LES REGLES QUI REGISSENT LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DU MAROC: LA SAGESSE, LA SAGACITE, LA CONSIDERATION A LONG TERME ET PROFONDE DES EVENEMENTS, L'EXAMEN CONSCIENT DES CONJONCTURES INTERNATIONALES ET DES ASPECTS DE LEUR DEVELOPPEMENT.

Enter

APRES AVOIR SOULIGNE QUE CETTE POLITIQUE EST AXEE SUR DES PRINCIPES ET DES OPTIONS QUE TOUT LE MONDE CONNAIT ET RAPPELE L'ATTITUDE ADOPTEE PAR LE MAROC AVANT, PENDANT ET APRES LE DECLENCHEMENT DE LA CRISE DU MOYEN ORIENT, L'EDITORIALISTE EVOQUE LE ROLE EFFICACE JOUE PAR LA DIPLOMATIE MAROCAINE LORS DE LA REUNION DE KHARTOUM ET LES ECHOS QUE S'EST FAIT LA PRESSE MONDIALE DU ROLE POSITIF JOUE PAR LE MAROC AU COURS DE CETTE CONFERENCE.

''C'EST LA NATURE MEME DU MAROC, POURSUIT L'EDITORIALISTE, D'AGIR SANS TAPAGE PARCE QU'IL OEUVRE AVEC FOI ET INTEGRITE ET PARCE QU'IL EST CONVAINCU QUE LES CAUSES QU'IL DEFEND DOIVENT TRIOMPHER ET QUE LA METHODE QU'IL UTILISE POUR LES DEFENDRE A FAIT LA PREUVE DE SON EFFICACITE, DE SA FORCE ET REALISE BIEN DES VICTOIRES.-(MAP)-

..SUIVRA..

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MAP-38

AL-ANBAA: LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DU MAROC....(DEUX).....

''RESTE A SOULIGNER UN FAIT, CONCLUT L'EDITORIALISTE, A SAVOIR QUE LES CONJONCTURES DELICATES QUE TRAVERSE NOTRE PARTIE ARABE, SI ELLE EXIGENT L'UNITE DES RANGS, CELLE DE LA VOLONTE ET DE LA LIGNE A SUIVRE, ELLES IMPLIQUENT EGALEMENT AVEC LE MEME IMPERATIF, UNE CONCEPTION NOUVELLE, UNE MENTALITE NOUVELLE ET UNE MANIERE NOUVELLE DE CONCONSIDERER LES EVENEMENTS EXCLUANT LES IMPULSIONS ET LES SENTIMENTS PASSIONNES.

''LE REVERS DOIT NOUS ENSEIGNER QUE NOUS VIVONS DANS UN MONDE IMMENSE ET FORT COMPLEXE ET QU'UNE ARME DECISIVE ET PUISSANTE FORGE LES EVENEMENTS DANS CE MONDE, CETTE ARME EST CELLE DE LA DIPLOMATIE QUI PREPARE LA TERRE ET LES CIRCONSTANCES PROPICES A L'UTILISATION DE TOUTES LES AUTRES ARMES''.-(MAP)-

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CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum Despatch No. 18 of 11 August, 1967

SUMMARY

Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference at Khartoum
1 - 5 August, 1967

The conference emerged from the strenuous efforts of Mahgoub, the Prime Minister, and President Azhari, to convene an Arab Summit for the purpose of considering a plan of action to restore Arab fortunes after the disasters of the Israeli war. (Paragraphs 1 and 2)

The proceedings were dominated by a determination to show a united Arab front to the world. There was no agreed agenda, and as far as an outsider could judge, the only firm decisions to come out were general support for a Summit meeting at Khartoum at the end of August, a preparatory meeting of Econmic and Oil Ministers in Baghdad on 15 August, and agreement, the status of which is uncertain, to appoint a three-man committee to reactivate the Jedda plan for settling the Yemeni question. Counter-measures against Israel were not apparently discussed seriously. (Paragraphs 3 and 4).

Other features of the Conference. The moderation of the Egyptians. The attendance of a Somali delegation as observers, and the non-attendance of the FLOSY delegation. Criticism of B.B.C. reporting. (Paragraph 5)

Sudanese reactions. There was no excitement in Khartoum; and pleasure that a high-powered Arab conference had met in Khartoum was mixed with disappointment that it had achieved so little. Mahgoub earned personal credit for his success in assembling the conference and for his able handling of the proceedings. Sadiq El Mahdi chose to see in the Conference an opportunity to endorse in public the extreme Arab line. (Paragraph 6).

In a negative sense British interests came out of the Conference as well as could be expected. A summit when Arab emotions ran deep could have caused further damage. This is not likely now. (Paragraph 7)

The Arabs are looking for a <u>modus vivendi</u> between themselves and with Israel. (Paragraph 8)

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22 AUG 1967

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No. 18
(10718)

BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION
OF THE ITALIAN EMBASSY,
KHARTOUM.
11 August, 1967.

Sir,

Arab Foreign Ministers' Meeting at Khartoum
1 - 5 August, 1967

I have telegraphed (Khartoum telegram No. 445) a brief summing up of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. I wish I could now submit a comprehensive report on the proceedings, but it has been a case of 'looking through a glass darkly', and I suspect that there was not a great deal to see on the other side. Moreover, with our present somewhat uncertain status, it is not easy to gather information from the few senior Sudanese officials in a position to know what went on. However, with these reservations, I have the honour to submit this report.

2. The Conference was the child of the Sudanese proposal, made shortly after the end of the Israeli war, that a Summit Conference of Arab Kings and Presidents should be held in Khartoum to agree a plan of action to remove the after-effects of Israeli 'aggression'. In

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The Right Honourable
George Brown, M.P.,
et ., etc., etc.,
London, S.W.1.

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the ensuing weeks Prime Minister, Mahgoub, in New York, and President Azhari from Khartoum, made tremendous efforts to persuade their colleagues to come to a meeting at Khartoum. They staked their political reputations (and a considerable sum of Sudanese money) on this initiative - so much so, that all their efforts have been concentrated on the holding of the Summit at any price, without regard to any contribution it might or might not make towards Arab unity and recovery. The prospects of the Summit faded and almost died in the face of apparently irreconcilable differences in the Arab world, and it seemed at one time that the mini-Summit in Cairo of the revolutionary leaders, and the uncompromising pre-conditions insisted on by the Syrians and the Algerians, had finally put paid to Sudanese hopes. President Azhari's unceremonious dash to Cairo to attend the mini-Summit showed that he had despaired, and was pathetically trying to retrieve something from the ruins. What he and Mahgoub did manage to retrieve was agreement for a Foreign Ministers' Conference. Perhaps this was intended as a consolation prize, but probably also King Hussein and President Nasser were anxious to escape from the cul de sac created by Arab intransigence and

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conflict of interest. I do not know what conditions were imposed by the various Arab states as the price of attendance; I infer from subsequent events that all delegates were under firm instructions not to commit themselves, and there was clearly no pre-arranged agenda. Mahgoub produced the following draft agenda which he was reluctant to push too hard and which was never formally accepted:

(1) Clearance of the atmosphere of inter-Arab relations.

(2) Coordination and unification of Arab resources.

(3) Implementation of the Arab solidarity pact.

(4) Unification of the Arab Military Command.

(5) Unification of Arab political leadership.

(6) Withdrawal of Arab currency reserves from countries of aggression.

(7) Unification of Arab policy towards foreign countries and determination of such a policy in accordance with foreign countries' attitude towards Arab causes.

(8) Stoppage of oil export whatever the sacrifice.

(9) Immediate liquidation of foreign military bases in all Arab countries.

3. Whatever pre-arrangements there may have been, a full tally of delegates (a list is attached) turned up in Khartoum at short notice and, after an opening address by Mahgoub, got down to business in closed session. Two

/possible

possible procedures were then apparently discussed: the first that the Conference should discuss all matters of mutual interest but pass resolutions only on those matters which were unanimously agreed; the second that no item should be excluded from the agenda, but that it would be left to individual governments to decide to what extent, if any, conclusions arrived at in debate would be put into effect. Both procedures were designed to reconcile the irreconcilable. There were probably general debates on the question of a Summit, on various matters raised by delegates roughly on the lines of the draft Sudanese agenda, and on issues dividing the Arab world: what finally emerged was general support for a Summit subject to further consideration of matters to be discussed; agreement that a meeting of Finance and Oil Ministers should tackle economic matters at a meeting in Baghdad on 15 August, and agreement on the setting up of a three man mission to reactivate the Jedda Agreement as a means of settling the dispute between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia over the Yemen. We have subsequently received information about the Yemeni Agreement from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jedda (Jedda telegram No. 530 of 7 August) that it was an Egyptian initiative which has been received with prudent reserve by the Saudis, but,

/seen

seen from here, the genesis and status of the Yemeni agreement were by no means clear, though there is no doubt that it figured prominently in the proceedings. It was not explained whether it was a conciliatory move made on Egyptian initiative; or whether a Yemeni settlement was demanded by the Saudis as the price of their participation; or whether the Saudis accepted the Egyptian proposals, or whether, if they did, these proposals were acceptable to the Yemenis (later statements by the Yemenis indicate that they are not).

4. The Conference apparently failed to come to grips with the harsh reality of the occupation of Arab lands and the military superiority of the Israelis. Instead, there was a mixture of polemics and threats of vengeance against the West. Ironically, the moderates possess the sharpest weapon in the Arab armoury - oil, and they have more to fear from subversion organised by their revolutionary breathren than from the Israelis. Yet at this time of crisis moderates and revolutionaries have to worship Arab solidarity together. They are compelled to co-exist and possibly it was the main achievement of the Conference that this uncomfortable fact was recognised, and a start made on a settlement of the terms for co-existence.

5. There were sideshows but few fireworks. Shukairi, the President of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, published on the eve of the Conference a twenty point memorandum (copy attached) which is a glossary of Arab extremism including proposals to remove the United Nations Headquarters to Paris and to cut down university courses to one year to provide more time for military training for the young. He was shot down by Mongi Slim, the Tunisian Foreign Minister, who challenged his right to take part in the proceedings at all. Mongi Slim became the unofficial spokesman for the moderate states, and he had the courage to question the wisdom of Arab tactics and to criticise the inept presentation of their case. A delegation of three Somalis, including two Ministers, turned up uninvited and identified Somalia with the Arab cause. They were admitted as observers. The Somalis presumably wish to get themselves adopted as Arabs and so end the feeling of isolation induced by Ethiopian and Kenyan hostility. The B.B.C. fed by the able Sudanese Reuter and B.B.C. correspondent, incurred a good deal of odium for its reporting of the Conference. The prominence given to Mongi Slim's pronouncements was resented, and the report that Iraq had decided to resume oil shipments was dismissed as a poisonous imperialist

/plot.

plot. On the negative side, the moderation of the U.A.R. delegation was noteworthy. With the help of Cairo Radio and their lackeys in the present Sudan Government they could, without difficulty, have whipped up excitement and led the extremist pack. Their forebearance is supporting evidence of the reports from Cairo that bankruptcy and the disasters inflicted on them by the Israelis are beginning to tell, and that **Nasser is re-insuring.** Heikal's recent advocacy of relations with the Americans astonished most Sudanese. The chief non-event was the failure of the FLOSY delegation to make their promised appearance. A few days before the Conference it had been announced that Asnag, Mokkawi and Basundwa would 'put their case to the Conference'. None of them turned up, and Khalifa, the resident representative of FLOSY in Khartoum, left before the delegates to attend a meeting in Taiz.

6. Turning briefly to local Sudanese reactions, streets and public **buil**dings were bedecked with Arab flags, obviously meant for the Summit, but there was no visible excitement and no demonstrations. The delegates were given the usual round of entertainment including receptions by the Imam, Sayed Ali Mirghani, the Supreme

/Council

Council, the Prime Minister and Sadiq El Mahdi. Mahgoub's speech at the opening of the Conference was well received and, although there are now mutterings, especially among Southerners, that it is high time that he got back to his desk and resumed governing the country, the general feeling is that he handled the Conference well and deserves much of the credit for reviving hopes of a Summit meeting in Khartoum. Azhari, as ever, did his best to earn as much personal kudos as he could from the occasion, and apparently he quarrelled bitterly with Mahgoub on the eve of the Conference as to who should deliver the inaugural speech. Mahgoub won and stole the show. Sadiq El Mahdi played a strange and rather unworthy rôle. Understandably he was at pains to draw attention to himself and his party and to steal Mahgoub's clothes, but in his public statements during the Conference he out Syrianed the Syrians calling for the recognition of East Germany, the removal of currency reserves from Western countries and the rest of the revolutionary catalogue of spite. The population at large took the Conference quietly but there was gratification that a high ranking Arab conference was being held in Khartoum for the first time. Among the more discerning however, there is disappointment and disillusion that the

Conference achieved so little.

7. From our own point of view the Conference went off as well as we could expect. If a Summit Conference had taken place when war fever was at its height our windows might well have suffered. Much of the heat has gone out of the situation now, and much of the resentment against the United Kingdom has died away. There is a growing realisation of the fact of Arab disunity confronted by Israeli military supremacy. We are by no means out of the wood and the meeting of Economic Ministers in Baghdad, and the Summit if it comes off, may produce some nasty shocks, but it would be contrary to current trends and attitudes if the Summit severely eroded our position in the Sudan, as it well might have done if it had taken place a few weeks ago.

8. As usual in the Sudan at moments of Arab turbulence, the voices of Nasser and Cairo Radio count most. At this meeting the U.A.R. were playing it cool and on present form they will do likewise at the next. The search will be for a formula, sponsored by a non-Arab and only tacitly accepted by the Arabs, for a modus vivendi in this area.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Beirut,

/Benghazi

CONFIDENTIAL

Benghazi, Cairo, Jedda, Kuwait, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington, the United Kingdom Mission, New York and to the High Commissioner, Aden.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(G.F.N. Reddaway)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The Palestine Liberation Organisation proposals are as follows:-

(1) The severance of political, economic and cultural relations with the U.S.A., United Kingdom and West Germany and the other countries which played a leading role against the Arab cause in the U.N. General Assembly, and the taking of the necessary action to nationalize all their institutions in the Middle East.

(2) The reinforcement of relationship with friendly countries and the diversion of economic and cultural relations to these countries, with a special stress on Islamic countries.

(3) The issue of a declaration that the Arab countries' relations with foreign countries are based on the attitude of the said countries towards the Arab cause and Palestine question.

(4) The recognition of German Democratic Republic.

(5) Table a motion in the U.N. General Assembly in its session in September to transfer the U.N. from New York to Paris.

(6) The formation of the United Arab States to be composed of the countries so wishing, with sovereignty over military, economic, political and cultural affairs.

(7) The reinforcement of the Arab League to strengthen the inter-Arab relation, including the proposed United Arab States.

(8) The hammering out of an Arab oil policy for the benefit of the Arabs, to be used as a deterrent weapon against the foreign countries which stand against the Arab cause.

(9) The withdrawal of the Arab reserves from foreign Banks and the establishment of a central Arab Bank.

(10) The establishment of a national monetary fund for construction and liberation.

/(11)

(11) The establishment of a United Arab information media within the Arab League.

(12) The University education should be cut to one year during which military training should be carried out.

(13) The set up of popular organizations in the Arab homeland to assist the Arab Governments in discharging all national responsibilities.

(14) The issue of a declaration by the Arab Kings and Heads of States pledging to mobilize their respective countries' resources for the liberation of Palestine. The proposed declaration is to be known as (Jerusalem Declaration).

(15) The continuation in reinforcement of the P.L.O. to enable it to mobilise the Palestinians.

(16) The reinforcement of the Palestine liberation army so that the P.L.O. can have full authority over it while the military duties are to be linked with the United Arab plan.

(17) The set up of camps for the training of Palestinians in the Arab countries, in co-operation with the P.L.O.

(18) The enactment of the necessary legislations by the Arab countries to collect the liberation tax from the Palestinian subjects living in these countries.

(19) The fulfilment of the financial obligations towards the P.L.O. as embodied in the resolution of the Arab Summits.

(20) Organization of popular resistance in the occupied Palestine.

List of Delegates to the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference

Algeria

1. Sayed Abdel Aziz Boutaflika
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed El Akhdar El Ibrahimi
(Algerian Ambassador to U.A.R. and Sudan)

Arab League

Sayed Abdel Khalik Hassouna
(Secretary-General of the Arab League)

Iraq

1. Sayed Ismail Khoiralla
(Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Abdel Mohsin Zalzala
(Ambassador to Cairo)

3. Dr. Shakir Mustafa Salcom
(Ambassador to Khartoum)

4. Sayed Abdel Hussein El Gamalli
(Director of Arab Affairs)

5. Sayed Ahmad Fawzi Abdel Gabbar
(Director of Information)

Jordan

1. Sayed Ahmad Togan
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Jamal Khotat
(Chargé d'Affaires, Khartoum)

Kuwait

1. Sheikh Sabbash El Ahmad El Gabir
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Abdalla Bushara
(Adviser, Foreign Affairs)

3. Sayed Fouad Hamza
(Legal Counsellor)

/Lebanon

Lebanon

1. Dr. George Hakeem
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Dr. Naguib Sidka
(Secretary-General, Foreign Affairs)

3. Dr. Adil Ismail
(Ambassador to Sudan)

4. Sayed Nadeem Dimaskia
(Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

5. Dr. Haleem Abu Izz Eddin
(Ambassador to U.A.R.)

Libya

1. Dr. Ahmad El Bashti
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Abdel Salam Besaikri
(Ambassador to U.A.R.)

3. Sayed Ibrahim El Bakbak
(Under-Secretary of Economics)

4. Sayed Khalifa Abdel Mageed El Muntasir
(Chargé d'Affaires, Khartoum)

5. Sayed Ibrahim El Hangary
(Director, Minister of Oil)

6. "Mukadam" Ramadan Salah
(Ministry of Defence)

7. Sayed Ghaith Seif El Nasr
(Third Secretary)

8. Sayed Abdel Gadir El Warfali
(Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs)

Morocco

1. Dr. Ahmad El Iraki
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed El Mahdi El Zantar
(Ambassador to U.A.R.)

3. Sayed Mahdi Ben Souda
(Ambassador to Beirut)

4. Sayed Abdel Hakeem El Iraki
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Palestine Liberation Organization

1. Sayed Ahmad El Shukairi
(President, P.L.O.)

2. Sayed Shafik El Hout
(Representative of P.L.O. in Beirut)

3. Sayed Saeed El Saba'a
(P.L.O. representative in Khartoum)

Saudi Arabia

1. Sayed Omer El Sakaff
(Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Abdel Rahman El Kadi
(Adviser)

3. Sayed Hussein Bafakih
(Second Secretary)

4. Sayed Saeed Attiya El Ghamdi (?)

Sudan

1. Sayed Mohammed Ahmad Mahgoub
(Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed El Sharif Hussein El Hindi
(Minister of Finance and Economics)

3. Dr. Ahmad Es Sayed Hamad
(Minister of Commerce and Supply)

4. Sayed Khalifa Abbas El Obeid
(Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs)

/Syria

Syria

1. Dr. Ibrahim Makhous
(Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Dr. Sami El Dorounbi
(Ambassador to U.A.R.)

Tunisia

1. Sayed El Mungi Salcem

2. Sayed Beshir El Mahdi
(Ambassador to Beirut)

3. Sayed Omer El Ghazali
(Chargé d'Affaires, Cairo)

4. Sayed Munsif El Mulli
(Embassy Advisor, Cairo)

U.A.R.

1. Sayed Mahmoud Reyad
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Hassan Sabri El Kholi
(Personal Representative of President Nasser)

3. Sayed Mohammed Kamal Eddin Khalil
(Ambassador to Sudan)

4. Sayed Mohammed Shukri
(Ambassador)

5. Sayed Abdel Raouf El Reidi
(First Secretary)

6. Sayed Amr Mousa
(Second Secretary)

7. Sayed Abdel Fattah Mansour Ali

/Yemen

Yemen

1. Sayed Mohammed Abdel Aziz Salaam
(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

2. Sayed Abdel Rahman Abdalla
(Ambassador to U.A.R.)

3. Sayed Mohammed Abdel Mete'a
(Ambassador to Sudan)

4. Sayed Ahmad El Shigni
(Chargé d'Affaires, Khartoum)

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Minutes

The Khartoum Conference.

In conversation with Ahmed Bennani, Secretary of State in the Premier's Office, and Mohamed Douiri, A.D.C. to H.R.H. Prince Moulay Abdallah, I gathered that a heated argument had taken place at the conference between Mr. Boumedi and the Tunisian Foreign Minister on one hand and the Algerian and Syrian on the other over the former's moderate views regarding the boycott and the embargo, and the treatment of local Jews. Morocco was openly accused by the Algerian of being pro-Zionist and pro-West, and of preferring more talk to action. Mr. Boumedi's retort was that, for self protection, Morocco could not clip her wings and break off with the sources of help and supplies while others seek these from the other camp freely. As for the petrol embargo, he reiterated that it does more harm to Arab countries than to the West who can easily obtain it from other sources though at a possibly higher cost, which they can afford. About the local Jews, he said that many of them were more useful to the country's economy and safety than some other communities, hinting at the Algerian.

A gist of the above was confirmed in conversation with Abdelhamid Bennani of the Foreign Minister's Cabinet yesterday evening who, apparently, had been in discussion with a colleague of his who had accompanied the Minister to Khartoum and acted as his secretary. He added that the measure of removing Algerians from the posts they occupied in Morocco was found necessary because of suspicion of them and as a reciprocal measure because Algeria has not only sacked Moroccans unceremoniously but also seized their belongings, cars, etc.

I was particularly impressed by Bennani's very understanding views which, he said, are shared by most highly placed Moroccans who believe that it was the Arabs fault in the first place to have sold their land at ridiculously high prices to Jews, then refused all possible solutions offered by Britain, and are now still harbouring very impractical notions about ever being able to throw Israelis to the sea. Meanwhile they attack and insult anyone who dares suggest something more practical.

Douiri said that Prince Moulay Abdallah was going to accompany the King to the Summit, and Moroccans are preparing not to stand any nonsense from the others.

A. Hasson
10/8/1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Minutes

Mr Lahri Bennani of the M.F.A had very little to say on the Khartoum Conference when I called today, as Mr Laraki had not yet returned from Agadir where he was being 'debriefed' by the King. He said that the Algerians + Syrians were very difficult to deal with and that Nasser was very anxious for a summit. He mentioned that if there were a summit Morocco + Tunisia would be very frank.

2.) I hope I may glean something from the German Ambassador tomorrow (though only Mr Tarca has seen Mr Laraki since his return) + then will report to London on the lot. some reasonably accurate + interesting + helpful.

Walker. 7/6

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With the compliments of

G.F.N. Reddaway

Her Majesty's Representative,
Rabat.

See also Jeddah despatch No. 7
and UK Mis NY despatches No. 21 & 22
below.

A.L. Southern 23. VII.

BRITISH EMBASSY
KHARTOUM
SUDAN

C. de A. Monsey suggested that the letter
two despatches should be of interest
to Tel Aviv (as well as
Jerusalem!)

I.O. 5/9

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Minutes

Khartoum Conference

Herr Voigt, the German Ambassador, told me this morning that he met M. Laraki yesterday afternoon. The latter had not been very forthcoming about the Khartoum Conference. However, the Minister had said that whatever the papers had printed and whatever was on the Agenda, all subjects had been raised. These included relations with the U.S./.U.K. and with Western Germany, relations with Eastern Germany, oil embargo, the Yemen, the general Israel situation, etc., etc. There had been a slight gain for the moderates and certainly the decision that the Financial and Oil Ministers should discuss the oil embargo in Baghdad on 15 August was an advantage. This would mean that the Foreign Ministers, meeting in Khartoum on the 26th, would have all the facts at their disposal and would not be so inclined to take irrational emotional decisions. It was as yet uncertain whether the summit would be held. This would depend on the outcome of the Baghdad and Khartoum Foreign Ministers' Conferences.

2. M. Laraki had told Herr Voigt that it would be most useful if the Western powers did all they could to help the Arab countries who had suffered from the aggression. He also suggested that the Western powers (more especially America) might help the moderate Arab Governments vis-à-vis the extremists by suggesting some acceptable way out of the problem posed by Israeli occupation of Arab territories. This would have to include a recognition of the Arab temperament and therefore an arrangement over the Mosque Al Aksa. I understand from Herr Voigt that this proposal was almost certainly put to the American Ambassador by the Foreign Minister when they met two days ago. M. Laraki said that it would be impossible for <u>all</u> the Arab states to recognise or deal with Israel. Herr Voigt understood that it might be possible for the Moroccans, amongst others, to find some <u>modus vivendi</u> with Israel.

3. Herr Voigt had not been told of any clash between the Algerians on the one hand and the Moroccans and Tunisians on the other at the Conference, but he thought such a clash likely. M. Laraki had told him that there was some "diversification" of opinions" between the Arab powers. He had also said that the Moroccans had gone to the Conference without any instructions to raise the question of Algerian-Moroccan frontiers. However, when the Moroccan delegation saw that some solution might be found to the Yemen question they themselves had put on record the difficulties that they

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had with the Algerians over their Saharan frontiers.

F Walker

(J.F. Walker)
11 August 1967

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By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 21 Saving 11 August 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 21 Saving of 11 August
And Saving Unnumbered to other Foreign Office and Commonwealth Posts

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 17 AUG 1967

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS
10 August, 1967

"It would be sinning against truth not to mention a certain trend of chauvinistic nationalism existing in the Arab world, though it is not shaping official policies. Certain Arab leaders who have no relations with Arab Governments have done no small harm to Arab peoples by their ill-considered speeches." Pravda article by Belyayev and Primakov, reporting from Cairo, 3 August.

2. "The Khartoum conference of Arab Foreign Ministers produced no tangible results, nor did it yield anything but an agreement to hold yet another meeting. This meeting will adopt no positive resolutions either because its task, brothers, will be limited to submitting recommendations to an Arab Summit Conference that is still shrouded in confusion and doubt .... This is not the time for dilly-dallying, differences and manoeuvres. The first and last aim of the Arab leaders must be to strengthen unity and take the necessary measures for the deliverance of the Arab nation. The battle cannot be won by meetings held only to prepare for further meetings."

Algiers Radio 7 August.

3. "According to sources close to the (Khartoum) conference, the Moroccan delegation took the opportunity of emphasising that the situation in the Arab world can be improved not only by a settlement of the Yemen conflict but also by a solution of all the problems which are disturbing the Arab atmosphere, particularly the Algerian-Moroccan frontier dispute." Le Petit Marocain Rabat, 7 August.

4. "Who is going to pay for these new sacrifices (in Egypt)? The measures which have been taken are going to reduce a number of privileges in the Egyptian Civil Service and in the Army. For the first time, officers will suffer cuts in their allowances, or rather their special gratuities for additional responsibilities, which allow senior Civil Servants and high-ranking Army officers sometimes to double their salaries. Also, at the end of every month, Ministers will receive 100 Egyptian pounds less (or a cut of between 20 and 25 per cent of their salaries)."
L'Humanité, the French Communist newspaper, 31 July.

/5. It

5. It is essential that Egypt should have diplomatic relations with the United States, to balance the U.A.R.'s international policy, wrote Muhammed Hassanein Heykal, Editor of the Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, on 4 August. "The head-on clash with the United States was, and still is, in my opinion, an error which we cannot afford and for which we are not equipped."

6. Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress in English for Africa on 4 August complained of the "passivity" of many African countries in the Middle East crisis, and warned them to beware of "Israel's Trojan horse" and to rebuff "any imperialist attempts in Africa". It said that Israel had established diplomatic relations with 28 African States, was developing trade ties and had sent 500 Israeli experts to Africa by the middle of last year. More than 300 Africans were going to Israel for technical training.

7. Izvestiya, on 1 August, blamed African countries for being deceived by the Israeli diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa, which was aimed at "driving a wedge between the Arab and African countries".

8. Comparing June's output of crude oil with that of May, this month's Petroleum Press Service shows that Libya's production fell by 80 per cent from 54 million barrels to 11 million. Iraq fell by 73 per cent, Kuwait by 41 per cent, Saudi Arabia by 40 per cent, Qatar by 18 per cent, and Abu Dhabi by 10 per cent. In contrast, Iranian production rose by two per cent in June and has since increased further.

9. "We may also presume that those States which advocate the further destruction of Arab economic resources have now seen the truth that was lost in the whirl of emotion and sentiment. This is that the oil-producing Arab States cannot pledge themselves to a long-term war effort if they lose their natural sources of income, which constitute the mainstay of their economies." Jiddah Home Service commentary on the Khartoum conference, 4 August.

10. "Moscow is now shifting the target from one of wiping out Israel to one of building a solid Arab-Moscow axis incorporating all of Arabia". Ghanaian Times, 20 July.

11. "There are certain groups within the Arab nation ... which are calling for the complete unification of the Arab countries' foreign policies on the basis of breaking off all relations with one world camp and establishing relations decisively with the other camp. We do not doubt the sincerity of some of these groups, but we doubt very much that their opinion is based on an objective and deep study of international and Arab realities, and of the facts and consequences of the setback." Amman Radio, quoting an Ad-Dustur editorial, 4 August.

/12. "Russia

12. "Russia has been carrying out a well-prepared long-term plan, aimed primarily at Bolshevising the Middle East and turning it into a Communist sphere of influence. Russia is therefore carefully seeking to fill the hearts of the people of the area with hatred and indignation against all the Western States. At the same time, Russia is trying to present itself as the saviour, loyal friend and guardian angel of the Arab region.... On the pretext of rearming some of the Arab armies, it has assumed for itself the right to supervise these armies with large numbers of Soviet experts, advisers and attachés. It is also assuming the right to supervise the implementation of Socialism and to ensure its stricter and wider implementation. This is done on the ground that the coming Arab battle against Israel requires more austerity and more Socialist measures."
Jiddah Radio on Soviet Middle East policy, 29 July.

13. "On Tuesday, 6 June, twenty-four hours after war broke out, there was not a single Egyptian General in Sinai (except those who found themselves surrounded). They had all returned to Cairo by the quickest route, leaving their troops in full disarray." L'Humanité. the French Communist newspaper, 29 July.

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MAP-34

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L' ''ABC'': L'URSS NE SACRIFIERA PAS SA POLITIQUE DE COEXISTENCE PACIFIQUE AU PROFIT DES PAYS ARABES.

MADRID, 10 AOUT.-(MAP)- SOUS LE TITRE ''L'URSS NE SACRIFIERA PAS SA COEXISTENCE PACIFIQUE'', LE JOURNAL ESPAGNOL ''ABC'' ECRIT CEMATIN:

''LES VISITES DES DIFFERENTES COMMISSIONS DES PAYS ARABES PROGRESSISTES SE SONT MULTIPLIEES A MOSCOU. CEPENDANT CES PAYS SAVENT TOUS QUE LA RUSSIE N'EST PAS DISPOSEE A SACRIFIER SA POLITIQUE DE COEXISTENCE PACIFIQUE DANS LE BUT DE TROUVER UNE SOLUTION, MILITAIRE URGENTE AU PROBLEME DU MOYEN-ORIENT. C'EST DANS CETTE OPTIQUE QUE L'ON PEUT COMPRENDRE LA PRECAUTION PRISE PAR LES RUSSES DE OOSER EN QUELQUE SORTE LES QUANTITES D'ARMEMENTS QU'ELLE DISTRIBUE AUX PAYS ARABES. C'EST LA PRESSE MAGHREBINE MEME QUI SOULIGNE LE FAIT CURIEUX CONSTITUE PAR L'APPUI DE MOSCOU PAR LA VOIX DE LA ''PRAVDA'' AUX PAYS MODERES PARTISANS D'UNE POLITIQUE REALISTE LORS DE LA CONFERENCE DES MINISTRES DE KHARTOUM-(MAP)-

..SUIVRA..

E/KR/BR+++++++++++

MAP-34

L' ''ABC'': L'URSS NE SACRIFIERA PAS....(DEUX).....

''NI BAGDAD, NI ALGER, NI DAMAS OU LE CAIRE, N'IGNORENT LES LIMITES PRUDENTES PRISES PAR LA RUSSIE POUR VENIR EN AIDE AUX PAYS ARABES AFIN QU'ILS RECUPERENT LES TERRES PERDUES. SI LA RUSSIE A REMIS A NEUF TOUTE L'ARMEE EGYPTIENNE, LUI PERMETTANT DE FAIRE FACE A TOUTE EVENTUALITE, IL N'EN EST PAS DE MEME POUR LES ARMEES DE L'IRAK ET DE LA SYRIE''.

''LE SEUL QUI SOIT RESTE HORS JEU DANS CE CAMP C'EST HUSSEIN POUR LEQUEL, JUSQU'A PRESENT, LA SEULE PROMESSE DE REARMEMENT LUI VIENT DES ETATS UNIS. IL EST VAIN D'ESPERER QUE HUSSEIN AIE RECOURS A MOSCOU CAR UNE TELLE EVENTUALITE SIGNIFIE UN CHANGEMENT RADICAL DANS SA POLITIQUE''.

''EN CE QUI CONCERNE LA CONFERENCE DE KHARTOUM, LES JOURNALISTES DE LA PLUS GRANDE PARTIE DES PAYS ARABES, AINSI QUE L'OPPOSITION MAROCAINE, MONTRENT UN OPTIMISME MODERE QUANT AUX RESULTATS OBTENUS. SEULE NOTE DISCORDANTE, ''AL-MOUDJAHID'', ORGANE DU GOUVERNEMENT ALGERIEN, QUI QUALIFIE DE VAGUES LES RESULTATS OBTENUS PAR CETTE CONFERENCE''.-(MAP)-

..SUIVRA..

E/KR/BR+++++++++++

L' ''ABC'': L'URSS NE SACRIFIERA PAS.....(TROIS).....

''ET CE QUI S'EST PASSE DANS L'AFFAIRE DU YEMEN, LORSQUE LE COMITE TRIPARTITE DESIGNE A KHARTOUM POUR FAIRE ABOUTIR LA PAIX AU YEMEN S'APPRETAIT A COMMENCER SES TRAVAUX, SEMBLE DONNER MALHEUREUSEMENT RAISON AUX ALGERIENS''.

IL Y A DES RAISONS DE CROIR QUE LES ROYALISTES DU YEMEN, FORTS DES PERSPECTIVES MILITAIRES FAVORABLE DANS LA SITUATION ACTUELLE, NE FASSENT PRESSION SUR RIAD POUR GAGNER DU TEMPS ET NEGOCIER SUR DES BASES BEAUCOUP PLUS FORTES''.-(MAP)-

E/KR/BR+++++++++++

11 August 1967

(1681/3)

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY

(A.S.M. MARSHALL)

1 Encl: Magazines Arabes reçu Ambassade Télégramme
du 10/8/67 : « L'Arabe Lorsque
Sacrifiera plus la politique de
Coexistence Pacifique au Profit des
pays Arabes »

BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESS SECTION AND READING ROOM,

AVE ALLAL BIN ABDULLAH

RABAT, MOROCCO. 329-96

J.S. Champion Esq
I.R.D

cc
CAT Tan.
DA
OS
AS

MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE Nouvelle Agence Rabat, (August 1967)

CMB

MAP 32

'' L'L'ITERNATURNAYA GAZIETA'':'' LA DEFAITE DE L'ARMEE EGYPTIENNE RETOMBE SUR LES OFFICIERS, ET NON SUR LES SOLDATS OU LES ARMEMENTS.

MOSCOU,9 AOUT-(MAP)- LA'' L'ITERNATURNAYA GAZIETA'' DE MOSCOU CONSACRE DANS SON DERNIER NUMERO UN ARTICLE SUR LE ROLE DES FORCES ARMEES DANS LE TIERS MONDE. PARLANT ENTRE AUTRES DE LA REORGANISATION DES FORCES ARMEES DE LA REPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE, ELLE ECRIT QUE PLUS DE SIX CENTS OFFICIERS SUPERIEURS DE CES FORCES ONT DEJA ETE MIS A LA RETRAITE RECEMMENT.

LA REVUE SOULIGNE QUE'' LE CORPS D'OFFICIERS DE CERTAINES NATIONS DU TIERS MONDE A MALHEUREUSEMENT MONTRE QU'IL NE RESISTAIT PAS A LA TENTATION DE SE TRANSFORMER EN UNE CLASSE DE PRIVILEGIES. L'EXEMPLE DE LA RAU DEMONTRE QU'UNE GRANDE PARTIE DES OFFICIERS EGYPTIENS, DETENANT DES POSTES IMPORTANTS DANS L'ADMINISTRATION ET L'ECONOMIE DE LEUR PAYS, S'EN SONT SERVIS POUR S'ENRICHIR, NE PENSANT QU'A DES APPOINTEMENTS ELEVES, DES COMPTES EN BANQUE, DES AUTOMOBILE ET DES DEMEURES SOMPTUEUSES.

LA REVUE AJOUTE QUE LES NATIONS ARABES ONT ETE DUREMENT AFFECTEES PAR LA DEFAITE SUBIE PAR UNE ARMEE EGYPTIENNE DOTEE DES ARMEMENTS LES PLUS MODERNES. LA CAUSE DE CETTE DEFAITE RETOMBAIT SUR DES OFFICIERS QUI '' N'ONT PAS MAINTENU LEUR FIDELITE AU GOUVERNEMENT REVOLUTIONNAIRE'' ET NON CELLE DES SOLDATS OU DES ARMEMENTS.(MAP)-

AA/MK+++++10 H10++++

File Copy

11 August 1967

1076

(6813)

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S

EMBASSY

(Rabat)

Maghreb Arabe Presse Telegram of 9/8/67:-

"Libération Gazette. La défaite

Israélienne retombe sur

les Arabes et non sur les Soldats

Américains"

EMBASSY

CHANCERY AND REGISTRY ROOM.

AVENUE MOULAY ABDELLAH

RABAT, MOROCCO. 329-98

J. S. Champion Esq QA.

IRD

C of A Jew

DAMAN.

OS

1076.

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 423 D M

[Date] 11 August. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] It is interesting to notice that- however much the Moroccans blow their own trumpet about their performance others fail to notice it!

A.L. Southorn 15.VIII
C. d'E 15/8
~~L.A.~~ 15/8.
I.O. 16/8

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TRIPOLI.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 775 OF 11 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, ALGIERS, JEDDA, AMMAN, RABAT, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, BEIRUT, ADEN, BENGHAZI, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.

DISTRIBUTION

I SAW LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER LAST NIGHT AND HE BROADLY CONFIRMED INFORMATION IN KHARTOUM TEL NO 445 TO YOU BUT MADE FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. HE HAD FELT THAT LIBYA FOR ONCE HAD MADE A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION BY OPPOSING IRAQI (GP UNDEC PROERT) FOR PROTECT ECONOMIC BOYCOTT WITH A MORE POSITIVE PLAN TO STRENGTHEN THE ARAB POSITION BY CULTIVATING SUPPORT IN THE WEST AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIC STRENGTH BY

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

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/exporting

EXPORTING AS MUCH OIL AS POSSIBLE TO ALL

INCLUDING THE UK AND US.

3. IN REPLY TO QUESTION AHMED BISHTI SAID THAT

SUPPORT OF KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD BEEN

DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THEIR

DELEGATIONS AND THEIR INARTICULATENESS. HE

CONFIRMED THAT MONGI SLIM HAD BEEN OUTSTANDING

AND A STRONG MODERATING INFLUENCE. THE EGYPTIANS

TOO HAD BEEN NOTICEABLY MODERATE.

4. BISHTI EXPECTS THE PRESENT ROUND OF CONFERENCES

TO CULMINATE IN A SUMMIT ON 29 AUGUST IN KHARTOUM.

THEREAFTER HE HOPES FOR A VERY EARLY RESUMPTION

OF DIRECT OIL SHIPMENTS TO THE UK AND THE

ACCEPTANCE OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SHIPS IN LIBYAN

HARBOURS. HE THOUGHT ACTION BEFORE 29 AUGUST

ON THESE SUBJECTS WOULD BE DIFFICULT.

FO PASS RABAT 20 SOSFA.

Enter

1076

14/8

MA[illegible]25

- AIDE BRITANNIQUE ET HOLLANDAISE A LA JORDANIE.-

NATIONS-UNIES (NY), 12 AOUT.-(MAP).- LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET LES PAYS BAS ONT FOURNI UNE AIDE SUPERIEURE A 925 MILLIONS D'ANCIENS FRANCS A LA JORDANIE ET A L'UNRWA, ORGANISME DE SECOURS DE L'ONU, ANNONCE-T-ON AUJOURD'HUI DE SOURCE PROCHE DU SECRETARIAT GENERAL DE L'ORGANISATION MONDIALE.

LA JORDANIE A RECU 625 MILLIONS DE FRANCS ANCIENS DE LA GRANDE BRETAGNE ET 50 DES PAYS BAS.(MAP).-

LM/DD/+++++++0 SH40++++++

BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

107/67 CONFIDENTIAL 14 August 1967

In the Ambassador's letter of 31 July to Denis Speares, he reported on Moroccan views with regard to the Foreign Ministers' Conference due to open in Khartoum on the following day. He wrote further on Moroccan foreign policy, as revealed by his conversations with the acting Foreign Minister, Ali Benjelloun, in his letter of 3 August to Denis.

2. The German Ambassador here, Heinz Voigt, told me that he had seen Ahmed Laraki, the Moroccan Foreign Minister, on his return from the Khartoum Conference. Laraki had said that despite press reports and the Agenda (as agreed beforehand - see paragraph 3 of the Ambassador's letter of 31 July), the discussions in Khartoum had covered all subjects. These had included the breach of relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, and with Western Germany. Discussions had also dealt with the question of relations with the D.D.R., with the oil embargo, with the Yemen and many other topics of interest besides the general Arab-Israeli situation. The moderate Arab states had had slightly the better of the talks. The decision that the question of the oil embargo should be considered by the technical ministers concerned at Baghdad on 15 August was a gain. It would mean that the Foreign Ministers, meeting in Khartoum on the 26th, would not be taking emotional decisions while ignorant of the actual position and the implications of their action. No decision had been taken as to whether a summit would be held. This would depend on the outcome of the forthcoming Baghdad and Khartoum Conferences.

3. Laraki had said that there was some diversification of opinions between the Arab Governments in Khartoum. He also reported that the Moroccan delegation had gone to the Conference without any instructions to raise the question of Moroccan-Algerian frontiers. However, when a solution to the Saudi-U.A.R. differences over the Yemen was discussed, the Moroccans felt it necessary to put their own dispute with the Algerians over Saharan frontiers on the record. Alice Massouh, the Embassy's Third Secretary, has learned from conversations with Moroccan members of the Prime Minister's and Foreign Minister's offices here that in fact a heated argument took place at the conference between Laraki and Mongi Slim on the one hand, and the Algerian and the Syrian on the other, over the formers' moderate views regarding the boycott and the embargo, as well as the treatment of local Jews. You will have noticed that on 4 August the Algerian home service broadcast strong criticism of the pro-Western Arab states and accused the latter of paying compensation to Zionist stores which had been wrecked by demonstrations, also of imprisoning Arab compatriots. (See Summary of World Broadcasts ME/2536 A/3 and /4 of 7 August.) In Khartoum Laraki had apparently retorted that for her own self-protection Morocco could not clip her wings and break off with her sources of supplies and assistance while others

/sought

P.V. Mallet, Esq.,
North and East African Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

sought these freely from the Eastern camp. As for the petrol embargo, he reiterated that it did more harm to the Arab countries than to the West, who could easily obtain oil from other sources though at a slightly higher cost. He informed the German Ambassador that while the embargo was a scratch for the Western countries, it was a cancer for the Arab oil exporting states. He apparently told the Syrians and Algerians that the local Jews were more useful to the country's economy and security than some other communities and hinted that the latter included the Algerians.

4. Even without clashes of the sort that took place at Khartoum, Moroccan-Algerian relations, about which I hope to write more fully later, are deteriorating. Maghreb Arabe Presse recently reported that as from Saturday, 5 August, all Algerians working in the administrative departments of the government, whether on contract or not, were to be dismissed. The excuse given was that Algeria now needed these experts and experienced personnel for their own administration. However, I have heard that it was the King who, in June, instructed the Ministry of Justice to get rid of those Algerian personnel taken on last year in order to help the arabisation of the Moroccan Courts. The Germans told me that there were quite a few Algerians in Radiodiffusion Télévision Marocaine who have also now gone.

5. Laraki, in discussing the Khartoum Conference with my German colleague, said that it would be most useful if the Western powers did all they could to help the Arab countries who had suffered from the aggression. This chimes with the suggestion made by Benjelloun as reported in paragraph 4 of the enclosure to the Ambassador's letter of 3 August. Laraki went on to say that the Western powers might help the moderate Arab Governments vis-à-vis the extremists by suggesting some acceptable way out of the problem posed by the Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Such a solution would have to take account of Arab temperament and make some arrangement over the Al Aksa mosque. The Foreign Minister also declared that it would be impossible for all the Arab states to recognise or deal with Israel. The German Ambassador gathered that it would be possible for the Moroccans, amongst others, to find some <u>modus vivendi</u> with Tel Aviv.

6. Once again the Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that Nasser was the best ruler that could be hoped for in Egypt. Were he to be replaced it would be very likely that an extremist Government would take over. Nasser was very keen for a summit in order to achieve a consensus of agreement amongst the Arabs. The Moroccans, who are not so happy about being committed to a summit, will, according to the information gleaned by Alice Massouh, take a very firm line at such a summit if it comes about. Mohamed Fenniri, A.D.C. to Prince Moulay Abdallah, has told her that the Prince would accompany the King to such a meeting and that the Moroccans would then stand no nonsense from the extremists.

7. I am copying this letter to Jolyon Kay in Algiers, Colin Brant in Tunis, Peter Tripp in Amman and to the Chanceries at Khartoum and Cairo.

(J.F. Walker)

RESTRICTED

1076

(1072/2035/67)

14 August, 1967.

United Kingdom Mission Despatch No.22
of 9 August

In a moment of temporary mental aberration, we wrote "nine" instead of "thirteen" in paragraph 15 of this despatch (second line from the top on the ninth foolscap page). Would you and other addressees kindly make the necessary correction? I am so sorry.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Geneva (UK Delegation to the UN), Jedda, Khartoum, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington, to H.M. Consulate General, Jerusalem, to POMEC (Aden) and to the Joint Intelligence Group, Nicosia.

(S. L. Egerton)

Miss A. M. Warburton, C.V.O.,
United Nations (Political) Department.

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24 AUG 1967

a/Asst P. Hand.

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(1072/2035/67)
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Rabat

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TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Chancery

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845 THIRD AVENUE,
NEW YORK, N.Y.

14 August 1967

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(22)

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UNITED NATIONS
14 August, 1967
Section 1

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CRISIS: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Sir Leslie Glass to Mr. Brown. (Received 14 August)

SUMMARY

1. Complaints circulated to the Security Council of frontier violations on the Israel-Syria border increased noticeably in April and May. The Syrians seem to have persuaded the Egyptians that an Israeli attack on South-West Syria was imminent, and the Russians did nothing to dispel their fears. (Paragraph 2.)

2. U Thant's handling of first unofficial, and then official, Egyptian requests for UNEF's withdrawal. Some troop contributors were against withdrawal, but their position was weakened by India and Yugoslavia. Argument on the rights and wrongs of U Thant's decision will continue, but he took full responsibility for it. (Paragraphs 3–5.)

3. Within days, the Egyptians announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Our efforts to get the Security Council to meet and consider the dangerous situation failed. Its implications began to sink home to the Latins and some Afro-Asians, and the Council finally met to consider U Thant's report on UNEF and his appeal for restraint by all. But there was still no general determination to deal with the threat to peace. (Paragraphs 6–7.)

4. The outbreak of war shocked the Council into action, but its first call for an immediate cease-fire was delayed for 36 hours while the Arabs argued about conditions for Israeli withdrawal. The Russians withdrew their support on this when the extent of the Arab defeat was clearer. The Israelis, Jordanians and Egyptians then accepted the cease-fire. (Paragraphs 8–9.)

5. The Syrians followed suit shortly afterwards, but the Israelis fought on until they had captured the heights overlooking the northern demilitarised zone. Feeling in the Council began to grow against them. We and the Americans were challenged to declare our position on immediate withdrawal. But it was clear even then that a majority in the Council would not support a resolution unduly weighted against Israel. (Paragraph 10.)

6. *Conclusions.* A precarious cease-fire was achieved but the Council's debates were exceedingly bitter and unconstructive. The Arabs, chagrined beyond all bounds, were given stiff doses of public support by the Indians and by the Russians—except on the "Big Lie". (Paragraphs 11–12.)

7. The Council can only act when broad agreement on the next step exists between the Great Powers and between the parties to a dispute. We should not expect more, while remembering that only the United Nations can provide the services it does to the international community. The despatch of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the area, as proposed by Her Majesty's Government, could be the next constructive step. (Paragraphs 13–14.)

CONFIDENTIAL

20398—258 8230—17

UKMIS to the UN,
(No. 21. Confidential) *New York,*
Sir, *9 August, 1967.*

I have the honour to report upon the United Nations' handling of the Arab-Israel crisis from the events leading up to the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the 18th of May to the beginning of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on the 17th of June.

2. Throughout the spring the provocations and ripostes along the Syrian-Israeli border, culminating in the destruction of six Syrian MiG aircraft on the 7th of April, increased in seriousness and frequency and were duly reported to the Security Council. The Israelis had by now given up hope that in the face of the Soviet veto the Security Council would pay serious heed to complaints from their side. Mr. Eshkol's statement of the 13th of May threatened fierce retaliation if border raids continued. Very soon afterwards the Syrian-UAR Mutual Defence Agreement was activated. It seems that by about the beginning of May the Syrians had convinced themselves and the UAR that the Israelis were preparing for a major air and land attack on South-West Syria (though this did not accord with UNTSO's assessments). Egyptian suspicions were confirmed when the Russians told a UAR parliamentary delegation on or about the 14th of May that there was a premeditated Israeli plan to invade Syria; the Russians have never publicly denied Nasser's statement on this point. What the Russians may have done privately to correct the Syrian assessment, and its repercussions in the UAR, we do not know. Their efforts to lessen the harm done were certainly not effective and they must take a large share of responsibility for what followed.

The withdrawal of UNEF

3. The UAR build-up in Sinai started about the 15th of May. This became known in New York the next day when the UAR Chief of Staff asked General Rikhye, the Commander of UNEF, to withdraw immediately all his troops from the territory of the UAR into the Gaza Strip "for their own safety". The Secretary-General reacted at once in an *aide-mémoire* to the UAR Permanent Representative in which he deplored the manner in which the UAR request had been communicated, and insisted that he be formally consulted. At the same time he ordered General Rikhye to maintain his positions. Meanwhile, on the evening of the 17th of May, U Thant consulted representatives of the troop contributors to UNEF. At this meeting Canada, supported by Denmark and Brazil, held out for resisting UAR pressure for the precipitate removal of UNEF, but other contributors gave little support and India and Yugoslavia were apparently in favour of acceding to the UAR request. At this point the Secretary-General was undecided how he should act. He gave Lord Caradon to believe that he thought a personal appeal to Nasser might calm the situation. But even at this stage he was of the opinion that any attempt by Nasser to dictate the deployment of UNEF could not be accepted, and must result in the evacuation of the complete force. The Minister of State spoke in the strongest terms to U Thant urging him to consider very carefully this crucial problem, since on his decision could depend peace in the Middle East as well as the whole future of United Nations peace-keeping.

4. At noon on the 18th of May U Thant received a formal communication from the Egyptian Foreign Minister requesting him to take the necessary steps for the Force's withdrawal "as soon as possible". Four hours later the Secretary-General informed the UAR of his intention to comply with their request. Having done so, he called a meeting of the UNEF Advisory Group, together with the troop contributors who were not members of the group, and informed them of his decision.

5. This momentous step has been much criticised. U Thant himself has justified it repeatedly and at length. There were strong legal and constitutional arguments for what he did. Moreover, there were the practical facts that the Indian and Yugoslav elements were likely to be pulled out by their Governments at any moment and the whole force was, in the Secretary-General's view, in considerable danger. Previous experience of attacks on United Nations contingents in the Congo were much in the minds of his advisers, Bunche and Urquhart. On the other hand, the grave dangers arising from his decision were so obvious that they might have argued at least for his playing for time. No doubt debate on the rights and wrongs of this decision will go on for a long time. But what cannot be questioned is the courage

of the Secretary-General in taking upon himself full responsibility for this decision, which he believed to be the right one and which he believed it to be his duty to take.

The Security Council

6. After his decision, the Secretary-General flew to Cairo to meet Nasser. But even while he was in the air the situation dramatically worsened. On the 23rd of May Nasser announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli vessels and to any vessels carrying strategic cargoes to Elath. Immediately we and others pressed for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. But, at that time, the Arabs believed that they had got away with a substantial and bloodless victory and their friends opposed a meeting. As a result, a whole day was lost in fruitless negotiation and finally the Council only met on the morning of the 24th of May. Even then all attempts to pass an uncontroversial resolution supporting the Secretary-General's efforts in Cairo were blocked. We were even accused of seeking to " over-dramatise " the situation; an accusation which subsequent events were rapidly to disprove.

7. The Secretary-General returned to New York on the 25th of May. After his report to the Council on the 26th of May, the dangers of the situation, particularly at the flashpoint of Aqaba, began to sink home to the Latins and some of the Afro-Asians, if not to the Arabs. In a further series of daily meetings of the Council beginning on the 29th of May, we strove for an endorsement of the appeal in U Thant's report for the forgoing of belligerence, restraint and lowering of tensions, but still without success. On the 3rd of June the Prime Minister himself impressed upon U Thant and the President of the Security Council the seriousness with which Her Majesty's Government viewed the situation and the urgent need for concerted United Nations action. It was clear, however, when the Council adjourned on the 3rd of June without result, that there was still no general determination to get to grips with the threat to peace in the Middle East. Meanwhile rumours of the formation of a naval force by maritime Powers to open the Straits of Tiran raised Arab hackles against the West.

Outbreak of war

8. War broke out on the 5th of June. Only this finally shocked the Council into action. We at once urged upon the Council the need for an immediate cease-fire resolution. But while the issue of the fighting was in doubt, the Arabs—as ill-informed as ever on what was happening on the ground—would not have such a resolution unless coupled with a simultaneous call for withdrawal of Israeli forces. In this they were backed by the Russians and the Indians. We and the Americans strove to bridge these differences, but the negotiations stuck on definition of the conditions of withdrawal. Ambassadors Goldberg (United States) and Fedorenko (USSR) had three long meetings on the 5th and the 6th, but no agreement could be reached.

9. As the 6th of June wore on, it became clear that the Israeli pre-emptive air strikes had been successful, and there was little doubt left on the outcome of the war. We saw then a dramatic reversal of the Soviet position in the Security Council. At 7.15 p.m. a resolution calling for a simple cease-fire was passed unanimously. The Russians may have informed the Egyptians of their change of line some hours before the vote; but there seems to have been no consultation. The next day, the 7th of June, a resolution setting a firm time for implementation of the cease-fire was passed. Israel accepted this and the Jordanians were the first Arabs to do the same. On the 8th of June the Egyptians accepted the cease-fire. Also on that day the Russians put forward a tough draft resolution condemning Israeli aggression and demanding that she should withdraw her troops behind the armistice lines of 1949. This remained their position for the rest of the debate until their draft was voted upon and failed on the 14th of June.

10. After the Egyptians had accepted the cease-fire, the Syrians became perilously exposed. Though they also accepted the cease-fire late on the 8th of June, hostilities continued until Quneitra, the garrison town in South-West Syria, from which the troublesome Syrian emplacements overlooking the northern demilitarised zone were garrisoned and supplied, fell to the Israelis on the 10th of June. Feeling in the Council began to shift strongly against the Israelis when it appeared that they were intent on making further territorial gains, in open breach of the cease-fire resolutions. We and the Americans were increasingly challenged to declare ourselves on withdrawal, and it rapidly became clear that

readiness to support a call for immediate and unconditional withdrawal was to be the touchstone by which the Arabs would distinguish friend from foe. As the failure of the Soviet motion on the 14th of June showed, it was also clear that a majority in the Security Council did not think that a call for condemnation of and withdrawal by the Israelis, without some balancing call on the Arabs to abandon the state of war, would help the situation.

Conclusion

11. Though they achieved a precarious cease-fire, this series of tense, vituperative and largely nocturnal Security Council meetings ended in deadlock on the more difficult issue of a settlement. The passion and violence of the Arab speeches against Israel suggested that the will to settle on the Arab side did not begin to exist. Shaken by the swift and devastating military defeat of their clients, the first reaction of the Soviet Union was to give them unstinting public support. Only on the subject of the "Big Lie", which the Minister of State nailed by repeated and categoric denials, did Mr. Fedorenko fail to support the Arabs. The Bulgarian representative revelled in the atmosphere of intemperate and tendentious speech. Even amongst the many unedifying moments of the debate one picture stands out—the stricken face of Mr. Goldberg, profoundly vulnerable in this dispute, when taunted by the Syrian delegate as being the representative of Israel rather than of the United States. India, for a mixture of motives, abandoned all pretence of objectivity and emerged as the Voice of the UAR. Mali, as a radical African country, took up sides automatically against the "American imperialists". So the Council was riven by a deep division.

12. As the world's top body for ensuring international peace and security, the Council was not impressive. Its recent enlargement to 15 members rendered it less and not more efficient. But such success as the Council achieved was due in no small measure to the considered and constructive interventions by the Minister of State.

13. The Middle East crisis has once again shown clearly that the Security Council is, in general, only able to act when there is broad agreement between the Great Powers and between the parties to a dispute on what is to be done. The United Nations Organisation nevertheless provides to the international community a service which, in the absence of anything better, is of great value. When the parties realised that they had all had enough of fighting, only the Security Council was there to provide a quick and effective means of bringing the war to an end. It is also United Nations machinery, fragile and over-extended though it may be, which maintains the Council's cease-fire, on the whole effectively. One must hope that when all the parties have concluded that they must make some concession in order to break the deadlock which still persists on the broader question of settlement, the Security Council will again be able to provide the necessary machinery, the necessary catalyst, to enable such concessions to be successfully negotiated. Indeed it is with such an end in view that you, Sir, have decided to back the idea of a United Nations Special Representative for the area.

14. The Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which, by an unexpected and untypical Soviet manoeuvre, formed the sequel to this series of Security Council meetings is the subject of an accompanying despatch.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Geneva (United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations), Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington; to POMEC (Aden), and to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Group, Nicosia.

I have, &c.

L. C. GLASS.

1076

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

UNITED NATIONS
14 August, 1967
Section 2

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB/ISRAEL CRISIS: THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Sir Leslie Glass to Mr. Brown. (*Received 14 August*)

SUMMARY

1. With the Security Council deadlocked, the Russians unexpectedly (and probably unconstitutionally) asked for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Session's high point was the Glassboro Summit, which gave members the hope that business might at least be going on between the two super-Powers. Your speech on the 21st June was warmly welcomed, not least by the Arabs. (Paragraphs 2–4.)

2. Behind the scenes the search for an acceptable form of words went on. Yugoslavia and other " non-aligned " States tabled a draft calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal, but no condemnation. The Latins produced a better draft linking withdrawal with an end to the state of belligerency. But it omitted to make mention of a special representative of the Secretary-General, for which we were pressing. (Paragraphs 5–7.)

3. France decided at an early stage to vote for the " non-aligned " draft. Thereafter our concern was to keep the Latins solid and to prevent the rival draft coming within striking distance of the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption. Eventually both drafts failed, but the Latin did relatively better than its rival. (Paragraphs 8–10.)

4. Resolutions on humanitarian assistance to the refugees, and on the status of Jerusalem, were also passed, both unanimously. (Paragraph 11.)

5. The Session was thereafter kept alive by its pro-Arab President Pazhwak, and by the Russians, who were desperately keen to take home some sort of resolution. The Dobrynin/Goldberg contacts began. The Latins continued the search for a compromise resolution, and a second resolution on Jerusalem was adopted. (Paragraphs 12–13.)

6. On the 19th of July Dobrynin and Goldberg agreed on revised versions of the Latin draft, but the Algerian Foreign Minister rejected this firmly when Gromyko put it to him. The Russians then tried to wind up the session with all speed, but had to vote against the Arabs to achieve this. (Paragraph 14.)

7. *Conclusions.* Increased Latin American cohesion has made them a political force to be reckoned with at the United Nations. The Pakistanis did far better than the Indians in Arab eyes. The French did poorly in spite of pressure on OCAM States. The Israeli case was brilliantly handled by Mr. Eban, against whom the Arabs could field no equal. (Paragraph 15.)

8. Soviet tactics and motives were inexplicable, except in terms of policy changes at the highest level in Moscow. Russian efforts to agree with the Americans on a substantive resolution were probably genuine, and may augur well for the longer term. As to the Arabs,

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their confusion at the way the Russians handled them ended in an obdurate but predictable refusal to accept Soviet advice. The continuing deadlock at the United Nations reflected growing international realisation that there are two valid sides to the Arab/Israel question. (Paragraphs 16–18.)

UKMIS to the UN,
(No. 22. Confidential) *New York,*
Sir, *9 August, 1967.*

I have the honour to report on the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, and the lessons to be drawn therefrom.

2. When it became clear in the Security Council about the 12th of June that both the Soviet and the American draft resolutions (the former calling for condemnation of Israel and immediate withdrawal of her forces from Arab soil) would fail, and that no compromise or consensus was likely to be forthcoming, the Russians made a totally unexpected move. While the Council was still considering the resolutions on the table, Mr. Gromyko wrote to U Thant on the 13th of June requesting the immediate convening of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. Many members were dubious about the usefulness and constitutionality of such a meeting but nobody was prepared, given the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East, to stand out against the proposal except the United States and Israel, joined somewhat incongruously by Botswana. The constitutional significance of the Soviet request, and its possible implications for United Nations peace-keeping, are the subject of another despatch. It is indeed a sign of changing times that it should be the Russians and not the Americans who appealed to the Assembly from the Security Council.

3. The high point of the Emergency Special Session took place outside the United Nations. This was the Glassboro Summit between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. I have read with great interest Sir Patrick Dean's despatch from Washington (No. 87 of the 29th of June) on that meeting, and can add nothing to it from the United Nations viewpoint.

4. During the Special Session's first week, all the major Powers spoke, as well as the main combatants in the war. Your own statement of the 21st of June (particularly the passage on the status of Jerusalem) received much praise as the most constructive single contribution, and did much to dispel the feeling that Her Majesty's Government would inevitably follow an American pro-Israel policy. More important, it did much to restore Arab confidence in British neutrality, which had been much sapped by their uncritical acceptance of the " Big Lie ".

5. While the main statements were being made, intensive informal consultations went on. You had important and constructive bilateral talks with many of the visiting Ministers. Within the Assembly there was from the beginning no enthusiasm for the crude Soviet draft resolution calling for condemnation of Israel and immediate unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory. There was an equal lack of enthusiasm for the American draft, which critics saw as making withdrawal contingent on negotiations between the combatants on matters of principle. It also became clearer as the week wore on that the Soviet attempt to make the Emergency Special Session an occasion for putting Israel and her American friend publicly in the dock had misfired, though many statements of great bitterness were made. An exception was King Hussein's dignified and realistic statement of the 26th of June.

6. Lobbying for something more acceptable to the bulk of the membership than the Soviet draft led on the 28th of June to the tabling by Yugoslavia and 13 other " non-aligned " nations, prominently India, of a draft which, while still calling for immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal, did not call upon the Assembly to condemn Israel. The resolution's last operative paragraph seemed however to be open to the interpretation that it barred the Security Council from taking any further action on the Middle East—of which subject the Council remained formally seized—until the Israeli withdrawal had been completed. It was this provision in particular which we and others found one-sided and unacceptable. Moreover, we saw no prospect of a resolution in these terms effectively achieving the object of a withdrawal of

Israel's forces. These objections remained in spite of later revisions which did a good deal to offset the resolution's one-sidedness.

7. The Latin Americans meanwhile had been in almost permanent conclave with each other, as well as taking part in meetings organised by the Danes, the Americans and ourselves to work out a more balanced draft. This sought to link withdrawal with an end to the state of belligerency and other signs of recognition by both sides that the threat or use of force would have to be abjured in future. Throughout these consultations we pressed strongly for a provision calling for the appointment of a personal representative of the Secretary-General to be in contact with the parties in the area. It was not however possible to obtain broad agreement to this throughout the group and it was omitted from the text finally tabled by Dr. Solomon of Trinidad, as Chairman of the Latin American group, on the 30 of June.

8. It was clear from the start that the Communists and Arabs, with a minimum of African support, could block the Latin American resolution. It was also clear fairly early on that 30 to 35 votes could be counted on against the " non-aligned " draft. Could the " non-aligned " hope for a two-thirds majority in such circumstances? France's decision to vote for the " non-aligned " draft, which was made known between the 1st and the 2nd of July, was crucial since if the great majority of OCAM's 14 members followed her lead, the " non-aligned " would have been within striking distance of their goal.

9. Our own lobbying efforts were devoted to maintaining support for the Latin American draft and dissuading those who, while opposed to the " non-aligned " draft resolution, were tempted, for reasons of political expediency, to abstain rather than to vote against it. With this last point in view, and also since it was of great importance to us that there should be an alternative resolution for which we could cast a positive vote, thus making clear our support for the principle of withdrawal providing it was in a proper context, we strongly urged the Latin Americans to put their resolution to a vote even if the " non-aligned " draft had already been adopted. In the event, however, this situation did not arise.

10. The result of the voting on the 4th of July had already been reported but is perhaps worth recapitulating. The " non-aligned " draft attracted less affirmative votes than we had estimated (53 for; 46 against; 20 abstentions). The bulk came from the Latin Americans and Western Europeans (except Sweden and Finland, who abstained); they were joined by one Asian and seven African States. The votes in favour were almost entirely Arab, extreme Moslem or Communist, plus four OCAM countries. The Latin American draft did rather better than expected (57 for; 43 against; 20 abstentions). The Latin Americans voted for it as a *bloc*, as did the overwhelming majority of the Western Europeans. In addition, seven OCAM and six English-speaking African States voted in favour. Japan voted in favour of both draft resolutions.

11. A resolution on humanitarian assistance to refugees and other victims of war, tabled by Sweden, was passed with only two abstentions; and a Pakistan resolution calling on Israel not to alter the status of Jerusalem, and to rescind all measures already taken, was also passed with a vote of 99 in favour, including our own.

12. At this point the Americans and Israelis and many others would happily have wound up the session. But Mr. Pazhwak, the Afghan President of the Assembly, by somewhat devious use of " consultations ", kept the Session in being from the 4th of July to the 21st of July to provide an opportunity for a compromise substantive resolution to be concocted.

13. The period was marked by growing Arab intransigence, orchestrated by the diminutive but pugnacious Algerian Foreign Minister, Bouteflika; and increasingly desperate attempts by the Soviet delegation, under Gromyko, to patch up some sort of resolution—at worst procedural if a compromise on substance could not be obtained—before returning home. Ambassador Dobrynin from Washington approached Goldberg on the 9th of July with a watered-down version of the " non-aligned " draft; not unexpectedly this was turned down. The Latins continued actively to search for a compromise, and came under pressure from the Russians to accept ingenious but inadequate variations of their original text. The Russians also exerted pressure in Arab capitals in the hope of getting agreement to a compromise draft. These efforts did not appear to have

much effect in New York, where on the 14th of July unanimous adoption of a second resolution on Jerusalem did something to raise Arab morale, thereby making them more intransigent on substance than ever.

14. On the 18th of July Presidents Boumedienne and Arif arrived in Moscow to communicate to the Soviet leaders the line adopted at the Cairo meeting of the Presidents of the UAR, Syria, Algeria and Iraq, and the Prime Minister of the Sudan. On the same day Dr. Solomon, on behalf of the Latin drafting group, finally bowed out of the negotiations with a letter to the President of the Assembly, which said that the results of the group's efforts to arrive at a compromise were " mainly negative ". On the 19th and the 20th of July Gromyko and Dobrynin were again in touch with the latter offering further concessions; this time two alternative versions were floated of the Latin American draft, both of them rather better (from our point of view) than the version we had voted for on the 4th of July. Many Western delegations had grave doubts whether the Arabs could accept the proposed Soviet wording even tacitly, but the Russians appeared sanguine enough, though they suggested an extension of the session for yet another four or five days during which the Arabs could be worked on. The crucial stage in their negotiations was reached on the evening of the 20th of July, when Gromyko and Bouteflika met to discuss texts. Without even consulting his Government, Bouteflika rejected both proposed drafts out of hand. Furthermore he let it be known that he would personally denounce any Arab delegation who abstained on the vote. The next morning, all the other Arabs, including the jaded UAR who had put it about earlier that they would abstain, had swung firmly against the Soviet proposal. Thereafter the Russians had no alternative but to try and get the session wound up with all speed. Even this proved difficult as the Arabs, influenced this time by Pachachi of Iraq, let it be known that they did not want any adjournment of the Session. They accordingly voted against a modest procedural resolution, concocted, though not sponsored, by the Indians, inviting the President to adjourn the session " temporarily ". This was supported by the West, the Soviet Union, the East Europeans, most Latin Americans and some moderate Africans and Asians. This odd voting pattern showed all the Great Powers (with the usual exception of France, who abstained) lined up at the finish against the " victims of aggression ". The latter had only themselves to thank.

Conclusion

15. It remains to ask what lessons and morals can be drawn from this extraordinary *dénouement*. Perhaps the most obvious gainers in stature were the Latin Americans, whose cohesion seemed to improve under intense pressures from the Communists and the more extreme Afro-Asians. Dr. Solomon of Trinidad gave a particularly clear-headed and courageous performance, and the Latins are conscious that they have flexed their muscles for all to see; at some temporary cost of popularity among the wilder Afro-Asians no doubt, but to their own considerable advantage as a group within the United Nations. The Pakistanis increased their credit with the Arabs as the leading sponsors of the two Status of Jerusalem resolutions and in doing so turned the tables on the Indians, whose Kashmir-based solicitude for Arab causes was scurvily rewarded. Indeed, at the end of the Assembly the Indians' irritation and disillusionment with Arab behaviour was second only to that of the Soviet Union. The West as a whole did well, perhaps at the cost of not separating its vital interests and concern for the area clearly enough from the Israeli presentation of their case. As in the Security Council, the Israeli presentation, if at times a little smug, was bravely and brilliantly handled by a team led by Mr. Eban, which had to deal with not one but 13 Arab speeches at a time. The bitterness of the Arabs was enhanced by the applause given to the Israelis by the daily gallery of New York Jews. The French were unable to prevent seven OCAM States from voting for the Latin American draft on the 4th of July, in spite of strong pressure exerted in OCAM capitals. The Israelis were delighted and point to this as a notable dividend for their policy of limited but imaginative technical assistance to selected African states.

16. Soviet actions and the motives behind them during the Special Session were the greatest puzzle of all, to their allies as much as to the rest of us. They seemed to make every possible mistake, and ended not only with a rejection of their proposals by the Assembly, but with bitterness against them amongst the Arabs themselves. Their

decision to call for an Emergency Special Session in the first place suggested that they would give the " victims of aggression " maximum propaganda support to make up for the fact that they had not stood by them militarily during the war. Such a policy, as was evident even at the time, involved serious risks because (*a*) it tied the Russians in advance to the defeated Arabs' chariot wheels; and (*b*) it had to be justified by outstanding success if it was to be acceptable domestically. By the 4th of July, when voting took place on the main resolutions before the Assembly, it was plain that the Soviet strategy had failed, in that a large segment of Afro-Asian opinion, and all the Latins, remained unconvinced of the justness of the Arab cause. Furthermore, the Arabs were increasingly dissatisfied at Soviet failure to deliver the goods, and suspicious of a sell-out at Glassboro.

17. The Russians then took frantic stock, sending Podgorny to Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, keeping Gromyko on at the United Nations, and finally sending Malik to sit in Cairo and keep in constant touch with the highest policy-makers (whoever they might be) in Egypt. At the United Nations they worked relentlessly to arrive at a substantive resolution; when negotiations with the Latins failed finally on the 18th of July, the attempts to deal directly with the Americans on the basis of the despised Latin text began, and it became clearer than ever that the Russians were very much in earnest. It is noteworthy that Boumedienne's tough talking with Soviet leaders in Moscow after the Cairo meeting of the five " progressive " Arab Presidents took place on the same day as Dobrynin from Washington (not Fedorenko) began dropping in on Goldberg. One can only conclude that, after their failure on the 4th of July (perhaps when Podgorny returned and reported to Moscow), the Russians decided at the highest level that re-arming the " progressive " Arabs on the scale necessary to enable them to win the " fourth round " was likely to be too dangerous, in spite of all the tempting political arguments in favour. So they decided to try for Israeli withdrawal at all costs, thinking that if they could obtain that for their *protégés*, Arab delight at this restoration of their territorial losses would in the end outweigh their fierce criticisms of Soviet " flexibility " at the United Nations. In the event Arab objections to the revised Latin draft, as marshalled by Bouteflika, were stronger than the Russians expected. They were left with no choice but to press for the earliest possible adjournment of the Special Session. They may now continue their dialogue on withdrawal privately with the Americans, leaving the Arabs to stew in their own juice while the economic and military facts of post-war life sink in, slowly but bitterly. We can expect little change in the public Soviet line in the forthcoming debates in the Security Council, but we should I suggest be thankful for the last-minute realism which, if this analysis is correct, prevented them from doubling their military stake in an attempt to retrieve the Arab defeat. They perhaps calculate that if they can avoid further hostilities and too great an economic and financial drain on them by their clients, they have already gained handsome advantages in damage to Western influence and interests throughout the Arab world, and in the strengthening of their own influence.

18. The United Nations as such came in for more criticism. After all the talk, the General Assembly could not agree on the simplest form of substantive resolution covering the main problem. But in fact the deadlock reflected a valuable acceptance by the nations of the world that there really were two sides to this question. Acceptance of this is basic to future United Nations efforts to reach a settlement.

19. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Algiers, Amman, Bahrain (Residency), Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Geneva (United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations), Jedda, Jerusalem, Khartoum, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Washington; to POMEC (Aden), and to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Group, Nicosia.

I have, &c.

L. C. GLASS.

1076/67

BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

15 August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

In paragraphs 3 and 4 of my letter 1076/67 of 14 August to Philip Mallet, I reported the clash that had taken place at the Khartoum Foreign Ministers' Conference between the Moroccans and Tunisians on the one part and the Syrians and the Algerians on the other. I also mentioned the recent worsening of Moroccan-Algerian relations.

2. You will have noticed from our Saving telegram No. 11 of 14 August that King Hassan, in his recent speech in Agadir, added to Moroccan criticism of Algeria. He mentioned Moroccan development despite foreign interference in Moroccan affairs and went further to indicate that while some countries indulged in expensive arms purchases and foreign adventures and believed that socialism was the reduction of the rich to the level of the poor, Morocco aimed by development to raise the poor to the level of the rich. The semi-official Moroccan newspaper Al Anbaa has now expressed the Government's preoccupation with Algerian interference in an article replying to the Algerian army magazine Al Jaish. I enclose a translation of the Al Anbaa article. This was broadcast by Radiodiffusion Télévision Marocaine and also sent out by Maghreb Arabe Presse. It is probably the most detailed defence that the Moroccans have yet given of their position during the Arab-Israel troubles.

...

3. I am copying this letter to Kay in Algiers and Brant in Tunis.

(J.F. Walker)

R.H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

Editorial of
Al Anbaa (Semi-official) No. 1128 of 13 & 14 August,1967.

The Algerian Army Magazine No. 41, issued last Thursday, continued an article attacking Morocco once again and spreading its poison against our country.

We will start by giving a summary of this article which was published in a magazine which might be regarded as official so long as, like other periodicals, it is subjected to the Algerian Government.

The Magazine wondered about the reasons for Mahjoub Ben Seddik's arrest after alleging that the strikes covered a number of economic services in Morocco, although everyone knows that the call found no echo among workers or ranks who denounced its sponsors, and that this was an outcome of the attitude the Government had taken towards the Middle East events and towards Zionism in general. The Magazine also alleged that the country's internal situation became seriously critical because of this official attitude which, it contended, did not correspond with the ambitions and wishes of the Moroccan people's masses. It even went so far as to say that the Moroccan Government has shown no solidarity with the Arab States in the Middle East.

Such was the gist of the article in the Algerian Army Periodical which, in fact, was a rife of hatred, anger and spite because of the progress and prosperity Morocco is achieving in many fields.

This does not surprise us as we have got used to Algerian attacks and to expressions of hostility towards Morocco and its people by the Algerian information instruments. But we regret such attacks on a sister State and neighbour which shares with Algeria the same links of religion, patriotism, language, blood and Arabism which the Foreign Ministers Conference in Khartoum had endeavoured to strengthen and consolidate. Moreover, Arab Ministers, including the Algerian Foreign Minister, were agreed on the necessity of reversion to the Arab solidarity Pact signed at the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca in September 1965, which Morocco and its King Hassan II had helped formulate, and presented it to his brothers the Kings and Heads of Arab State for application and execution.

The Algerian Magazine attacked the internal situation in Morocco, alleging that compatriots are arrested and thrown into prison cells for their opposition of the Government's policy which, according to the Magazine, was pro-Zionist and opposed the Arab nation's attitude. The Magazine, however, seems to have forgotten that the simplest of international usage and regulations preclude interference in other States' internal affairs. Moreover, there is in Morocco, at any rate, free and honest justice which gives full guarantees to each compatriot, regardless of his position and circumstances, and assures for him the full liberty of free expression of views before the court as well as self defence, which the judicial system in Algeria does not at all do for Algerian nationals.

It is simultaneously funny and disgraceful that the Algerian Government Magazine should misrepresent Morocco's open attitude towards the Middle East crisis in daring to attack our foreign policy. Quite shamessly it announced that Morocco has adopted no official attitude to make known its solidarity, help and support for fellow Arabs. Once again the Magazine has forgotten or overlooked all the bold solidarity attitudes Morocco had adopted both in the practical

sphere/

sphere or in the diplomatic level. If some irresponsible journalists are ignorant of facts or pretend not to be aware of them for some particular purpose, then we had better remind them of the course of events which, as journalists, they ought to keep in mind. His Majesty King Hassan II was the first head of Arab State to send his personal emissary to Cairo to get in touch with the U.A.R. authorities. Upon the outbreak of the crisis and of war between Arabs and the Zionist State Morocco mobilised its armed forces and sent units of its army to stand by fellow Arabs and wage the battle with them. His Majesty was first to suggest an Arab Summit Conference for the strengthening of solidarity between Arab States and for availing means of confrontation of the enemy. Upon the termination of war His Majesty appealed to his people to participate in the human campaign; thereupon all Moroccans contributed generously for helping Arabs dress their wounds and reconstruct their economy. His Majesty sent important amounts of drugs, foodstuffs, blankets and tenting to brothers in the U.A.R., Jordan and Syria, thus fulfilling his duty of human solidarity with fellow Arabs.

In the diplomatic level Morocco's efforts are common knowledge. When an Arab Summit was found impossible at that moment His Majesty proposed a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers in Kuwait then in New York for the continuation of their work there and to be able, at the same time, to follow the activity of the General Assembly's Extraordinary Session on the Middle East crisis. At the recent Arab Foreign Ministers Conference in Khartoum Morocco played a leading part, to which world newspapers and broadcasts testified. Thanks to Morocco's wise and constructive attitude at this Conference Arab Ministers were able to resort anew to a sort of positivity and sound logic and to confront events with the necessary firmness, seriousness and practicality.

We should not fail to remind the Magazine of the enthusiastic broadcasts His Majesty the King addressed to his people during and after the crisis, which were marked by frankness, objectivity, wisdom and far sight.

Morocco is very well aware of its Arab rôle, is fully appreciative of its responsibilities and knows that there is no vagueness about its absolute support for sister Arab States regarding the Middle East crisis, or its complete opposition of hateful Zionism, which require no analysis or confirmation. In standing by the Arab nation in its dilemma Morocco is doing so because of its keenness on Arabism, faith in the efficacy of Arab solidarity and conviction that the Arab nation will attain its ambitions only if efforts are unified and military plans and political programmes are coordinated.

At any rate Morocco's King, Government and people will continue along the path they have demarked for economic development, the improvement of the people's standards and the extermination of all evidence of under-development, regardless of whether or not its internal situation or foreign policy are abused or libelled by a newspaper of a sister State. However it regrets that interference in its internal affairs should come at a moment when need is great for the strengthening of solidarity among Arabs and when evidence of the settlement of conflicts between Arab States has started to loom on the horizon. It regrets that this should happen at a moment when hope is strong of the execution of the Arab solidarity Pact for the confrontation of the common destiny, the resistance of the common enemy and for serious and sincere action for the liquidation of

the residue/

the residue of the recent war between Arabs and the Zionist State with a view to the expulsion of Zionist gangs from Arab territory they occupied.

The Arab proverb says, "If you have no shame, then you can do what you like".

1076

PRODROME RABAT
FOR 3 FO LDN GRS 77 151843Z

ROUTINE TRIPOLI TO RABAT
TELEGRAM NO 21 15 AUGUST

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELNO 18 OF 15 AUG RFI TO FOREIGN OFFICE, BENGHAZI, TUNIS, CAIRO, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, RABAT, ALGIERS, JIG CYPRUS, WASHINGTON AND CBFNE.
AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT IN TODAYS PRESS ANNOUNCED THAT KING HUSSEIN IS TO VISIT KING IDRIS IN LIBYA SHORTLY, IN THE COURSE OF A SERIES OF VISITS WHICH THE KING IS PAYING TO HEADS OF ARAB AND ISLAMIC STATES. NO DATES ARE GIVEN.

AJS 16.VIII

SARELL.

SENT 151845Z PP

PRODROME RABAT

TELEX ◇ SERVICE ◇ TELEX ◇ SERVICE

Algerian Attacks on pro-Western Arab States

Algiers home service in Arabic (a) 20.00, (b) 13.00 GMT 4. 8. 67

FCO 1076

(a) Excerpts from radio commentary:

Brothers, it seems clear that there are in our Arab homeland some people who were helped by special circumstances to reach the summit of responsibilities. Today they are playing a tune which almost makes us doubt its connection with the truth of the Arab nation. This tune sometimes appears in the form of a decorated cloak of slogans about realism, wisdom and prudence, and sometimes in the form of a clear call for negotiations with the enemy. We are, therefore, entitled to suspect these ideas whose authors never cease to reiterate this talk in a manner which attracts attention. We say that we are fully entitled to suspect the source of these suggestions and the intentions of those who put them forward.

Yes, brothers, we are not advocates of war just for the love of war, nor are we messengers of violence merely for the love of violence. Also, we are not among those who are accustomed to rouse people with empty slogans. Nor have we ever been among thoee who claim greatness, gallantry or empty glories. The history of our entire Arab people in the East and the West testifies that our nation never at any time accepted humiliation or degradation nor did it accept defeat and surrender...

Questions of destiny, which concern the life of the entire nation, can never under any circumstances be the subject of bargaining and compromises and manoeuvring. It is not permissible to meet at a table, round or otherwise, or at a green or red or yellow table, to negotiate over a point which concerns the life of the entire Arab nation in the present and the future.

Brothers, we say this because the question of Arab destiny, in our view, is not a question of relations between countries which are brought together by the Arab League, but of close ties between the sons of one people and one nation from the Ocean to the Gulf. From this angle we see that responsibility falls on all Arab rulers whether in the East or the West. They must all make efforts in one direction: that is, to liquidate the traces of aggression and liberate Palestine. As for the Arab people, they chose the road without hesitation or delay from the first days and so the issue does not need any technical genius in bargaining and manoeuvring, but what is needed is the mobilisation of all the national efforts to liberate the stolen territory. It should be quite clear to all rulers that the Arab people will never accept any substitute for the line of resuming the battle...

Do they not remember, those who today are shaking in the face of the Zionists' military triumphs, that the crusaders remained in Palestine for 70 years before being driven out by the armies of Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi? Do they not remember that imperialism dominated Algeria for one century and a third, but it left it in defeat as a result of the Algerian people's struggle? Do they not remember scores of similar battles in the history of the Arab nation? Yes, they say, we have been defeated in three successive wars with the Jews so there is no escape from admitting the fait accompli - in other words, abandoning all the noble aspirations and dreams for which the millions of Arabs gave sacrifices.

The truth, dear brothers and sisters, is that there is a startling and strange phenomenon which is very much in harmony with this talk that is coming from some Arab capitals and the destructive calls coming from Washington, London and Tel-Aviv. They are Israeli, Anglo-US voices which are talking in the Arab tongue through some Arab media.

The whole matter might be natural and ordinary if their talk was confined to Arab questions and internal Arab relations, but they have exceeded these bounds and begun to attack our friends who helped us during the crisis and who are still declaring their readiness to help us in the future. Faced with such a phenomenon we can only wonder about the real role of such sinful voices in the ranks of our Arab people, but this questioning becomes unjustified when we know that they are fulfilling the role assigned to them within the framework of a stage play in which they do not even act as players but as extras in a role which they themselves may not have fully appreciated.

In any case, Arab and socialist Algeria has clearly defined her position. She is certain that she is in harmony with the profound aspirations of all the sons of the great Arab nation in the East and the West. Algeria's position has not resulted from a false desire to show off or to be vulgar, but is a true translation of the personality of her noble Arab people. Quite certainly, this receives the support and sympathy of the Arab masses from Casablanca to Baghdad.

(b) Excerpts from report of 'Ash-Sha'b' leader:

... We can understand anti-freedom stands outside the Arab homeland and can explain the attitude of certain governments that stood by the aggressors, but what surprised us and continues to surprise us is to see certain governments in the Arab homeland adopt suspicious attitudes and take the position of defending the enemies' views. Hundreds of Arab compatriots and strugglers were sent to prison and received the heaviest sentences, including hard labour. These strugglers committed no crime except that they stood by the side of their brothers in defence of justice. Compensation was paid to the Zionist stores which were subjected to the wrath of the masses and apologies were made to the embassies which were subjected to the same wrath.

Those who carried out all these actions did not utter a single word about the plight of the homeless Arabs nor about the Arabs' stores which were destroyed, looted and from which their owners were ousted in (?Gaza) and Jerusalem. We could have kept quiet about such attitudes, adding them to the dozens of similar attitudes in the past, and not considering them abnormal in the present critical period which the Arab nation is experiencing, if those who are running such affairs had not suddenly wanted to make themselves today's heroes in the present decisive battle and flooded the world press and news agencies with statements that created confusion not only for the Arab masses but also as far as world public opinion is concerned - this world public opinion which began to understand our just stands. The oddest thing of all is that they concentrated all their attacks on the popular masses. [Passage about the distortion of facts by such governments.]

These false faces, which appear superficially today, do not deceive us. The masses of today are not the masses of yesterday...

Algiers Radio Interview with Dr. Makhus

Algiers home service in Arabic 20.00 GMT 4.8.67

Excerpts from interview with the Syrian Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Makhus, recorded by Algiers radio's special correspondent:

[After dealing with the UN debates - which had shown the Arabs who were their friends and who their enemies - and stressing the need to strike at the interests of the NATO States, Makhus said in answer to a question on the Khartoum conference:]

When we were in Kuwait we made definite proposals that can be summarised as severing diplomatic relations with States that helped the aggression and with States that may stand against us at the UN; [words indistinct] a meeting point so that every State knows its stand at the UN; the withdrawal of all credits by governments as well as individuals, from Western banks; stopping the flow of oil not only to the USA and Britain but also to all Western States standing against us at the UN, since stopping oil only to the USA and Britain is not as serious as stopping it to West Germany and the NATO States standing against us; unilateral abolition of military bases in the Arab homeland without negotiations [words indistinct] and (?their) boycott by people and governments; recognition of Republican Yemen and the use of the energies wasted by both UAR and Saudi Arabia and Yemen itself at the point where they are needed by the Arab people [words indistinct]; (?aid for) the needy countries, such as Iraq which stopped oil to all countries at that time, from countries that can afford it (?such as) Kuwait; we also asked for a committee from Algeria, Sudan and Iraq to [words indistinct].

I believe that if these proposals had been adopted at the [Kuwait] conference of Foreign Ministers and we had gone to New York to declare this as our stand, it would have (?settled) the question finally, because the aggression took place in order to strengthen Western (?influence) and to crush the progressive tide in the Arab homeland. If the aggressors had seen that this objective was not achieved and that on the contrary it resulted in the eradication of Western interests in the region, then the mathematical equation would have changed (indistinct reference to oil interests) and the result would have been the withdrawal of the Zionist forces [words indistinct]. But this was not agreed upon and it was suggested that the issue should be considered after the session of the conference [words indistinct]...

At the Khartoum conference we shall make the same demands and we shall insist on them, as we believe that if there is an intention to hold a Summit, the Arab masses must believe that there is a change, even a simple one, in the stand and that there is a harmony, even simple, among the Arab States towards the Arab cause as a whole, and that this deep and effective disaster has shaken consciences and changed minds and that these States have responded to the will of the masses...

[After speaking on the Cairo meeting of five Arab countries and stressing the need for Arab unity, Makhus was asked about the lessons of the setback. He said:]

Division was one of the main causes of the setback... We must in the future unify our efforts and energy on the basis of what is best for us, not on the basis of weakness, defeatism and despondency. We must also learn from the logic of science and create a new Arab man capable of meeting the requirements of modern civilisation... Furthermore we must depend on ourselves above all... The world (?gave advice to) the Arabs in the name of world peace. Appeals came to us from friend and foe asking us not to begin shooting and to preserve world peace. The Arab people paid the price, in the form of their national security, for this peace which was in fact not preserved...

For details see Appendices

Mr Maclay

Chancery
Rabat

With the compliments of

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

N.E.A.D.

FOREIGN OFFICE

8 August, 1967

A25 18-VIII

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
17 AUG 1967

Mr Maclay

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE

Reference 1076

CONFIDENTIAL

Khartoum and Baghdad Conferences

M. Filali was not very forthcoming about the Khartoum and Baghdad Conferences, though he confirmed that a summit would depend on the outcomes of both these Conferences. He said that the atmosphere of the Khartoum Conference had been comparatively relaxed and that some progress had been made on the questions separating the Arabs at present. He indicated that Morocco did not especially wish to involve herself in the Yemen question and also that Morocco had raised her frontier problems with Algeria. He agreed that this latter problem was not only one of frontiers but of the expulsion of officials on the one hand and the return of Moroccan businessmen and private citizens from Algeria on the other.

JFWalker

(J.F. Walker)
16 August 1967

O.C. ALS 16.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

Ed (1626)

CONFIDENTIAL DESPATCH NO: 7

H.M. Representative,
RABAT.

1076.

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

M. C. G. MAN

22 AUG 1967

JEDDA

Saudi Arabia during and after the Arab-Israeli War

AhS 23.VIII

16 August, 1967

Jedda Despatch No: 7
of the 8th of August, 1967

SUMMARY

Saudi Arabia during and after the Arab-Israeli War

Geographically and traditionally sheltered as she is from the outside world, Saudi Arabia has always lagged behind the Arab nationalist movement. The weakness of her position was apparent on the outbreak of war: King Faisal had become a leading opponent of President Nasser, the champion of the Arabs against Israel. (paragraphs 2 - 3)

2. Palestinians play a disproportionately large part in influencing opinion in Saudi Arabia, which therefore pays lip service to the cause of Palestine. King Faisal had no alternative but to toe the Arab line despite Nasser's open hostility towards Saudi Arabia. Yet Faisal too is deeply opposed to the existence of Israel as an independent State. (paragraphs 4 - 5)

3. The Saudi armed forces were alerted on the 25th of May. There were bomb incidents in Jedda. The King returned on the 4th of June from his visits abroad and was criticised for not coming back sooner. During the war there was only minor unpleasantness to Americans in Jedda and Riyadh, but in the Eastern Province disturbances broke out and the National Guard were called in. The American community in the country were on the point of being evacuated. Almost no hostility was shown to the British community. The Saudi government gave assurances of protection, but at the same time provocative Saudi broadcasts gave full coverage to the 'Big Lie'. (paragraphs 6 - 11)

4. Oil production which had stopped during the disturbances was quietly resumed; an embargo was put on exports to Britain and the United States. Otherwise Anglo-Saudi commercial relations were hardly affected. (paragraph 12)

5. The war had its bizarre aspects. The Saudi Army moved up into Jordan after the cease-fire. (paragraphs 13 - 14)

6. The King lost no time in identifying Nasser as the culprit responsible for the Arab débâcle. For Faisal, Nasser remains Saudi Arabia's most dangerous enemy, but Nasser's charismatic appeal was sufficient to make Saudi Arabia fall in with UAR policy. Although the Saudi press censures Nasser, Faisal has to keep up an Arab appearance. (paragraphs 15 - 16)

7. Faisal wants to continue with the development of his country in peace, but feels unable to lift the oil embargo by himself. Nevertheless he may yet decide to go it alone. So far Saudi Arabia has not suffered too badly as a result of the oil embargo. (paragraphs 17 - 18)

/8. Faisal's

8. Faisal's policy is pragmatic. He will say the right things about Palestine while keeping a wary eye on the UAR's manoeuvres over Yemen and South Arabia. (paragraph 19)

9. Saudi Arabia's problems have been thrown into relief. Internal security is very much on Faisal's mind. The pressure of 'revolutionary socialism' on Saudi Arabia from outside is bound to have its effect in the long run. (paragraph 20)

10. The excellent impression created on Faisal by his State Visit to Britain remains. He did not believe the 'Big Lie'. Whereas Anglo-Saudi friendship is still firm there is bitterness towards the United States. At no time did the Saudis contemplate breaking off diplomatic relations with the Americans and ourselves. (paragraph 21)

11. A tribute to my staff. (paragraph 22)

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
JEDDA.

DESPATCH NO: 7

(1085)

8 August, 1967.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit an account of the part played by Saudi Arabia at the time of the recent Arab-Israeli war and some reflections on the likely course King Faisal has charted for his country in the treacherous waters which lie ahead. I should perhaps explain at the outset of this despatch that I myself left Jedda on the 27th of April in order to accompany King Faisal during his State Visit to Britain and I did not return to Jedda until the 21st of June. My Counsellor, Mr. W.P. Cranston, was therefore in charge at this post during the crisis. I could get no nearer to the war than a television set in a Health Centre in Surrey, surrounded, ironically enough, by a predominantly Jewish clientèle.

2. Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy, sheltered for so long by geography and tribal and religious tradition against the restless world outside, has always lagged far behind the Arab nationalist movement. Her attempts over the last eighteen months to marshal Islamic solidarity as a force against 'revolutionary socialism', though sincere, have not found a popular echo abroad and in the event the weakness of Saudi Arabia's position at the outbreak of war became all too clear. The crisis which led to the war served to show up the difficulties Saudi Arabia faces:

/her

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.,
Etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

her inability to appeal to the Arab masses, the absence of any real national feeling across the whole country and her relative military feebleness. Small wonder then that even here, President Nasser became a champion overnight, temporarily nullifying the attempts of moderate Arabs and Western well-wishers to build up King Faisal into a comparable Arab figure.

3. Saudi Arabia before the Arab-Israeli war was more conscious than most Arab States of the divisive factors in the Arab world. She had become a leading opponent of Arab socialism. The King and most of his people were united in distrust and dislike of Nasser. The war in Yemen, the running sore of South Arabia and frequent violent attacks on Faisal and his friends like Hussain of Jordan, broadcast over Cairo radio and often from the mouth of Nasser himself, kept the Saudis well aware of the Egyptian threat. Added to this was - and still is - Faisal's conviction that Nasser is merely being used by atheist Communism for its own purpose, and Communism is of course a destructive creed which the devout Muslim must rigorously oppose.

4. The injection of the problem of Palestine into the Arab body has, however, always been sufficient to drug it into monomania. There is no doubt who calls the tune: there are enough Palestinians scattered around the Arab world, usually playing a disproportionately large part in influencing opinion in their adopted country, Saudi Arabia included, to alarm the most ardent anti-Nasserist government. "Scratch an Arab and you find Palestine" is not necessarily true of the majority of Saudis, either in Najd or Hijaz, but they often behave for public consumption as if it were. Privately, most Saudis will speak in open criticism of Palestinians,

/but

but stay touchy on the subject of Palestine. At the top, the King and his advisers have no illusions about the security risk to the régime posed by these intelligent and embittered people, but Saudi Arabia must perforce pay lip service to the Palestine cause.

5. Thus from Jedda we saw the threads of Arab policies, spun out before the crisis in all their various colours, suddenly twisted up together. Unity was achieved: the Arab wish came true for a few hours. King Faisal, caught in London by the gathering storm, was involved in a situation he was powerless to influence. From his public statements - and indeed from his private remarks to us - it was clear that he had no alternative but to toe the Arab line and back President Nasser's stand against Israel, disappointing though this must have been to a press hungry for some stricture on Nasser or a slip of the royal tongue. But Faisal is too wily a fox to fall into word traps, however cunningly concealed, and he emerged from his press conference at the Dorchester Hotel on the 23rd of May as the close supporter of his Arab "brother" in Cairo. It is of course hard to be convincingly respectful to a rival leader who has roundly cursed you, threatened you with air attack and actually gone as far as to bomb your towns (Najran and Jizan were again both bombed in mid-May) and Faisal did not fool anybody at the press conference. Yet Faisal's opposition to the existence of Israel as an independent State is fundamental and although he suspected all along that Nasser was only bluffing he may well have been tempted to hope, however fleetingly, when hostilities broke out that Israel's hour was about to strike.

/6. Already

6. Already on the 25th of May, the Saudi Armed Forces had been put on the alert and told to be ready for the struggle to liberate Palestine. This followed a warning that oil supplies to the West would be severed if the latter supported Israel. All remained quiet in the country despite a noticeable rise in excitement. Then, suddenly, on the evening of the 2nd of June, three bombs exploded in Jedda damaging half a dozen cars and blowing holes in walls, but fortunately causing no casualties. All three were directed at American targets: the Embassy compound, the Military Mission and a firm of contractors. This was the work of Palestinians most of whom have now been rounded up and jailed. Armed guards were immediately put on all Embassies and public buildings thought to be in danger. The next day King Faisal returned to his country, but there was much private criticism that he had spent so long away at a crucial time and had done nothing to hurry his return.

7. During the war itself the country was gripped by a transistorised fever. Work stopped and no ear was far from a radio. When we heard of mobs ransacking our Embassies elsewhere we burnt our papers and prepared to expect the worst. Apart, however, from a few minor incidents of unpleasantness to Americans, the chief population centres of Jedda and Riyadh remained quiet. The coolies and taxi drivers who sprawl about across the road from this Embassy continued to lie inertly by their radios.

8. Nevertheless in the Eastern Province, there were sharp reminders of the precarious security of the oil producing areas and two days of disturbances took place before the National Guard, brought in from Riyadh, restored complete order. Houses were wrecked and

/cars

cars destroyed, both at the American oil town of Dhahran and at the U.S. Military Mission, but almost no violence was offered to persons, nor were the oil installations themselves damaged. The trouble-makers were Palestinian-led and noisy though not highly organised. The National Guard speedily dispersed a larger demonstration in Al-Khobar on the 8th of June, proving their worth in contrast to the Regular Army who appeared to have no inkling of what a demonstration was, or how they should react, or even which side they were on (it was a soldier who helped the demonstrators take down the crest from the U.S. Consulate-General at Dhahran). On the other hand the National Guard made many arrests and about 150 of the Palestinian demonstrators are now believed to be languishing in dark dungeons.

9. Meanwhile wild rumours began to circulate in Jedda about the seriousness of these demonstrations, the immediate cause of which was the 'Big Lie' of British and American intervention in the war. Shots had been fired in Al-Khobar and at least two people were reported to have been killed, but figures much greater than these were current. The American community were very worried, and my U.S. colleague (who was under pressure from Washington) prepared for evacuation. By mid-day on the 7th of June most of the Americans in the Eastern Province, as well as in Jedda, were sitting on suitcases waiting for their marching orders. We our-selves did not feel that there was any need to order evacuation since no open hostility had been shown to British subjects beyond a few incidents of rudeness and some unpleasantness towards British school teachers in Dammam from their pupils. We advised

/people

people to carry on as usual where possible, and otherwise to stay quietly at home.

10. Later the same day the U.S. Embassy received assurances that the Saudi Government would do all that was necessary to protect the American and European communities, and we received a similar assurance soon after. National Guardsmen began to appear everywhere and the Americans thankfully decided against evacuation.

11. The King was by then in a very difficult position. All Arab broadcasting stations were pouring out a stream of Arab triumphs, exhortations and warnings not to listen to seditious foreign broadcasts. Jedda radio English service translated the larger gems and gave full coverage to what the other Arab countries were saying about the 'Big Lie', thus thoroughly unsettling the Western communities. Attempts by the Americans and ourselves to stop these broadcasts, or at least to have denials read out, were in vain. Nevertheless loudspeaker vans toured the streets and warned against disturbances. There were no incidents except those in the east, and the National Guardsmen, inspite of their unkempt appearance, were a reassuring sight.

12. Oil production which had stopped on the 7th of June as a result of the disturbances was quietly resumed again on the evening of the 12th, though not to British and American destinations. For the most part, British interests in Saudi Arabia were unaffected. Commercial relations continued with only a mild lull and most merchants went on dealing with us as before. There was no run on the banks, but nervous foreigners (mainly Americans) converted their bank balances into travellers cheques in anticipation of evacuation.

/13. The

13. The war had its bizarre aspects. About twenty Egyptian planes flew through on their way north from the Yemen. Egyptian pilots appeared in Jedda, not a week after victims of Egyptian gas-bombing were shown to the diplomatic corps. We were told that the planes which had bombed Jizan called in to refuel there on their way home. Palestinians were arrested in Jedda and elsewhere, particularly the ones who were loudest in their calls for action.

14. The Saudi Army kept its fighting record intact by crossing the border into Jordan after the cease-fire.having moved up from their initial positions overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. Eventually one uncamouflaged infantry birgade of about 4000 men took up station in southern Jordan, while a similar force of the National Guard moved up to the border behind them.

15. Most enlightened Saudis quickly realised the extent of the Arab defeat although public opinion needed to believe in some external aid for Israeli in order to digest the utter superiority of the Israeli arms. For their part, the King and his advisers lost no time in identifying the culprit who was responsible for the Arab débâcle - Nasser. The King made little secret of his disillusionment with Nasser's political and military handling of the crisis and openly voiced his doubts about the "Big Lie" in front of the entire diplomatic corps in Jedda, to the bitter embarrassment of the U.A.R., Syrian and Algerian Ambassadors. In conversation with me on the 24th of June, His Majesty launched into a grim attack on Nasser for having so irresponsibly plunged the Arabs into a senseless disaster. All Faisal's suspicions came to the surface and it was clear - as it still is - that for him it is Nasser, not Israel, who remains Saudi Arabia's most dangerous enemy and whose military

/foothold

foothold in Yemen is a dagger pointed at the Saudi regime.

16. The charismatic character of Nasser and the tremendous appeal he had in the heat of the moment, sufficient to make the Saudis fall in with U.A.R. policy and promise to put their tiny airforce at the U.A.R.'s command (no reply was ever received from Cairo) must have been galling facts of life for Faisal, but he had to accept them and join in the chorus screaming for Israel's destruction. Moreover, his special position as Custodian of the Holy Places and Imam of the Muslims demanded that Faisal should say the right things. Thus it came about that on the 6th of June he addressed a wildly excited crowd in Riyadh with a strident call to all Muslims to wage 'Jihad' against Zionism. But Faisal realises that he and Nasser have nothing in common and the Saudi press and radio began to underline the differences immediately the war finished. What started as criticism of the oil embargo has now turned into attacks of increasing sharpness on Arab stratagey and revolutionary socialism, with Nasser receiving a major part of the blame. On his side, Nasser singled out Saudi news media for criticism in his speech on the 23rd of July accusing them of hostility and criticising Faisal in particular for non-cooperation in the war. The threads of Arab unity which were woven together so speedily at the beginning of June are now rapidly becoming unravelled again. Yet for all this Faisal still has to keep up an Arab appearance and must not be seen to be keeping too blatant company with the Americans and ourselves. There is therefore no mention in the press or radio, as there used to be before the war, of my U.S. colleague or myself when we have an audience of the King.

/Everyone

Everyone else receives publicity. This is perhaps childish, but costs Faisal nothing and is his way of toeing the Arab line.

17. Faisal resents being forced by the mistakes of others to cut off his nose to spite his face and stop oil exports to Britain and America. A vast development plan is under way for his country and Faisal wants to be left in peace in order to continue the good work of building a better Saudi Arabia. He is working hard through the press to prepare public opinion for the resumption of oil exports and to illustrate the pitfalls of following the U.A.R. But for internal and inter-Arab reasons, the King understandably feels unable to go it alone. He is therefore holding his hand, probably judging that he can afford to lift the oil embargo only if Saudi Arabia, ideally in company with Kuwait and Libya, receives a tacit mandate from an Arab Summit Conference or, sooner and better still, from the next Foreign Ministers meeting at the end of August. If this does not work and no early solution seems in sight, the temptation to go it alone will, I think, be great for Faisal despite all the obvious dangers. At that point it is just possible that he may decide to force the issue and lift the embargo, hoping that this challenge will rally the moderate Arab States behind him and that self-interest will persuade the others to acquiesce in his action.

18. Saudi Arabia has not in fact suffered too badly as a result of the oil embargo and can manage without significant detriment to her economy for another two months. The picture was bad in June when the country sustained a loss in oil revenues amounting to 136 million riyals (this loss is to some extent notional since part of it can be recovered if production is raised

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in the future). With the arrival of a number of tankers, however, production was running at a high level of 2.8 million barrels per day in July compared with a figure of 1.675 for June. There has been much talk of the need to raise taxes, reduce salaries and prune government expenditure and a Ministerial Committee has been set up to examine the financial consequences of the short fall in oil revenue, but the Minister of Commerce and Industry told me privately that the country was strong enough to avoid such measures until mid-October.

19. Faisal's policy is essentially pragmatic and for the present he is treading carefully, patiently watching how matters develop in Arab counsels and saying very little. He has made no public announcement since his 'Jihad' speech on the 6th of June. He must hope that moderation will prevail and that the oil will be allowed to flow again to Britain and the United States. In the meantime Saudi Arabia will continue to say the right things at the United Nations and elsewhere about Palestine and we must expect her to adopt a rigorous attitude over Jerusalem and the West Bank. She will continue to encourage and succour her friends, particularly King Hussain whose continued survival is in Saudi Arabia's own interests. Above all, Faisal will keep a wary eye on U.A.R. manoeuvres over the Yemen problem for, as he told me in June, he feels certain that Nasser is now free to pay increasingly suspect attention to Yemen and South Arabia. Faisal does not believe that the latest proposal for a return to the Jedda Agreement of 1965 reflects a genuine desire by Nasser to leave Yemen and let the country work out its own destiny. He remains convinced that Nasser wants to keep his troops in Yemen so that he can cast his evil

/influence

influence over an independent South Arabia. And not only South Arabia, but the Gulf as well with the ultimate objective of unseating the Saudi régime. It therefore remains a cardinal objective of Faisal's policy to get Nasser out of Yemen as soon as possible.

20. It is true that Saudi Arabia survived the Arab-Israeli crisis with little immediate loss beyond oil revenues, a loss due to an Arab policy which is widely admitted to be a mistake. But Saudi Arabia's own problems have been thrown into relief and this is another reason why Faisal must tread cautiously and look inwards for a while. The bomb incidents in Jedda and disturbances in the Eastern Province during June have significant implications for the internal security of the Saudi régime, and this is very much in Faisal's mind. If another crisis should happen, the King cannot be sure that there will not be new trouble despite the presence of the National Guard. Saudi Arabia moreover depends heavily on Western experts and these might be tempted to leave in the event of a breakdown of public security. Faisal has always told us that Communism stalks behind Nasser; yet although he will not openly admit it, he must realise that it is not just a question of Nasser and Communism, but of the steady pressure from outside of 'revolutionary socialism' on a politically backward Saudi Arabia which is bound to have its effect in the long run. He must therefore steer Saudi Arabia with great care through the months ahead hoping that the situation in Yemen and South Arabia will turn to his advantage, that the wild men in Damascus and Algiers will be kept at bay and that some sort of settlement will be reached with Israel which will prevent the recurrence of a new crisis in the

/Middle

Middle East and enable Saudi Arabia to marshal her strength and watch over her security.

21. Faisal has not allowed the Arab-Israeli war to affect his relations with Britain or the United States. Indeed, I found him more friendly than ever when I saw him on my return to Jedda in June. The excellent impression created on him by his State Visit to Britain had in no way suffered. He never believed the story about our collusion with the Israelis and has been reassured by our attitude towards Israeli 'aggression'. He regards us as an ally in preserving the security and stability of the Arabian peninsula and, although he never loses an opportunity to criticise the way in which we are trying to solve the problem of South Arabia, he has never suspected our good faith. Anglo-Saudi friendship has therefore not been shaken by the Middle East crisis and this is true at most levels in the country. To this extent we have emerged from the war a good deal better off than the Americans. Faisal himself has had some hard things to say to my U.S. colleague about the American attitude during and subsequent to the war, but he accepts that America has to support Israel and, more important, he knows full well that Saudi Arabia would totter to a halt without the Americans. At the lower levels, however, there is still much criticism of the United States and many Saudis remain convinced of American collusion with Israel and keep their distance from the American Embassy. At no time, however, did the Saudis contemplate breaking off diplomatic relations with the Americans or ourselves. The King's principal adviser, Dr. Rashad Pharaon, was emphatic to me on this point and it has been confirmed by my U.S. colleague.

/22. Here

22. Here in Saudi Arabia we were only on the fringe of the war, but much hard work was done by all my staff and I have heard from Mr. Cranston how one and all cheerfully and willingly applied themselves to the heavy burden which the crisis placed upon them. I should therefore like to close this despatch by paying a personal tribute to the staff for the way in which they carried out their duties at a post not renowned for its climate in June.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Tunis, Triploi, Benghazi, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tehran and Washington, to the British Interests Sections of the Italian and Swiss Embassies at Khartoum and Algiers respectively, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative at the United Nations, New York, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Political Agents at Doha, Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

I have the honour to be
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

(M. C. G. Man)

1076

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL,
CASABLANCA.

32/5/67

17 August 1967

Dear Arthur,

You will remember that I mentioned to you the possibility of distributing "Middle East Talking Points" to a few selected members of the British Community for use on a non-attributable basis. We have now received a copy of Elwell's letter, IR 2/23/1 of 3 August.

2. When I put up the original suggestion the paper in question was being sent to us in several copies on plain paper, but as you know it has since reached us in the form of a Saving telegram. Since interest in the whole question has tended to subside in spite of the efforts of the Istiqlal press to keep it alive and since in particular the "big lie" has been firmly nailed, I doubt whether the proposed exercise would be worth the trouble involved and, in particular, whether it would be worth while retyping the "Talking Points" on plain paper. Unless, therefore, I hear from you to the contrary I propose to drop the suggestion.

Yours ever

Patrick.

(Patrick Johnston)

Arthur Marshall, Esq.,
British Embassy,
RABAT.

X 17/8

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Tel walker 17/8 1076

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(Enter) Full text, now circulating, to be entered separately instead AS

MAP 80

APPEL AUX JUIFS MAROCAINS:

RABAT,17 AOUT-(MAP)- UN GROUPE DE MAROCAINS JUIFS (PROFESSEURS, INGENIEURS, MEDECINS, JURISTES), SE PROPOSE DE PROUMOUVOIR UN GROUPEMENT NATIONAL AYANT POUR OBJECTIF DE DEVELOPPER UNE CONSCIENCE NATIONALE PLEINE ET ENTIERE AU SEIN DE LA MINORITE JUIVE MAROCAINE. C'EST LE SENS DE L'APPEL QUI VIENT D'ETRE LANCE A LA COMMUNITE JUIVE DU MAROC QUI SEMBLE ENCORE ASSISTER EN SPECTATEUR DEVANT LE COMBAT QUE LIVRE LE SIONISME AU MONDE ARABE, ET QUI DONNE L'IMPRESSION DE VOULOIR RESTER A L'ECART, POUR NE PAS DIRE PLUS, A L'EGARD D'UN DRAME QUE VIT LA NATION MAROCAINE A LAQUELLE POURTANT CETTE MINORITE APPARTIENT-CI-DESSUS NOUS DONNONS DE LARGES EXTRAITS DE CET APPEL QUI A ETE SIGNE PAR MM. RALPH BENARROSH-JOSEPH BENDELLAC, HAIM BENISTY- LEON ELMALLEM- JOSEPH LEVY- SIMON LEVY-RENE GHANA- ISSAC BEBBAGH-ABRAHAM SERFATY. (MAP)-

(A SUIVRE)

BA/MK++++++

MAP 81

-APPEL AUX JUIFS....(DEUX)...

L'APPEL DECLARE NOTAMMENT:

'' LA MINORITE MAROCAINE DE CONFESSION JUIVE SE TROUVE AUJOURD'-HUI A LA CROISEE DES CHEMINS. SON AVENIR MEME SUR LA TERRE DE SES ANCETRES, DANS SA PROPRE PATRIE, RISQUE D'ETRE COMPROMIS.

'' L'AGRESSION D'ISRAEL CONTRE LES ETATS ARABES, SA POLITIQUE EXPANSIONNISTE, L'OCCUPATION ET L'ANNEXION DE NOUVEAUX TERRITOIRES, LEX EXACTIONS COMMISES PAR SES TROUPES QUI PROVOQUENT UN NOUVEL EXODE DE REFUGIES PALESTINIENS, SOULEVENT LA COLERE LEGITIME DES MASSES POPULAIRES.

'' EN UN MOMENT AUSSI GRAVE, LA POPULATION JUIVE MAROCAINE EST RESTEE CEPENDANT, DANS SA GRANDE MAJORITE, ISOLEE DU PEUPLE. LE FOSSE N'A CESSE DE S'ELARGIR ENTRE JUIS ET MUSULMANS, L'INCOMPREHENSION ET LA MEFIANCE SE SONT DEVELOPPEES DANGEUREUSEMENT, L'OPINION GENERALE TENDANT D'UN COTE A CONFONDRE JUDAISME ET SIONISME, DE L'AUTRE A DENATURER LE CARACTERE ESSENTIEL-LEMENT ANTI-IMPERIALISTE ET ANTI-SIONISTE DE LA LUTTE DE LIBERATION DES PEUPLES ARABES''.(MAP)-

(A SUIVRE)

BA/MK++++++

[redacted] U/Rabat

1076

By Bag

SAVING TELEGRAM

FOREIGN OFFICE/COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO ABIDJAN AND CERTAIN OTHER MISSIONS

Telno 23 Saving AZS 23.VIII 17 August 1967 (J.I.P.G.D.)

UNCLASSIFIED I.O. 1/2578

Addressed to Abidjan telegram No. 23 Saving of 17 August And Saving Unnumbered to certain other Posts.

MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS

"Israeli soldiers are said (censes) to have attacked by themselves last June, since no proof of direct American, English, German or other foreign participation has been given by the Arab States". - From Algérie Actualité, Algerian Sunday newspaper, 6 August.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 22 AUG 1967

"Arab peoples must grasp this fundamental idea, that it would be very difficult, emotionally and politically, for the countries of the East, (in context meaning U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe) if ever they come to the point, to fight directly against Israel. We are unlikely to see Arab and Eastern armies fight side by side against Israeli troops. We can hardly imagine pilots or missile technicians from the Eastern countries confronting Israel's planes or missiles in Palestine or Arab countries; so long as the enemy camp limits the conflict at least in appearance to the Arabs and the Israelis. At the most, there might be Socialist volunteers, but that only if the enemy had appealed for volunteers from the other camp". - Algérie Actualité, 6 August.

"The damage (from the oil embargo) suffered by Britain, the United States and the West in general may be compared with a slight scratch that a light dressing would be sufficient to cure. For the Arab world, the losses suffered are quite likely to lead to a spreading cancer". - The Moroccan Foreign Minister, Dr. Ahmed Laraki, during the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference in Khartoum (reported in Rabat, 3 August).

"We were not as good at building and constructing for our future as we were at dreaming... We built the summit conference and then demolished it. We established the Unified Arab Command and then crippled it. We then spent years when our wounds were bleeding on a long road of peripheral differences, fabricated battles and conflicts". - From King Hussein's accession anniversary broadcast, 10 August.

"The Arab Socialist Union must remain under the Government... When it tries to compete with the Government or bring it to heel, it is only creating duality of authority, or confusion of responsibility... The attempt (by information media) to arouse enthusiasm and exaltation and to consider that as a form of mobilisation has proved worthless. It has been shown to be incapable of supplying stamina in a war whose battles demand stamina". - From an article by Mohammed Hasanayn Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, broadcast by Cairo Radio and Voice of the Arabs, 11 August.

Heykal is now being accused by the UAR govt. of deception and other similarly grave crimes.

/"The United

"The United States Oil and Gas Journal recently reported an Israeli plan to build a canal from the port of Elath in the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean coast...which might in the future replace the Suez Canal or at least considerably lessen its importance. There are reports of other plans, too. Thus the United States bulletin, Economic Law, reports that Israel proposes to provide Western companies with concessions for working Sinai oil deposits seized from the U.A.R., and, furthermore, as the magazine points out, it is proposed to offer these concessions on much more favourable terms than those on which the Egyptians were insisting". - Moscow Radio home service, 5 August.

"One of the greatest contradictions arises from the Egyptian public's eagerness to learn what has really happened and what will happen now, and from the obvious reluctance of the country's leadership to discuss publicly these questions at a moment when the enemy is lurking a mere 120 kilometres from the capital. The official spokesman, Mohammed Heykal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, has said that the time is not auspicious for stock-taking and for a debate on lessons to be drawn. This can be done only after the consequences of aggression are eliminated. The official premise is that no retreat is possible from the demand for the unconditional withdrawal of the enemy's troops. The moment is equally not considered propitious for any further social changes. For example, sequestration of agricultural land has been annulled in some 300 cases and another 4,000 cases are to be subjected to re-examination. The private sector has been given a go-ahead for independent exports". - Rude Právo's Cairo correspondent, 20 July.

The United States Government forecast (on 9 August) that an extra 7,400,000 barrels of oil would be shipped to Europe this month to help make good the shortage in Arab oil. The August estimate compares with July's 6,100,000 barrels.

"India's food supplies from America and Canada are costing 17 per cent more in freight and insurance. In a year, closure of the Suez Canal will add £150 million to India's bill". - Daily Telegraph, 11 August.

"Now the pro-American lobby in Cairo is alleging that without the West - and the United States, to be exact - the U.A.R. will be unable to overcome the economic difficulties which cropped up because the Suez Canal was closed and because of the consequences of the Israeli war". - Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in English for Africa, 9 August.

"Why did the Soviet Union, after the June disaster, abandon its slow pace and rush forward? The Kremlin realised that it had a good opportunity in the Middle East, and in its greed, it did not hesitate to seize that opportunity. The Arab leaders who went to Moscow to ask for arms have undoubtedly noticed this change in the Soviet attitude. They must also have noticed that Soviet arms, which were formerly offered for sale on attractive and easy terms, are now offered as though they were made of precious platinum". - Jiddah Radio, 9 August.

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J.I.P.G.D.

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1076
(~~1687~~)

17 August 1967

File Copy

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
EMBASSY
(A.S.M. MARSHALL)

Encl: Maghreb Arabe Presse News Agency Telegram of 16 August 1967: "Les 'Frères Musulmans du Monde' s'élèvent contre les allégations d'un Article de l'Agence Soviétique de Presse Novosti."

BRITISH EMBASSY
PRESS SECTION AND READING ROOM
AYT ALLAL BIN ABDELLAH
RABAT, MOROCCO. 329-90

J. S. Champion Esq.,
Information Research Department
Foreign Office

LES "FRERES MUSULMANS DU MONDE" S'ELEVENT CONTRE LES
ALLEGATIONS D'UN ARTICLE DE L'AGENCE SOVIETIQUE DE PRESSE
"NOVOSTI".

BEYROUTH, 6 AOUT-(MAP)- UNE DECLARATION PUBLIEE PAR L'"ASSOCIATION MONDIALE DES FRERES MUSULMANS" ELEVE CONTRE LES ALLEGATIONS ET LES ACCUSATIONS DIFFAMATOIRES PARUES DANS LE BULLETIN DE L'AGENCE SOVIETIQUE DE PRESSE NOVOSTI AU SUJET DE LA DEUXIEME GUERRE ENTRE LES ETATS ARABES ET ISRAEL.

LA DECLARATION SOULIGNE QUE CES ACCUSATIONS PORTENT D'UNE MANIERE INCONTESTABLE QUE LES AUTEURS SOVIETIQUES N'ONT AUCUNE VALEUR A COTE DE CELLES DES OCCIDENTAUX ET A TITRE D'EXEMPLE, LES AVIONS FRANCAIS QUE POSSEDE L'AGRESSEUR SIONISTE.

L'ASSOCIATION MONDIALE DES FRERES MUSULMANS EXPRIME PAR AILLEURS UN PROFOND REGRET QUANT A L'ACCUSATION QUI DES COMMUNISTES ATHEES QUI PRETENDENT QUE PARMI LES CADRES DE LA RESISTANCE DES ARABES ET QUE LA PLUS GRANDE PARTIE DE LEURS SOLDATS SONT DES PAYSANS ILLETRES QUI VIVENT TOUJOURS DE LEGENDES ISLAMIQUES REACTIONNAIRES.

EN CONCLUSION, LA DECLARATION SOULIGNE QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT SOVIETIQUE A ETE L'UN DES PROMOTEURS DE LA CREATION D'ISRAEL ET QU'IL CONTINUE A CONSIDERER QUE LA RECONNAISSANCE D'ISRAEL EST L'UNE DES BASES DE LA PAIX AU MOYEN ORIENT.(MAP)-

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TE

PRODROME RABAT
FOR5/19 FOLDN GRS 30A 191626Z

1076.

ROUTINE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT
TELNO. 430 18 AUGUST 1967

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ADEN TELNO. 552
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE REPAETED FOR
INFORMATION TO BEIRUT (FOR RIO), RABAT, UNIS.
TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, EL AVIV, AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT,
BAHRAIN, KHARTOUM, TEHRAN, KABUL, RAWALPINDI, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW
AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND ALGIERS.
ASIDE. Not rec'd.
FO TELEGRAM NO 706 NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY,
QUOTE AL MUSTAQUIM UNQUOTE, ADEN ARABIC WEEKLY NESEEEE NEWSPAPER,
TO-DAY PUBLISHED THE ARTICLE IN FULL UNDER THE HEADLINE QUOTE
SOVIET NEWS AGENCY ATTACKS GAMAL ABDEL NASSER UNQUOTE.
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TO RABAT AS MY TEL M50,

SOSFA

AZS 21.VIII

SENT AT 1630/19 ND

J.O.

See flag "A"
1076 Vol VII

MAP are keeping the Novosti pot stirred without any need for encouragement from us. X 21/8

PRODROME RABAT

AZS 29-VIII
Rec'd.

I.O. 4/9

D. A. R.

With the compliments of

THE BRITISH EMBASSY
A.B. Urwick

THE NEW YORK TIMES FRIDAY AUG.18/67

Copies to: Eastern Dept. Arabian Dept. and N.E.A.D., F.O.
Chanceries, Amman, Beirut, Benghazi, Jedda, Khartoum, Tel Aviv, Tripoli & Tunis.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
18 August 1967

The Chancery,
Rabat.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY
24 AUG 1967

THE NEW YORK TIMES
FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1967.

1076

TRAINING OF ARABS IN U.S. TO DOUBLE

House Informed of Plans for Servicemen Studying Here

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — The Administration has disclosed plans to nearly double the number of Arab servicemen receiving military training in the United States within the coming year.

This was the first indication since the Arab-Israeli war in June, when all American military shipments to the Middle East were suspended, that the United States would expand any portions of its military aid programs to countries in that region.

Several Congressmen indicated privately that they would oppose the move.

The Defense Department, in a letter made public today, has informed the House Armed Services Committee that there were 326 Arab servicemen receiving training now in this country and that the number would be increased to 633 during the fiscal year ending next June 30.

The Pentagon also explained that, despite Congressional criticism, the United States continues to train 20 servicemen from Iraq and Sudan, both of which broke diplomatic relations with Washington in June, because the Administration belives these countries "are genuinely trying to retain or restore diplomatic and other connections with the United States."

In its most optimistic statement about resuming ties with specific Arab states, the Defense Department letter said the Administration hoped the present "official interruption" of American relations with Sudan and Iraq would "not be of long duration."

The Administration's position was outlined in a letter from the Pentagon to L. Mendel Rivers, the South Carolina Democrat who heads the House Armed Services Committee, in response to inquiries initiated by Representative Lester L. Wolff, Democrat of Long Island.

Amendment Planned

Mr. Wolff, who made the correspondence public, said he planned to offer an amendment to the foreign aid bill to halt most American military aid to Arab states, especially those that fought Israel during the six-day war in June, broke relations with the United States in that period or condoned mass demonstrations against the United States.

"I'm going to put in an amendment to prevent any aid, especially military aid to any country which takes actions which are unfavorable to the United States," he said in an interview.

At present, he said this would include Syria, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen and Sudan, all of which broke relations with the United States, plus Jordan, which signed a military alliance with the United Arab republic against Israel.

The Administration previously said that all military aid to the Middle East was "under review". But, mindful of Soviet efforts to win new clients for Russians arms, especially in Jordan, Government spokesmen have indicated that some shipments would be resumed eventually to offset Moscow's diplomatic offensive.

The letter to Representative Rivers from Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, presented the Administration's rational for military aid to pro-Western Arab countries.

While the United States has a policy of "friendship, aid and protection" toward Israel, Mr. Hoopes asserted, "we have national interests of the highest importance in the Arab world."

He contended that it was a basic American goal "to encourage and strengthen the moderate Arab states, in order to weaken the radical [Arab] potential and to avoid a polarization of power relationships in which the United States would have no friends in the Middle East except Israel, while the Soviet Union would gain uncontested influence and possibly control throughout the vast and populous Arab world."

In Libya and Saudi Arabia, he added, American oil companies "have substantial investments which would be seriously jeopardized by any abrupt step taken against the Arab countries as a whole."

The Pentagon letter maintained that one means of keeping friendly ties with Arab countries and promoting Arab moderation was in "training selected military officers who may be tomorrow's political and economic leaders."

In an attached table, dated Aug. 9, the Defense Department disclosed training plans for the fiscal year 1968, ending next June 30, that would bring to this country 296 servicemen from Libya, 121 from Saudi Arabia, 102 from Morocco, 60 from Jordan, 30 from Lebanon and 24 from Tunisia, as well as 61 from Israel.

Diplomatic Ties

All of these countries have continued diplomatic relations with the United States despite Arab militants. Lebanon recalled its Ambassador from the United States during the Arab-Israeli war.

At present the Pentagon gave the breakdown of Arab students as follows: Morocco 150, Saudi Arabia, 69, Libya 40, Jordan 35, the Sudan 12, Iraq 8, Tunisia 7, Lebanon 5, plus 36 from Israel.

The Pentagon letter said the Iraqi and Sudanese students would complete their courses by next April and noted that, because of the break in diplomatic relations by their Governments, there were no plans for new Iraqi and Sudanese students.

Representative Wolff, noting that roughly 40 of the Arab students were pilots, warned against the danger of supplying "valuable security information" to Arab pilots from countries "allied with the Soviet Union" or "militantly opposed to the United States and/or our allies."

RESTRICTED

AZS 29.VIII

Cypher/Cat A
PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 832 18 August, 1967
RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 832 of 18 August
Repeated for information Saving to:- Washington, Moscow, Paris and certain Arab Posts.

Tito Visit.

Following is our translation of text of substantive joint statement issued here last night.

(a) The two Presidents exchanged points of view on the crisis in Middle East and internal situation. Discussions also took on questions appertaining to the development of relations and cooperation between the two countries in all fields. The two sides paid particular attention to the efforts being made to remove the traces of Israeli aggression against Arab States and both sides affirm that situation arising from aggression is a matter which cannot (repeat cannot) be permitted to continue and constitutes a serious violation of the rights, interests and integrity of Arab States and a direct threat to peace in Middle East and in the World. They also affirmed that it is not (repeat not) possible to arrive at a solution of this crisis except by respecting the rights and just interests of Arab peoples. The two sides especially affirm that interests of the peace and freedom loving States cannot (repeat cannot) permit the creation of a dangerous precedent which permits an aggressor to enjoy the fruits of his aggression and in this respect the two sides consider that United Nations should be required to face up to the grave challenge which will have a special effect on the future of the role played by the non-aligned and other progressive and peace loving States who are facing in this crisis a serious test.

The two sides affirm the necessity for help to the States to enable them to compensate for the losses resulting from the war and to consolidate their economic and defensive strength in order to be able to resist any further attempt at aggression.

The two sides discussed the positive measures which must be taken to this effect on the bilateral and multilateral levels.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 24 AUG 1967

The two sides consider that these discussions constitute a new major contribution towards the mutual understanding and sincere friendship which binds the two countries. The discussions will strengthen the joint efforts which the two sides are making to participate with nonaligned and peace loving States on behalf of the just cause of Arab States and the freedom and independence of their peoples and towards peace and progress in the World.

President Josip Broz Tito has invited President Gamél Abdel Nasser to visit Yugoslavia. President Gamel Abdel Nasser has accepted the invitation with thanks.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 25, Moscow 26, Paris 26 and certain Arab Posts.

Mr. Tesh Sent 1015Z 18 August, 1967

Recd 1359Z 18 August, 1967

[Repetition to Arab Posts referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

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FO 371/ 86 ARRIVING TO Rabat

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CONFIDENTIAL

A25 30.VIII

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 30 AUG 1967

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 839 18 August 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 839 of 18 August. Repeated for information to Belgrade, Saving to Washington, UKMIS New York, Moscow, Paris, and Unnumbered to Arab Posts.

Tito Visit.

UAR Press has insisted all along that Tito was coming here as a friend of Nasser, friend and supporter of the Arabs, and fellow leader in the non-aligned world; and that his objectives were to compare notes on recent contacts (e.g. the Eastern Bloc Meetings and the Khartoum Foreign Ministers Conference) and to discuss the situation and the threat to Mid-East and World peace. The two Presidents were to study the aggression, its consequences and its liquidation; and the Press emphasised from the start Belgrade pronouncements that Tito would not (repeat not)support any pressures for a solution not (repeat not) acceptable to the Arabs. The "Socialist States" were regularly referred to as allies of the non-aligned World and it was pointed out that Tito would be briefing himself for the next economic meeting of the Communist Bloc. There were continual contacts between the Indian Ambassador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. Ahram mentioned on 11 August Tito's previous contacts had included President Johnson, and Gomhouria that Johnson had sent Tito a message. Massaa noted in passing that the importance of the talks arose from the fact that they preceded the next political stage which should begin in the Security Council. The following day Ahram mentioned again a message to Tito from Washington but said that the last message he had received was an urgent one from the USSR leaders immediately after he left for Cairo. Ahram also stressed that Tito had brought no (repeat no) firm proposal, and repeated that Israel's retreat was the first condition of the examination of problem. The following day Gombouria repeated that Tito had made no (repeat no) proposals but said had transmitted the viewpoints of the U.S. and USSR. Massaa also reported Indian denial of any Indian proposal, and in its editorial accused imperialist propaganda of being responsible for these rumours.

3. Virtually nothing was said about Tito's visits to Damascus and Baghdad. On 17 August the Ahram correspondent with Tito on his journey quoted Yugoslav sources to the effect that following his talks Tito's views were that the Arab world was united on the liquidation of the aggression and that he himself, as friend of the Arabs,would pursue his consultations with the Arab States, the other non-aligned Capitals, the Socialist States, and "certain Western Capitals" to find a way out of the period of political stagnation following the U.N.Debate. He would pursue these contacts either personally or through the U.N. "He had brought no (repeat no) secrets with him".

Article in Gomhouria referred to Western lie that Tito's proposal had envisaged the withdrawal of Israel on condition of a guarantee of her existence by the Four Powers including Russia.

4. The Canadian Ambassador has reported that the Spanish Ambassador indicated to him that Tito had brought a Draft Resolution. I have already reported (1037/67 15 August to Speares) that the Yugoslav Minister/Counsellor here told the Indonesian Counsellor that Tito did bring a plan, the essence of which was Israel withdrawal, and international guarantee of frontiers, non-belligerency, and freedom of navigation at Tiran. The Yugoslavs here have remarked to the French that the main problem was to get the Arabs to agree on any common policy.

5. In spite of all these indications, the real outcome of the discussions may be locked up in the two long talks which Nasser and Tito had a deux. The published statements, which I have telegraphed separately, give little away as was to be expected; but the tone suggests that the emphasis is on a political solution and there is no (repeat no) direct mention of economic pressure.

Foreign Office please pass Belgrade 2, and Saving to Washington 27, UKMIS New York 19, Moscow 23, Paris 28 and Unnumbered to Arab Posts.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1100Z/18 August
Recd 1456Z/18 August

[Repetition to Arab Posts,
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.]

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1076

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 840 19 August 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 840 of 19 August. Repeated for information Saving to UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow, Paris, J.I.C. Cyprus, LIC Aden and to all Arab Posts.

Arab - Israel.

Heikal's article of 18 August takes up the theme (my telegram 799) that United States is trying to destroy Arab Nationalism. Results of Bagdad Conference are still awaited but regardless of them a Summit Conference was necessary, to mobolise all or at any rate a powerful part of Arab potentialities. Britain had encouraged the Arab League for its own purposes but Arab unity was now a spontaneous expression of Nationalism. Heikal had argued against Khrushchev that Nationalism was a stronger inspiration than Socialism. Heikal hints strongly that while the Nationalists are prepared to keep the heat off reactionary Arab forces, these will be under strong pressure from "the people". He instances the Sudan, which rallied to the cause in spite of the Government's traditional support, and faced a CIA plot for its pains. The "Revolutionary" Arab Powers had a major role in supporting the peoples will. The reactionary forces would be given their chance to co-operate but the only constructive action so far had been the U.A.R.'s offer to Saudi Arabia on Yemen. The Foreign Ministers at Kuwait had been evasive, the Arab delegations in New York divided, and at Khartoum the atmosphere was acrimonious and some Ministers had chosen to "preach". Meanwhile the United States was sparing no (repeat no) effort to prevent united action.

2. The long prelude to this argument was a return to the controversy over the nature of the revolution in Egypt (see my telegram No. 817). This controversy has been continued by Goumhouriya in the last week but the voice of the Left has itself been divided between the Extremist intellectuals in Goumhouriya and some in Akhbar who are taking what may be the official Russian line of moderation. Heikal re-asserts his stand on personal liberties and the "shortcomings of the ASU" and condemns paid mouthpieces, pedlars of Nationalism for profit, and those who seek to achieve for profit, and those who seek to achieve under crisis conditions ambitions which previously evaded them. Revolutionary ideas were derived from the bible of Nasser's speeches and based on hard facts.

/Foreign Office

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RE IN
31 AUG 1967

Foreign Office please pass Saving to UKMis New York 20, Washington 28, Moscow 24, Paris 29 and Unnumbered to J.I.C. Cyprus, LTC Aden and to all Arab posts.

Mr Tesh

Sent 0900Z/19 August 1967

Recd 0900Z/19 August 1967

[Repeated as requested except to Arab Posts]

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[illegible] 87 [illegible] Rabat

107

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat.A

PRIORITY TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 819 21 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 819 of 21 August, Repeated for information to Benghazi, Amman, Tel Aviv and Saving to Tunis, Cairo, Beirut, Rabat, Algiers, Jedda, Khartoum, Bahrain, Kuwait and UKMission New York.

Arab-Israel Crisis.

While I admit to having no information on whys and wherefores of Israel's resistance to an extension of 31 August deadline for return of West Bank refugees beyond BBC and British Press reports, I wonder if we could not further improve our image among our Arab friends at little price by a suitable public statement urging Israel to reconsider her position on this matter and allow refugees a longer interval to return over the Jordan. I am sure this would help Libyan Government in its efforts to restore normal relations with United Kingdom.

Foreign Office pass Benghazi No. 291, Amman No. 21, Tel Aviv No. 11, and Saving to Tunis No. 12, Cairo No. 3, Beirut No. 6, Rabat No. 9, Algiers No. 7, Jedda No. 5, Khartoum No. 3, Bahrain No. 5, Kuwait No. 7 and UKMission New York No.3.

Mr. Sarell

Sent 1250Z 21 August
Recd 1715Z 21 August

[Repeated as requested]

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88 Rabat 1076

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By Bag SAVING TELEGRAM

A.L. Southern 6.IX

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

C dja 6 IX.

Telno 7 Saving 22 August 1967

FO. FS(E) 6/9/67

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 7 Saving of 22 August

Repeated for information Saving to Washington, UKMis New York, Paris, Moscow, Belgrade, New Delhi and all Arab Posts.

Arab/Israel.

The Indian Ambassador, whom I have just seen on a different matter, gave me what developed into an urgent plea for some initiative by Britain to break the present Middle East deadlock and get secret negotiations moving.

2. Mr. Pant has been in recent and frequent touch with the Egyptians during the visit of President Tito (whom he talked to himself). His line has always been pro-Nasser, whom he sees as the only possible leader in Egypt at the moment. His main concern however was that things in the Middle East would drift into chaos, including economic breakdown and damage to all our interests and that the Arabs could not extricate themselves without outside help. He was of course particularly concerned about the Canal and the effect on India of its closure.

3. He said the present mood of President Nasser and of the Egyptians generally was one of complete frustration and helplessness. They felt deeply that they were suffocated by the conflicting interests of the two great powers. They had hoped for outside help from France but in vain. They were psychologically disposed to look to the British, whom they understood best of the powers.

4. Sufficient groundwork had been done during the General Assembly Debate, and since, for it to be perfectly clear that there were certain points on which the Arabs could agree. When pressed he specified freedom of navigation on Tiran, demilitarisation, the return of UNEF, and the opening of the Canal to "certain types of shipping". There was an adequate basis for discussion to start, in secret, though for open implementation it was essential that Israel should withdraw first to save the Arabs utter humiliation. The Syrians and Iraqis too would make concessions (I pressed him on Syria; he would only say that the Syrians had to take a certain line in public). It was only the countries immediately concerned who counted; it was unrealistic to wait for united Arab action, which would never work out in practice whatever it was in theory.

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY -6 SEP 1967

But on the other side, they had absolutely no knowledge of how far the Israelis were prepared to go. As for the Americans, the Egyptian impression was growing that the United States was deliberately withholding from contact in order to weaken the Arab world and possibly to wait for the overthrow of Nasser.

5. He stressed that the final solution must be an imposed one (imposed by the Security Council) which could then be accepted, with whatever apparent unwillingness, by all sides, and ended by repeating that we ourselves did have contacts and could and should take some initiative though we could clearly not in the end take a dominant role.

6. Mr. Pant said that he had been urging on his Government some initiative to stop the deterioration of affairs. This may refer to what I heard from elsewhere, that he had been trying to get Mrs. Gandhi to come to Cairo at the time of President Tito's visit. It may also be however that the Indian Government have been making similar suggestions to you.

7. Comments follow by telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 30, UKMis New York 22, Paris 31, Moscow 26 and unnumbered to Belgrade, New Delhi and all Arab posts.

Mr. Tesh Recd 25 August 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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Eastern Dept.

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1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 433 D M

[Date] 22 Aug. R M

Repeated to

A.L. Souther 23.VIII
d.o. 23/8/67
C. d'A Thw 23/8

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1839 OF

22 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW

YORK. UKMIS GENEVA. WASHINGTON. TRIPOLI.

BENGHAZI. KUWAIT. BAHRAIN. KHARTOUM. JEDDA. RABAT.

TUNIS. JERUSALEM. AMMAN. BRITISH INTERESTS

SECTIONS: CAIRO. ALGIERS.

YOUR TELEGRAM 959: RETURN OF REFUGEES.

PLEASE REPRESENT URGENTLY TO MR. EBAN THAT IT

WOULD BE UNREASONABLE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

TO INSIST ON THE 31 AUGUST DEADLINE ESPECIALLY

IN VIEW OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED

IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM 1012. IN SO

DOING. YOU MAY INFORM HIM OF H.M. AMBASSADOR~S

RECENT REPRESENTATIONS IN AMMAN (MY TELEGRAM

NO 1808 TO TEL AVIV AND AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 1025.)

12. Jr cannot

Not rec'd

DISTRIBUTION

Not rec'd

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2. IT CANNOT BE IN ISRAEL~S OWN INTERESTS TO OBLIGE THE NEW REFUGEES TO REMAIN AS A CENTRE OF DISAFFECTION ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE JORDAN. THE CONSEQUENT AGGRAVATION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM CAN ONLY MAKE EVEN MORE REMOTE ANY EVENTUAL ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. AN UNYIELDING ATTITUDE ON THIS PROBLEM IN WHICH THERE ARE SUCH STRONG HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS CAN ONLY DAMAGE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD, AND CERTAINLY OF U.K. PUBLIC OPINION.

3. PLEASE REPORT BY TELEGRAM WHEN YOU HAVE TAKEN ACTION AS WE INTEND NEWS DEPARTMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS, BALANCING THIS WITH A SIMILAR REFERENCE TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE PROPAGANDA ABOUT THIS QUESTION.

SOSFA.

1076

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH EMBASSY
RABAT

24 August 1967

Dear Mission,

We notice, as you may already have done, that your most interesting despatches Nos. 21 and 22 of 9 August have not been copied to Tel Aviv. You or Eastern Department (to whom we are sending a copy of this letter) may consider it worth while doing so unless this has already been done.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

U.K. Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/ICA A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO Rabat.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 437

[Date] 24 Aug.

D M

R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

J.E. Walker 24/8
Lord 24/8
O.S. Adm 25.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV.

ADDSU TO FO TEL 965 OF 23/9

R 1 UKMIS NYORK GENEVA NTEN TRIPOLI BENGHAZI

KUWAIT BAHRAIN KHARTOUM JEDDA RABAT TUNIS

JERUSALEM AMMAN AND 3 INTERESTS SECTIONS CAIRO

ALGIERS.

YR TEL 1336.

RETURN OF REFUGEES.

I HAD THIS MORNING, BEFORE RECEIPT OF YR TEL

UNDER REF SPOKEN TO LOURIE ON A PERSONAL BASIS

AND URGED A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE

MATTER. I DREW ON AMMAN TELS 1023 AND 1025. I

ALSO SAID THAT REPORTS FROM OTHER ARAB POSTS

INDICATED KEEN INTEREST IN THE ARAB WORLD.

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/Israel

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ISRAEL INTRANSIGENCE WOULD BE EXPLOITED TO THE

HILL BY ALL THE ARAB STATES AND WOULD, QUITE

JUSTIFIABLY, HAVE AN EFFECT ON WORLD PUBLIC

OPINION, NOT LEAST IN THE U K. HE SHOULD BEAR

IN MIND THAT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE THERE

WOULD BE DEBATES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHEN IT RECONVENED AND ISRAEL

COULD JUST NOT AFFORD TO BE IN THE DOCK OVER

REFUGEES AS WELL AS OVER THE MANY OTHER ASPECTS

OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

2. YR TEL ARRIVED IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS CONVERSATION

AND I READ TO LOURIE PARA 2. I ASKED TO BE

GIVEN AN INTERVIEW WITH MR EBAN AS SOON AS

POSSIBLE. LOURIE SAID THAT EBAN WOULD BE TAKING

A WEEKS HOLIDAY FROM FRIDAY: HE WAS EXHAUSTED

AND HIS LAST WEEKS HOLIDAY HAD BEEN A FIASCO

SINCE HE HAD BEEN CAUGHT UP IN NUMEROUS SPEAKING

ENGAGEMENTS AND RADIO INTERVIEWS. HE WOULD DO

THE BEST HE COULD BUT HE COULD NOT PROMISE

ANYTHING DEFINITE.

3. I HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH

Yrs Amosica

MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, WHO HAS ADVISED HIS GOVT

NOT TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS UNTIL NEARER THE

DATE OF AUGUST 31. WHEN IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE

TO POINT MORE EXACTLY AT THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE

PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO RETURN BUT

HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF THE

DEADLINE. HE HAD ALSO HAD INDICATIONS FROM HIGHLY

PLACED ISRAEL OFFICIALS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT

THE GOVT WOULD GIVE WAY IN THE END, BUT ONLY AT

THE ELEVENTH HOUR. GEN RABIN IN CONVERSATION HAD

LET SLIP A REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ARMY

EXPECTED TO BE HAVING TO COPE WITH RETURNING

REFUGEES "UNTIL OCTOBER".

4. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF CONSIDERATION COULD BE

GIVEN TO NOT (REPEAT NOT) GIVING IMMEDIATE

PUBLICITY TO OUR PRESENT DEMARCHES. AT THE PRESENT

JUNCTURE THIS MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR

THE ISRAEL GOVT WHO HAVE GENUINE INTERNAL

DISAGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM AND A HOSTILE PUBLIC

OPINION TO BEHAVE REASONABLY IN A WEEKS TIME

(IF THEY INTEND TO DO SO). I WOULD SUGGEST

/instead

INSTEAD THAT I BE AUTHORISED TO MAKE ANOTHER,
FINAL DEFINITIVE APPROACH ON 29 OR 30 AUGUST. IF
POSSIBLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE,
AND THAT AT THAT STAGE PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN.
IT WILL SURELY BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE ARAB
WORLD IF OUR APPROACHES ARE SEEN TO HAVE MET
WITH SOME SUCCESS, WHICH THEY ARE MORE LIKELY
TO DO AT A LATER STAGE. EVEN IF THEY DO NOT, WE
SHALL HAVE LOST NOTHING IN WAITING A FEW DAYS IN
ORDER TO TELL THE ARABS THAT WE HAVE TRIED OUR
BEST AND WE COULD THEN MENTION THAT WE STARTED
MAKING REPRESENTATIONS AS EARLY AS 23 AUGUST.

FO PASS TRIPOLI 5 KUWAIT 13 BAHRAIN 14
KHARTOUM 2 JEDDA 15 RABAT 2 TUNIS 5
JERUSALEM 122 BIS ALGIERS 4 AND AMMAN 269. SOSFA.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code ● Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cy/CATA'

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 438 D M

[Date] 24 AUG R M

Repeated to

[Priority] Routine

24/8

Cat A 24/8
DA
FSE 2578
25/8
AAS 25.VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM BEIRUT.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 947 OF 23/8

RPTD FOR INFMN TO KHARTOUM AMMAN BAHRAIN KUWAIT TRIPOLI RABAT AND TUNIS.

BAGHDAD MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS.

DISTRIBUTION

SECRETARY - GENERAL OF LEBANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. WHO HAS NOW RETURNED FROM THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE. TOLD ME TODAY THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN USEFUL. IT HAD NEVER BEEN INTENDED TO TAKE DECISIONS AT BAGHDAD OR EVEN TO AGREE ON UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATIONS. BUT ONLY TO DEFINE THE PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND HEADS OF STATE. AFTER 6 DAYS OF VERY FRANK DISCUSSION. THESE PROBLEMS NOW BEEN POSED WITH EXCEPTIONAL CLARITY.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

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21

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL EXPECTED THE MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN'S MINISTERS AND HEADS OF STATE TO TAKE PLACE AT KHARTOUM ON THE DATES ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED. THE LEBANESE GOVT HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED THEIR INVITATIONS AND. ALTHOUGH SYRIA STILL HAD RESERVATIONS HE DID NOT THINK THESE WOULD DETER OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR PREVENT SYRIAN ATTENDANCE. PROVIDED THE SUMMIT MEETING DID TAKE PLACE. HE EXPECTED IT TO RESULT IN AGREEMENT EVEN IF THIS DID NOT NECESSARILY COVER THE WHOLE FIELD. HE FORESAW LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN SAFEGUARDING LEBANESE INTERESTS BECAUSE THE ADVOCATES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST THE WEST HAD ALREADY LOST MUCH GROUND AT BAGHDAD AND WERE LIKELY TO LOSE MORE AT KHARTOUM.

3. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE POSTPONING DECISION ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE ~~QUESTO~~SUMMIT MEETING AND. WHEN PROMISING TO RECEIVE ME AGAIN ON HIS RETURN FROM KHARTOUM. SAID THAT BY THEN HE MIGHT HIMSELF POSSIBLE HAVE SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK ME.

4. IF THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE FAILS TO PRODUCE SUFFRLMENT. OR ATLEAST A STRONG CONSENSUS. ON

(settlement??)

X. ??

(continued)

CONTINUED HOSTILITY TOWARDS BRITIAN AND THE

UNITED STATES. I THINK THAT THERE IS INDEED A

CHANCE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVT WILL THEN TAKE

THE INITIATIVE IN SEEKING SOME FORM OF RAPPROCHEMENT.

F O PASS KHARTOUM 24. BAHRIAN 236. KUWAIT 58.

TRIPOLB 9. RABAT 8. AND TUNIS 4.

SOSFA.

SERVICE TELEX

PRODROME RABAT
OP RABATDF FDF
PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON

1076.

FOR 5 GRS 143 241321Z

ROUTINE TEL AVIV TO RABAT =

ELNO 003 24 H AUGUST, 1967.

ADDRESS TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 971 OF 24/8/67 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, TRIPOLI KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, BENGHAZI, KHARTOUM, JEDDA, RABAT, UNIS, JERUSALEM, BIS CAIRO, AND BIS ALGIERS.
MY TELNO 965. — 1076/67
RETURN OF REFUGEES.
REFUGEES ARE STILL RETURNING AT A RATE OF ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN HALF THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS APPROVED.
YESTERDAYS TOTAL WAS 1,750 OUT OF AN APPROVED QUOTA OF 3,000
ISRAEL PRESS TENDED INITIALLY TO PUT THIS DOWN TO JORDANIAN INEFFICIENCY BUT ARE NOW TAKING THE LINE THAT JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE DELIBERATELY HOLDING REFUGEES BACK IN ORDER TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO EXTEND 31 AUGUST DEADLINE.
2. ISRAEL MINISTER OF INFORMATION STATED YESTERDAY THAT THE DEADLINE WAS FINAL BUT THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL REQUESTS AFTER 31 AUGUST FROM FAMILIES ON THE WEST BANK FOR THE RETURN OF THAIR RELATIVES FROM JORDAN.

HADOW+++ SENT AT 1825Z MOE

A.L. Southorn 25.VIII
C d'Aftm 25/8
I.C.O. 25/8

PRODROME RABAT
PRODROME LONDON